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Anti-Prologue 
Refrains of Tragedy 
Tragedy: Since the first memorandum between Greece and its international 
creditors in 2010, both national and international discursive spheres have been saturated 
with narratives of “tragedy.” Like a constant refrain that is produced by an invisible 
gramophonic machine, “tragedy” is picked up by activists, elected members of Greece’s 
current government, elected representatives of Greece’s official opposition, Greece’s 
international creditors, refugees, members of both the far right and the far left, national 
and international press and performance art and theatre artists, so to enunciate very 
different collective experiences and initiate very different performances of power and 
resistance. This contingent relation between various enunciations of tragedy and different 
initiations of collective performances of power and resistance was particularly intensified 
after the Greek snap elections in January of 2015. This dissertation will trace this 
intensification of the non-causal contingency between different enunciations of tragedy 
and different initiations of power and resistance in four different spheres: in the spaces of 
negotiation between Greece and its international creditors, in street protests and 
demonstrations, in the refugee camps, and finally in theatre spaces. These four different 
spheres will also lay the pathway for the four chapters of this dissertation.  
Depending on what the performances of power and resistance that emerged from 
these four different spheres intended to achieve, in 2015-2016 Greece, these spheres 
became the stage for different conceptualizations and enunciations of tragedy. More 
particularly in 2015-2016 Greece, tragedy fluctuated between notions of poetic praxes 
that have the capacity to challenge the status quo and notions of supposedly unavoidable 
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events that cannot be challenged or changed by any praxis of ποίησις (poiisis). In my 
contention the latter is one of the most aporetic contemporary uses of tragedy: although 
tragedy is conceptually founded upon the poetic praxis of ωδή (ode)—and, as I will be 
arguing in detail in this dissertation’s fourth chapter, upon the dramatization of that 
praxis—tragedy today is often associated with happenings and events that are emptied—
at least on a level of performance and presentation—of human action (Taxidou 2004). 
This tension between notions of tragedy that, in Greece within the larger European 
context of 2015 and 2016, are associated with revolutionary poiisis on a level of actual 
reality and notions of tragedy that, within the same spatiotemporal contexts, are 
associated with events and happenings that are emptied of human poiisis lays the 
conceptual ground for elaborating on the four different spheres/ case studies of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, in 2015-2016 Greece, this tension between conflicting notions 
of tragedy is framed in terms of potential disruptions or continuations of conditions of 
indebtedness.  
Before I elaborate more on the notions of tragedy that are framed in terms of 
potential disruptions or continuations of conditions of indebtedness—disruptions and 
continuations that as I have already argued this dissertation traces in the spheres of 
negotiation between Greece and its international creditors, of street protests and 
demonstrations, of refugee camps and finally, of theatre spaces—I would like to offer a 
brief description that, in my contention, would situate us in Greece within the larger 
European context of 2015 and 2016. On January 25th 2015, the left-wing party of 
ΣΥΡΙΖΑ (SYRIZA)—a coalition that stands for Greece’s radical left—won the Greek 
snap legislative elections—a victory known as “first time left”—disrupting a 30-year 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3	  
Greek bipartisanship that was previously shared between the right-wing party of New 
Democracy and the center-left party of PA.SO.K. During these 30 years of Greek 
partisanship, Greece’s relation with the European Union was formulated and equilibrated 
as a relation of dependency that was founded upon Greece’s indebtedness to its European 
and international creditors—the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since 2010, the equilibration of 
Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors was maintained via creditor/ debtor 
informal memorandum agreements that were signed during “exceptional”—and by 
exceptional I mean informal—eurogroup meetings that were not, in any way, answerable 
to the Greek Parliament or to any elected Parliament.  
This exceptional and informal aspect will be thoroughly addressed in the first 
chapter of this dissertation. For now I would like to mention that before the victory of 
SYRIZA in January of 2015, the right-wing government of New Democracy and 
Greece’s international creditors were about to come to a third memorandum agreement. 
Promising an alternative strategy, the left-wing party of SYRIZA won the snap elections 
of 2015 because of its, at the time, nonnegotiable reassurance, that SYRIZA, if elected, 
would not sign a third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors.  
After this very brief description of Greece within the larger European context of 
2015 and 2016, I would like to elaborate on the first of the four spheres that I mentioned 
above: the sphere that emerges from the negotiations between Greece and its international 
creditors. In order to do so, I will focus on three different moments. One that includes the 
left-wing party of SYRIZA, one that includes Greece’s international creditors and finally, 
one that refers to Greece’s official opposition. Let’s start with the first one. Alexis 
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Tsipras—president of SYRIZA and current Greek prime minister—during his last 
interview before the snap elections of 2015, stated that in the upcoming elections “the 
Greek people will have to make a decision regarding a very clear dilemma: whether they 
want the tragedy that they have been experiencing during the last years to continue (…) 
or whether they want a way-out.” 1 Tsipras’s strategic choice to describe Greece’s 
condition of indebtedness as an endless “tragedy” and SYRIZA’s potential victory as a 
definite exodus from this ongoing tragedy, coded tragedy as an undisrupted continuity of 
Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors that, according to Tsipras’s statement, 
is intrinsically contradictory to change and interlinked to the forces of both Greek and 
European political right.  
As a result, in the context of Tsipras’s pre-electoral speech, any collectively 
desired disruption of Greece’s tragedy could only happen in terms of extrinsic 
intervention: that of the left-wing party of SYRIZA that, until that day, it existed outside 
Greece’s well-rooted bipartisanship system and thus outside any promised agreements 
that had already happened between Greece’s previous governments of New Democracy 
and PA.SO.K and its international creditors.  
After describing the first moment that referred to the left-wing party of SYRIZA, 
let’s continue with the one that refers to Greece’s international creditors. When SYRIZA 
won the elections in January of 2015, the former government of the right-wing party of 
New Democracy, had already “promised” to accept an upcoming “third economic 
adjustment program”, or in other words, a third memorandum. Although I am placing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLIEIvIMGgo (Author’s translation)  
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particular emphasis on how, in neoliberal frames of 21st century Europe, a left-wing party 
is always already spoken for and about in the first chapter of this dissertation, for now I 
will reiterate Wolfgang Schauble’s—Germany’s Federal Minister of Finance—response 
to SYRIZA’s refusal to sign a third memorandum between Greece and its international 
creditors, in March 2015. According to Schauble, SYRIZA’s resistance to the upcoming 
third memorandum agreement was a “tragedy staged by the Greek institutions in Athens, 
and thus it is hard for us to find a potential solution.”2 As opposed to Tsipras’s coding of 
tragedy as an undisrupted continuity of a painful condition of Greece’s indebtedness to its 
international creditors, Schauble’s signification of tragedy, “describes” the abrupt change, 
“staged” by the “the first time left” that threatens to change Greece’s equilibrated 
indebtedness. For the German politician of the Christian Democratic Union, Schauble 
“the staged tragedy in Athens” not only challenges Greece’s conditions of 
indebtedness—a condition that Greece’s international creditors did not want to alter—but 
is also staged by the, so called, infantile, uncooperative, reactionary and unpredictable 
newly left-wing government of SYRIZA that is too naïve to understand the risks of 
disrupting Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors.  
Greece’s official opposition seemed, at the time, to be on the same page with 
Wolfgang Schauble and Greece’s international creditors. While, from February to June 
2015, the left government of SYRIZA was strongly resisting signing a third 
memorandum during its first negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, the right-
wing party of New Democracy was strategically describing SYRIZA’s resisting efforts as 
“tragedy.” According to Adonis Georgiadis—current Vice-President of the right-wing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 http://www.tanea.gr/news/economy/article/5220276/soimple-to-thema-ths-elladas-den-einai-to-
xreos-alla-h-epistrofh-stis-agores/ 
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party of New Democracy—“The “first time left”, is turning into a national tragedy”3 
While the left-wing government of SYRIZA was trying to resist another memorandum 
and to disrupt Greece’s equilibrated condition of indebtedness, Greece’s official 
opposition was signifying left’s resistance as “national tragedy” Interestingly enough, 
since SYRIZA’s victory in January 2015, both Greece’s international creditors and 
Greece’s official opposition perpetuate narratives of tragedy in order to signify “first time 
left’s” resistance to the upcoming third memorandum.  
The negotiations between the newly elected left-wing government of SYRIZA 
and Greece’s international creditors were extremely intensified during the June 28 
Eurogroup meeting. During this meeting, the president of both the Eurogroup and the 
Board of Governors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Jeroen Dijsselbloem 
extorted Yianis Varoufakis, the at the time Greece’s Minister of Finance and current co-
founder of the DiEM254, forcing him to sign a third memorandum. Approximately two 
hours after Dijseelbloem’s “exortion”, Tsipras froze the negotiations and called for a 
Greek referendum scheduled for the 5th of July.  
On July 3rd, five days after the June 28 eurogroup and two days before the Greek 
referendum of 2015, more than 200000 people assembled in Syntagma Square—the 
central square of Athens which is right in front of the Greek Parliament— in order to 
publically and collectively say ‘ΌΧΙ” (NO) to the severe austerity measures “suggested” 
by Greece’s international creditors. Christos Thivaios, one of the invited artists who 
performed during the demonstration, shouted into the microphone “Because we owe 
more to our poets than we owe to our creditors.” During the street tragedy of the “NO” 
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demonstration, Greece’s indebtedness, was not coded in terms of credit, but in terms of 
poetic creativity. The street tragedy of the “NO” demonstration in July 2015, dramatized 
the collective and shared hope that Greece’s equilibrated condition of indebtedness to its 
international creditors can be disrupted.  
As opposed to the disruption of the notion of indebtedness that the “NO” 
demonstration dramatized, public discourse and art that was produced and was created 
for and about the refugee camps often linked notions of tragedy to “unavoidable” events 
fully inaccessible to human agency. During my visit to a number of refugee-camps and 
hot-spots in both Turkey and Greece, I accidentally ran into a photography exhibition 
titled “The Tragedy of the Century: Refugees”. The exhibition took place on Istiklal 
Caddesi—one of the most crowded streets inside the city of Istanbul—and included oral 
histories, quotes and pictures taken by refugees. All these dispossessed human lives that, 
as curators noted, were “forced to leave their homelands, because of the humanitarian 
crisis, disasters, wars and terrors in the Middle East” are kept in camps in Turkey and 
Greece, most of the time under the most inhuman circumstances, so that they never 
intermingle with the rest of society. The hosting countries expected from the refugees to 
pay their debt to their hosts, by remaining imperceptible outsiders. Therefore in order for 
this condition of indebtedness not to be disrupted, the only way the “unavoidable” 
tragedy of the refugees can reach the gaze of the rest of the society is through 
simulacrums: pictures that are simultaneously haunted and dispossessed by the bareness 
of the physical presence of those depicted in the pictures. 
Far from understanding tragedy as an agentless imposed condition three theatre 
productions of tragedy: the production of Woyzeck by Zero Point Theatre Group that 
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happened right before the Greek snap elections of 2015 and the production of Oresteia by 
Houvardas and of Antigone by Efthimiou that happened in post-referendum Greece 
emphasized tragedy’s poetic aspect. Although I will elaborate in detail on those 
productions in the second and fourth chapter of this dissertation, for now I would like to 
briefly focus on Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck. During the political 
turmoil before the Greek snap elections of January of 2015, and the “first time left” 
victory of SYRIZA, the Zero Point Theatre Group—a Greek theatre group that explores 
the political manifestations of experimental tragedy—staged a very radical production of 
Buchner’s Woyzeck. The Zero Point theatre group chose to stage Woyzeck during the 
Greek left’s struggles because, according to group’s founder and director Savas Stroubos, 
Buchner, in this “segmented tragedy”, conceptualizes “the tragedy of dehumanization 
(…) since for us the entire world is a series of concentration camps (…) and it is because 
of that aspect of tragedy that the play is timely relevant.” In this context, tragedy is coded 
as the visible dramatization of a series of invisible processes of dehumanization that 
organize human experience in contemporary versions of both perceptible and 
imperceptible concentration camps. In this context, the poetic force of tragedy sheds light 
on these invisible aspects of the political that within frames of 21st century Europe are 
mainly exerted via both abstract and concrete imposed conditions of indebtedness.  
I started this section by arguing that, especially since SYRIZA’s “first time left” 
victory in 2015, different narratives of “tragedy” repeat themselves like a constant refrain 
that is produced by a hidden and invisible gramophonic machine. This invisible 
gramophonic machine not only produces different codes and significations of tragedy but 
it also assembles all these contradictory codes and significations together. As we see in 
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the four contradictory moments of tragedy that I just described above, SYRIZA’s “first 
time left”, Greece’s official opposition, Greece’s international creditors, activists and 
street demonstrators, refugees, and theatre artists, choose narratives of “tragedy” in order 
to enunciate different collective experiences of Greece’s indebtedness to its international 
creditors and thus to initiate different performances of power and resistance. What is the 
common thread relating these contradictory moments and uses of tragedy? The common 
thread between them will be the path of this dissertation.  
Throughout this dissertation I will understand 2015-2016 Greece within frames of 
21st century neoliberal Europe as the Greek debtor/ nation-state that, especially since the 
election of the left-wing government of SYRIZA in February 2015, is called to prove its 
“westerness” via being indebted to the rich European North. The “European” not only 
implies the narratives that perpetuate schizoid inequalities and power differentials 
between the “lazy and poor European South” and the “productive and rich European 
North” but it also refers to the Grexit discussions of 2015.  
A very important conclusion that, I contend, emerges from a close observation of 
this constant and contradictory repetition and differentiation of the refrain of tragedy in 
2015-2016 Greece is that there is a non-causally contingent relation between different 
enunciations of tragedy and different initiations of performances of power and resistance. 
This non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and 
different performances of power and resistance in Greece, after the victory of the left-
wing party of SYRIZA in January 2015, will be the main focus of this dissertation. 
As I mentioned in the beginning of the Anti-Prologue, this dissertation will trace 
this relation between different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10	  
power and resistance in Greece after the snap elections of January 2015, in four different 
spheres: in Greece’s negotiations with its international creditors, in street protests and 
demonstrations, in refugee camps, and finally in theatre spaces.  
Before moving forward with this dissertation’s conceptual methodology, I would 
like to share one of the most catalytic experiences from which this dissertation emerged. 
While Greece’s relations with its international creditors have always been one of the 
main referential axes of my research interests, activism and creative practice, this 
dissertation’s focus on the relations between different enunciations of tragedy and 
different initiations of performances of power and resistance, initiated with my 
participation in the “NO” demonstration on 3rd of July of 2015. Although I am placing 
particular emphasis on the “NO” demonstration in the second chapter of this dissertation, 
for now I would like to briefly explain why this particular demonstration was one of the 
most decisive moments of my research and writing process.  
The “NO” demonstration took place five days after the newly elected left-wing 
government of SYRIZA refused to make the payment due to Greece’s international 
creditors and thus, froze the negotiations and called for a Greek referendum. The Greek 
referendum of 2015 asked from the Greek citizens to vote whether they approve (“YES”) 
or disapprove (“NO”) the proposal made to Greece by the European Commission, 
European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, during the Eurogroup 
meeting on the 25th of June 2015.  
In response to SYRIZA’s call for the Greek referendum of 2015, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), under the presidency of Jeroen Dijsselbloem—both the 
president of the Eurogroup and the president of the Board of Governors of the ESM—
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stopped providing Greek banks with money, causing5 their immediate closure. Three 
days before the Greek referendum of 2015, more than 20000 people gathered in the 
central square of Syntagma, and hundreds of thousands of people occupied public parks 
and squares all over Greece, in order to publically say “NO” to the austerity measures 
“suggested” by Greece’s international creditors. Although the public gatherings on the 3rd 
of July of 2015 happened upon SYRIZA’s call, the demonstrators were not just registered 
voters or supporters of SYRIZA. On July 3rd of 2015, the hundreds of thousands of 
people that were publically demonstrating both their support for SYRIZA’s negotiations 
with Greece’s international creditors and their resistance to the, at the time, upcoming 
third memorandum, included Greek citizens, non-citizens, undocumented immigrants, 
refugees, voters and registered members of a wide range of “anti-memorandum” 
parties—SYRIZA included—members of the Greek government, elected members of the 
parliament as well as supporters of both the far left and the far right.  
These hundreds of thousands of people said publically and collectively “NO” to 
the austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors, not through 
setting aside but through affirming and assembling their differences. Additionally, they 
publically and collectively demonstrated their resistance to the upcoming memorandum, 
not in spite of but because of the scaremongering performed by Greece’s international 
creditors—a scaremongering that, as we see in the moments that I describe above and as 
we will continue to see in the moments that I will be describing throughout this 
dissertation—was strategically communicated and coded in terms of tragedy. Especially 
during Greece’s negotiations, Greece’s international creditors used narratives of tragedy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Caused indirectly the immediate closure of the Greek banks. I will elaborate more on this in the first 
chapter of this dissertation.  
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in order to force the government of SYRIZA to accept another memorandum of 
indebtedness. On the 3rd of July of 2015, the assembled crowd of hundreds of thousands 
responded to Greece’s international creditors by signifying its own tragedy. Instead of 
signifying tragedy in terms of perpetuating conditions of indebtedness the street tragedy 
of the “NO” demonstration coded tragedy in terms of resistance, collective enunciation 
and poetic transformation.  
Although this dissertation’s focus on the relations between different enunciations 
of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance initiated with my direct 
participation in this street “unmaking” of the tragedies coded by Greece’s international 
creditors, the “NO” demonstration was one of the many situations that manifested this 
contingency. Since the “NO” demonstration on 3rd of July 2015, the interplay between 
different enunciations and performances of tragedy was particularly intensified in four 
different situations: when the left-wing government of SYRIZA, in spite of the deafening 
results of the Greek referendum against the new bailout agreement, ended up signing a 
third memorandum, on the Greek shores where dead bodies of refugees were washed up 
on a daily basis and finally in theatrical productions of tragedy, where artists intended to 
conceptualize theatrical stages as social spaces for collective imagination that could 
disrupt things as they are.  
Even though this dissertation focuses on the relations between various 
enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance within frames 
of Greece within the larger European context of 2015-2016, my current research and 
writing is also in constant dialogue with both European and global manifestations of 
these relations: from Trump’s election because of his fascist aesthetics, to the nationalist 
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and inhumanly xenophobic governments of Poland and Hungary, from the Brexiteers of 
June of 2016 to the shameful EU-Turkey Refugee Deal, from the European technocrats 
that make decisions without being answerable to any kind of parliamentary formation to a 
series of European referendums that either voice the highly nationalistic states of the rich 
European North or are ignored as part of the leftist, reactionary, naïve and lazy poor 
European South, from Golden Dawn’s fascist activities to SYRIZA’s failure to disrupt 
the current neoliberal status quo, from a neoliberal conceptualization of Europe on 
conditions of indebtedness and on creditor/ debtor power differentials to growing 
inequality and perpetual austerity. As I have already argued, within frames of 2015-2016 
European Greece tragedy, like a constant refrain produced by an invisible gramophonic 
machine, becomes the voice of the European technocrats, of both Greek and European 
neoliberal forces, of the refugees, of the dispossessed, of the extreme far-right, of the far-
left, of the political left, of performance art and theatre artists, of street protestors and 
demonstrators, of the indebted and so on.  
Why does our current condition display such a need for differentiated references 
to tragedy and for producing various refrains and multiple versions of this abstractly 
concrete theatricalized conceptualization of lived experience? Also, where and what kind 
of resistance emerges from this produced multiplicities of refrains of tragedy? After 
SYRIZA signed the third memorandum of indebtedness between Greece and its 
international creditors in August 2015, a lot of supporters both from the left and the far-
left, me included, were immensely disappointed. Was Deleuze predictive when, via post-
May ’68 lenses, he argued that, “there can be no left-wing government” (2002, 191) 
implying that once left becomes the governing norm it fully looses its revolutionary 
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force? Were Deleuze and Guattari far-sighted when, back in the late 70s, drew upon 
Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy, and, in their Anti-Oedipus, they argued that tragedy 
entails both the revolutionary and fascist forces of deconstruction? Additionally, were 
Deleuze and Guattari right, when even before the burst of the neoliberal bubble in the 
80s, they drew upon Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy in order to argue that today’s 
resistance needs to understand that power performs in terms of creditor/ debtor power 
differentials that are designed to never cancel debt? These are some of the main questions 
that this dissertation takes up.  
These references to Deleuze and Guattari are not accidental. Throughout this 
dissertation I will argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, in the larger context of their other writings, lays the ground for a 
radicalized conceptualization of tragedy that could grasp how both power and resistance 
perform under conditions of sustainable indebtedness in frames of 21st century neoliberal 
Europe. 
TragedyMachine(s): Refrains and Machines  
 In the previous section, titled “Refrains of Tragedy”, I looked at four different 
moments in Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 during which 
the refrain of tragedy was repeatedly enunciated in order to initiate different 
performances of power and resistance. I argued that, in Greece after the victory of the 
left-wing party of SYRIZA in 2015, there is a non-causally contingent relation between 
different enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance. I 
particularly described the different enunciations of tragedy as refrains, produced by an 
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invisible gramophonic machine that assembles together the different performances that 
are initiated by the repetition of the refrain of tragedy.  
 I contend that, from both an ontological and epistemological point of view, this 
dynamic interplay between the repetition of the same phonetic sound—a sound that in 
our case is tied to the word of tragedy—and the production of difference, in terms of 
performances, is very well grasped by Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain. But, as I 
will argue in this section, that affective aspect of the phonetic dimension of the repetition 
of the refrain does not come until Deleuze and Guattari’s second conjoint work, 
published in 1980 and titled A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. While 
in A Thousand Plateaus (ATP), Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain transformed 
into something less discursive and more affective, in their first conjoint work titled Anti-
Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (AO) their conceptualization of refrain was 
expressed in terms of the discursive repetition of the story of Oedipus’s tragedy, and of 
the difference that this repetition produces.   
It is my contention that a close elaboration of this metamorphosis—a 
metamorphosis that as I argued above, starts, in Anti-Oedipus with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain as a differentiated discursive repetition of the story 
of Oedipus’s tragedy, and continues, in A Thousand Plateaus, with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain as differentiated phonetic repetitions of sounds 
that produce affect and thus, initiate different kinds of performances—would lay the 
ground for a radicalized conceptualization of tragedy that would be valid in frames of 21st 
century Greece and neoliberal Europe.  
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In AO, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of refrain in order to frame 
their opposition to both Freud and Lacan’s discursive clinicalization of Oedipal tragedy. 
They specifically argue that both Freud and Lacan, through clinicalizing Oedipal tragedy, 
turned the latter into “an old refrain” (83). Although one would assume that Deleuze and 
Guattari accuse both Freud and Lacan of being imprisoned into the same epistemological 
paradigm, that’s not really the case. The authors of Anti-Oedipus argue that it is because 
of the repetition of this “old refrain” that they “were unable to posit any difference in 
nature, any border line, any limit at all between (…) Oedipus-as-crisis and Oedipus-as-
structure” (83). While both Freud and Lacan use Oedipal tragedy as an “old refrain” in 
order to perpetuate a very clear binary between structure and crisis, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that it is this “old refrain” of Oedipal tragedy—a refrain the combines notions of 
dramatic poetry with notions of discourse, assumed knowledge and so forth— that shows 
that structure and crisis are always immanent to each other. From this point of view, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (Anti) Oedipal tragedy enunciates both the structural aspect of 
crisis and the critical aspect of structure.  
This contingency between “Oedipus-as-structure” and “Oedipus-as-crisis” 
disrupts any discursive narratives that causally link the death of tragedy to the death of 
rituals dedicated to the worship of the twelve Gods of Olympus. In their Anti-Oedipus, 
Deleuze and Guattari use the work of Lacan in order to challenge these causally oriented 
understandings—understandings that in my contention emerge from Steiner’s work on 
tragedy—that link the death of tragedy to the death of the twelve Gods of Olympus. 
While Lacan argues that, “tragedy has no way of holding its own indefinitely in the forms 
of society where the tragic sense is increasingly lost … a myth cannot sustain itself when 
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it supports no ritual, and psychoanalysis is not the Oedipus ritual” (83). Deleuze and 
Guattari contend that it is Lacan’s question, and not tragedy, that “merely retreats” (83). 
Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, I contend that today we should no longer be asking 
whether tragedy is lost or not but whether tragedy, as a concept of lived experience, is 
immanent to its own destruction. And most importantly what are the political stakes of 
that immanent destruction.  
Although it may seem that we are off of topic, or maybe too immersed in theory, I 
would like to elaborate a bit more on Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualizations of 
“refrain” as expressed in their first collaborative work titled Anti-Oedipus, since I 
contend that this particular discussion of refrain is an outstanding forewarning in regards 
to Greece’s current condition. The authors of Anti-Oedipus also argue that tragedy’s 
immanently deconstructive dimension is its “real machinic element.” Although I will be 
focusing in detail on Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of machines throughout this 
dissertation, for now I would like to briefly define Deleuze and Guattari’s reference to 
tragedy’s “machinic element” as a synthesis of very contradictory and heterogeneous 
elements that produce the continuation and disruption of various flows. In AO Deleuze 
and Guattari write “In a word, every machine functions as a break in the flow in relation 
to the machine to which is connected, but at the same time is a flow itself, or a production 
of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 39). It 
is because of that “real machinic element” of the repetition of the refrain of tragedy, that 
tragedy performs as a synthesizer that combines its own deconstruction with its own 
construction.  
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One could argue that, while I described Deleuze and Guattari’s first 
conceptualization of the refrain in terms of the discursive repetition of the tragedy of 
Oedipus, the story of Oedipus was left behind. Although it might seem that this is the 
case, it is my contention that it is not the story of Oedipus that is left behind. As opposed 
to a forgotten story, the tragedy of Oedipus, through its metamorphosis into a repetitive 
refrain, or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, through its metamorphosis to a “eternal 
lullaby” (354) becomes something that is open to any kind of coding and signification. 
The repetitive invocation of “the eternal refrain of Oedipus, the eternal lullaby,” (354) 
does not say the same story again and again: on the contrary it makes the story open to 
any kind of meaning-making processes, coding and significations.  
It is the eternal and infinite repetition of the refrain of tragedy that forces tragedy 
to infinitely and eternally resist its own crystallization. From this point of view, discourse 
is mixed with language, dramatic poetry, knowledge, memory and/ or assumption of 
knowledge, abstract meaning and vaguely common references, in ways that this mix 
exceeds all of the above. But that exceeding is not an externally synthetic whole that rules 
over its parts. On the contrary that exceeding is discourse and non-discourse, knowledge 
and non-knowledge, memory and non-memory, all at once.  
The repetition of a refrain makes it abstract and always pluralized. In ATP 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain understands the latter as something that 
produces various flows of affect. As in Demystifying Deleuze Rob Shields and Mickey 
Valle remind us, refrain in ATP becomes a concept for the “rhythmic” and “periodic” 
(Shields and Vallee 2012: 150) repetition of sounds, videos, images, objects etc that it 
vaguely refers to what is assumed to be commonly experienced, imagined or remembered 
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and that it simultaneously introduces new experiences, imagination and memories. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s language affect is “anything that ‘comes into being when 
something is affected or affects something else’ and that affect is ‘the determination of all 
potentiality’” (16). Furthermore Deleuze and Guattari often describe this process of 
“coming into being” as a process of territorialization, which is always already a process 
of deterritorialization. Refrains are parts of both of these processes. Deleuze and Guattari 
write “It is as though forces of deterritorialization affected the territory itself, causing us 
to pass from the territorial assemblage to other types of assemblages […] The grass stem 
and the refrain are two agents of these forces, two agents of deterritorialization” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987: 325). Therefore refrains are rhythmically repeated sounds, images, 
objects, sentences, catchphrases and so forth that not only establish new territories of 
knowledge, memory and experience but also that move beyond any kind of meaning-
making processes like for instance language and signification, that claim to be specific. 
 Before making a direct connection between Deleuze and Guattari’s ontological 
and epistemological understandings of refrain and Greece’s current condition, I would 
like to elaborate momentarily on the historical context out of which the concept of refrain 
emerged. Deleuze and Guattari came up with the concept of refrain when in state-happy, 
post May’ 68 France and post-1977 Italy the political lefts switched from “oppositional 
parties” to “governing parties” and as a result lost their revolutionary force (Guattari 
2007: 13). It was in this context that the authors of Anti-Oedipus turned to the works of 
Nietzsche on tragedy in order to reveal the masks of seemingly resolvable exchanges and 
to conceptualize resistance under condition of dialectically unresolvable power disparities 
between a creditor and a debtor.  
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In Deleuze’s opinion, Nietzsche was the one who turned to tragedy in order to 
“lay bare the condition of judgment” (Deleuze, 1997: 126) and to understand “the 
adventure of debt as it becomes infinite and thus un-payable”  (126). In his Essays 
Critical and Clinical—a book that includes essays and articles that Deleuze wrote mostly 
during his collaboration with Guattari between 1970 and 1993—Deleuze writes, 
“Nietzsche’s greatness lies in having shown, without hesitation, that the creditor-debtor 
relation was primary in relation to all exchange. One begins by promising, and becomes 
indebted not to a god but to a partner, depending on the forces that pass between the 
parties” (127). In 2015-2016 “European” Greece, both Greece’s international creditors 
and the government of SYRIZA use refrains of tragedy in order to introduce this promise 
of dialectically resolvable exchange in the name of Greece’s evaluation so that Greece 
keeps paying but never fully repaying its debt.  
One of the conclusions that can be drawn from these repetitive and different 
enunciations of tragedy has to do with the abstract openness and non-specificity of the 
word “tragedy”. In 2015-2016 Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 
2016, tragedy, just like a refrain, has been repeatedly picked up by so many and so 
different institutional and non-institutional bodies, national and international public 
spheres, governmental and non governmental organizations, committees, resisting 
minorities, political parties etc, neither because the word “tragedy” means something 
very specific, nor because tragedy is causally tied to concrete initiations of performances. 
On the contrary so many and so different bearers of signification choose “tragedy” 
because tragedy, in this context, has become abstractly open to multiple coding 
processes, meanings, interpretations, significations and performances. As opposed to 
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establishing specific references to concrete meanings, this abstract openness of different 
enunciations of tragedy in 2015-2016 European Greece—a nation-state of a very specific 
geopolitical location that is member of both the European Union and the Eurogroup—
underlines the non-causal relation of contingency between Greece’s current condition and 
the need for theatrically-oriented words that grasp and constitute the current status quo in 
terms of masked multiplicities. In 2015-2016 European Greece, especially after the 
victory of the left-wing party of SYRIZA, tragedy becomes a “go to” word not in spite of 
but because of the referential theatricality that the latter entails.  
Why does tragedy Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 
tragedy becomes one of the most repetitive refrains of 21st century European economy of 
debt? Why is Greece contingently in need of enunciations that blend theatrical concepts 
of tragedy with theatrical masks of different meaning-making processes, coding and 
significations? For two reasons: one, because this kind of theatre bases its force in 
processes of deconstructing any pre-established significations and replacing them with 
different ones and two, because these kinds of theatrical masks obscure non-dialectical 
contradictions as dialectical oppositions. Before I further elaborate on those two reasons 
and on their relevancy to 2015-2016 Greece, I would like to argue that these two reasons 
are interlinked to Deleuze’s and to Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s 
conceptualization of tragedy. Although the next section is particularly focused on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of Nietzsche’s conceptualizations of tragedy, and 
on the relations between those conceptualizations of tragedy and grasps of history and 
lived experience, for now I would like to mention that according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
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Nietzsche is the first one who, via understanding history and lived experience as tragedy, 
gets life’s deconstructive and non-dialectical force.  
I content that there is a very important connection between the two reasons for 
which, in the beginning of the previous paragraph I argued that 2015-2016 Greece within 
frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe is in need of refrains of tragedy. Based on my 
argument in the beginning of the preceding paragraph, the first reason, according to 
which 2015-2016 Greece intensifies a relation between its condition of indebtedness and 
different enunciations of tragedy, has to do with tragedy’s conceptual capacity to 
deconstruct any pre-established significations and replace them with different ones: 
especially when these pre-established significations are linked to conditions of 
indebtedness. 
Throughout this dissertation I will argue that this non-causally contingent relation 
between different enunciations of tragedy and different conceptualizations of forces of 
deconstruction and construction, manifests itself as different performances of power and 
resistance. According to Deleuze and Guattari—as I will in detail explain in the next 
section—Nietzsche is the first one who gets tragedy’s conceptual capacity to deconstruct, 
and thus resist, any pre-established significations, while at the same time it establishes 
new ones. Deleuze and Guattari specifically argue that Nietzsche suggests that it is 
through deconstruction that our “new socius” proceeds (192). I contend that it is because 
of this grasping of history as deconstruction—a grasping that emerges from Nietzsche’s 
work on tragedy and the conceptual interplay between tragedy and history—that the 
authors of Anti-Oedipus “shake loose the yoke of Oedipus and carry it to the point of its 
auto-critique” (268). Writing from a post May 68 point of view, when all the European 
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state-happy masks fell and yet Europe chose to keep looking the other way, Deleuze and 
Guattari draw upon Nietzsche’s understanding of tragedy as a non-dialectical 
contradictorily coexistence of forces of deconstruction and construction, in order to shed 
light on deconstructive resistance’s authoritative capacities. They specifically argue that, 
resistance in our times “is like the story of the Resistance fighters who, wanting to 
destroy a pylon blew up and fell back into its hole” (268). We are no longer—if we ever 
were, which I don’t think is the case—dealing with an either/ or question that creates a 
dialectical binary and oppositional tension between power and resistance. As one can see 
in Greece within frames of 21st century Europe, both power and resistance found 
themselves upon conceptual forces of deconstruction. This dissertation looks at how the 
repetition of the refrain of tragedy functions like a machine that somehow synthesizes all 
those heterogeneous forces together, so to grasp performances of resistance that do not 
“fall back”, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari, into the pylon’s hole.  
Because it might seem that we are again too immersed in theoretical discussions 
that take us off of this section’s intention to conceptualize TragedyMachine(s), before 
moving on to the second reason that explains why 2015-2016 Greece intensifies a 
relation between its condition of indebtedness and different enunciations of tragedy, I 
would like to summarize what I have been describing since the beginning of this section. 
I looked at Greece within the larger European context of 2015 and 2016 and I argued that 
there is a non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of tragedy and 
different performances of power and resistance. I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of “refrain” could grasp this non-causally contingent relation between abstract 
enunciations and specific initiations of performances. I also contented that, although 
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Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on the concept of “refrain” both in Anti-Oedipus and in A 
Thousand Plateaus, in Anti-Oedipus they conceptualize refrain in terms of discursive 
repetitions of Oedipal tragedy. I specifically focused on how these repetitions of the 
“refrain of Oedipus,” produce difference, through deconstructing any pre-established 
significations and through simultaneously constructing new ones. I also placed particular 
emphasis on how Deleuze and Guattari understand this contradictory synthesis of 
heterogeneous processes of deconstruction and construction as the “real machinic 
element” of the repetitive refrain of the tragedy of Oedipus. After understanding 2015-
2016 Greece’s condition as a parallel trajectory to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conceptualization of refrain, I focused on the non-causal contingency between different 
enunciations of tragedy and different performances of power and resistance. I argued that 
in 2015-2016 Greece, there are two reasons that intensify this contingency: the first one 
has to do with tragedy’s conceptual force of deconstruction, that in my contention, 
emerges from Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s understandings of tragedy.  
The second reason that in my opinion explains the non-causally contingent 
relation between Greece’s cotemporary condition and the multiple enunciations of 
tragedy and the different initiations of power and resistance has to do with masking non-
dialectical relations as dialectical ones. But this dialectical masking of non-dialectical 
contradictions is not independent from the contradictory synthesis of forces of 
deconstruction and construction that I described above. On the contrary, if Deleuze and 
Guattari’s works on Nietzsche’s understandings of tragedy, shed light on tragedy’s 
conceptual force to trace deconstruction as both power and resistance on a level of lived 
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experience, then Deleuze and Guattari simultaneously shed light on the non-dialectical, 
but yet very contradictory, tension between power and resistance.  
But before we move to more specific elaborations on the potential manifestations 
and stakes of these non-dialectical tensions that mask themselves as such in order to mask 
their capacity to perform as non-oppositional multiplicities, I would like to switch my 
focus from Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain in Anti-Oedipus, to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of refrain in A Thousand Plateaus. It is my 
contention that this change of focus will lay the ground for a clearer understanding of the 
interplay between different enunciations of the refrain of tragedy and non-dialectical 
tensions between forces of power and resistance.  
In the very beginning of this section I argued that while in Anti-Oedipus the 
concept of refrain emerges from discursive repetitions of the tragedy of Oedipus, in A 
Thousand Plateaus the concept of refrain becomes a phonetic repetition that is less 
discursive and more affective. It becomes the song of a child who is “gripped with fear, 
in the dark” and “comforts himself by singing under his breath (…) the song is like a 
rough sketch of a calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 311). But that production of phonetic repetition does not 
emerge from a dialectical opposition against a concretely known and visible antagonistic 
force. On the contrary, just like in the case of the repetitive refrain of Oedipal tragedy 
that, in the case of Anti-Oedipus, it remains open to any kind of significations, the child 
“in the dark” produces rhythmic, melodic and repetitive phonetic sounds in order to resist 
multiple forces that could be potentially threatening.  
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I contend that it is because of this openness of the repetitive refrain that we are not 
dealing with dialectical oppositions that pre-schematize power and resistance in terms of 
graspable thesis-antithesis. On the contrary we are dealing with multiplicities of forces 
that move beyond dialectics. According to Deleuze and Guattari “the combat, if combat 
there is, has moved” (345). Additionally, according to the French philosophers, 
Nietzsche, in The Birth of Tragedy “became aware of this situation long ago, even before 
it had been installed” (345). But there is one huge problem. Yes, the combat has moved 
and yes, schematizing resistance in terms of oppositional dialectics can no longer be 
efficacious. But these multiplicities of forces use masks of dialectics in order to produce 
an antithetical resistance that is doomed to never be efficacious. It will be my contention 
throughout this dissertation that, especially in the case of 2015-2016 Greece within 
frames of 21st European neoliberalism, these multiplicities of forces that move beyond 
dialectics, ironically enough used the refrain of tragedy in order to be framed as 
dialectical, either because they failed to conceptualize non-oppositional 
conceptualizations of resistance or because they simply wanted to conceal their intensity. 
Deleuze, in his Negotiations, asks “in what situations we feel like humming a tune” 
(Deleuze, 1990: 25-26). And I ask again: Why in 2015-2016 Greece within larger frames 
of European economy of debt, different bearers of signification picked up the refrain of 
tragedy in order to enunciate different experiences and thus to initiate different 
performances of power and resistance?  
Based on what I answered earlier in this section, this contingency occurs because 
of two reasons: one, because of tragedy’s conceptual force of deconstruction, and two, 
because of tragedy’s conceptual force of non-dialectical tensions and contradictions. Both 
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of those reasons emerge from Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on Nietzsche’s grasps of 
tragedy. Although the next section will particularly focus on the connections between 
Deleuze and Guattari and Nietzsche in terms of conceptualizing lived experience and 
history as tragedy, for now I would like to underline one of the biggest contradictions of 
my own argument.  
Up to this point I have understood tragedy; one as a refrain whose reoccurrence is 
intensified in Greece after the victory of the left-wing government of SYRIZA in 
February 2015; two, as a repetitive refrain that, in 2015-2016 Greece is contingently but 
non causally related to different initiations of power and resistance, as a concept that, 
based on Deleuze’s and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings on Nietzsche, grasps non-
dialectical tensions and contradictions and understands both the deconstructive and 
constructive aspects of power and resistance; three, as a concept of repetition that 
produces difference and finally; four, as performance. Enunciation-Concept-
Performance: One could argue that I jump from one to another without being clear. I 
would have to disagree. In 2015-2016 Greece, tragedy is all of those things together. It is 
not just theatre, just language, just form, just content, just voice, just concept, just 
refrains, just discourse, just affect, just sounds, just performance. It is not just power or 
just resistance, just deconstruction or just construction, just dialectics or just non-
dialectics. It is everything all at once.  
It is because of the always already decentered, differentiated and pluralized aspect 
of the refrain that the latter is irreducible to just discourse, or just language, or just 
signification. It is because of the pluralized aspect of the refrain that the latter produces 
affect. In Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity—a book 
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that applies the theories of Deleuze and Guattari in order to theorize the neoliberal 
condition—Maurizio Lazzarato describes refrain as a means of “subjective mutation 
[that] is not primarily discursive; it does not primarily have to do with knowledge, 
information, or culture since it affects the nucleus of non-discursivity, non-knowledge, 
and non-acculturation” (Lazzarato 2014: 16). And that’s where I contend that Deleuze 
and Guattari’s concept of machine joins our discussion. Although I have been arguing 
that in 2015-2016 Greece, tragedy feels like a constant refrain that is produced by an 
invisible gramophonic machine, since the very beginning of this Anti-Prologue, I never 
really explained what this gramophonic machine is about.  
The gramophonic (γραµµόφωνο) machine is the machine that synthesizes written 
inscriptions (γραµµα, gramma,) with phonetic sounds (φωνή, phone). Although I will be 
focusing on Deleuze and Guattari’s different conceptualizations of machines throughout 
this dissertation, for now I will just argue that, for the authors of Anti-Oedipus, machine 
is a “synthesizer” (1987:343) that synthesizes “disparate elements” (343) together and 
that produces and disruption and the continuation of various kinds of flows. In Anti-
Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of “phonographic connections” 
(191) in order to describe the processes of bodily and embodied inscriptions of unwritten 
laws in non-capitalist societies. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “the 
machine” and “phonographic connections,” I argue that in Greece within the larger 
context of 2015-2016 Europe the refrain of tragedy is both discursively and phonetically 
repeated as something abstract, because of is openness towards multiple significations, 
and that it is that abstract openness that gets to be in-scripted, pretending that is 
something concrete when it is not. It is my contention that this hypocritical inscription—
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an inscription that performs concreteness while being abstract—is one of the biggest 
current challenges that Greece has to face.  
Although I will be focusing on this hypocrisy throughout this dissertation, for 
now I would like to link this hypocrisy with what I have argued above and to ground it in 
specific examples. If one looks at the text of the third memorandum, the text of the Greek 
referendum, the series of laws that the Greek parliament voted after Greece’s acceptance 
of the third package of austerity measures in August of 2015—I will be focusing on those 
documents in the next two chapters—they all maintain a certain level of abstraction while 
they are performing being concrete. And the relation between their abstraction and their 
concreteness is not a relation of a dialectical opposition but just like I argued above, a 
relation of contradictory coexistence. This is why I contend that we no longer deal with 
“phonographic” but with gramophonic connections.  
Let me offer a quick summary, so to finally assemble the concept of 
TragedyMachine(s). Since the beginning of the Anti-Prologue, I have argued that in 
Greece, after the victory of the left-wing party of SYRIZA in February 2015, an invisible 
gramophonic machine produces multiple repetitions of the refrain of tragedy. I also 
argued that in 2015-2016 “European” Greece there is a non-causally contingent relation 
between the repetitive refrain of tragedy, various enunciations of different experiences 
and different initiations of performances of power and resistance. Furthermore, I 
contended that Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of refrain could grasp the production of 
difference that emerges from the repetition of both the discursive and phonetic aspects of 
the word “tragedy”. Additionally, I discussed how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “the 
machine” could understand how all this difference and heterogeneity is “consistently 
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synthesized” and “held together” without having specific teleological goals or forming 
higher unities. Finally, I described how, in 2015-2016 Greece “formal” documents, like 
the third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors, or the Greek 
referendum of 2015, inscribe the discursive and phonetic abstraction of the refrain of 
tragedy, while pretending that the latter is something concrete.  
TragedyMachine(s): Multiplicities of gramophonic machines that, in 2015-2016 
Greece within frames of 21st century European neoliberalism, synthesize repeatedly 
abstracted enunciations of the refrain of tragedy, with different and concretized 
performances of power and resistance. This synthesis is not a dialectical synthesis that 
emerges from the conflict between two antithetical forces, but a connective synthesis of 
multiple contradictions. In 2015-2016 Greece, the main manifestation of this 
gramophonic synthesis of abstracted refrains of tragedy with concretized performances of 
power and resistance is the inscription of debt and the production of disruption and 
continuations of flows of debt and conditions of indebtedness. Tragedy becomes a refrain 
of 21st century European debt economy because of tragedy’s vague and abstract 
implications to the continuation and disruption of conditions of indebtedness.  
As a result in 2015-2016 Greece, TragedyMachine(s) produce asymmetrically 
non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors that are 
hidden beneath masks and promises of resolution that are designed to remain elusive. In 
order for resistance to be successful it needs to never cease to destroy these seeming 
promises of resolution. The next section starts from this hypothesis. 
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2015-2016 Greece and The Relevancy of TragedyMachine(s): Nietzsche, Deleuze, 
Guattari 
As I argued in the very beginning of the Anti-Prologue, the relation between 
Greece and Europe has primarily been a relation between Greece and its International 
Creditors. Greece’s formation, not only as a nation-state, but also as a European nation-
state, was founded upon relations of indebtedness. More specifically, Greece was 
recognized as nation-state in 1830 because of the two loans it received from Britain. 
Additionally, the nation-state of Greece, became part of the European Economic 
Community—the first conceptualization of what would later become the European 
Union—when, in 1978, Kwstadinos Karamalis, the then Greece’s prime minister, and 
founder and president of the right wing party of New Democracy, “received” European 
money so that Greece could “belong to the West”, as he stated in one of his celebratory 
proclamations.  
In this section—the third and last section of the Anti-Prologue—I will argue that 
Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors is an indebtedness that is designed to 
preclude exodus. I will look at 2015-2016 Greece, and I will draw upon the relations 
between the different repetitions of the refrain of tragedy and different initiations of 
performances of power and resistance—a relation that is extensively described in the first 
section of the Anti-Prologue—in order to argue that Greece’s unresolvable indebtedness 
to its international creditors is founded upon creditor/ debtor power differentials that 
sustain, and thus never actually cancel, debt. Using the concept of TragedyMachine(s)—a 
concept that was introduced in the second section of the Anti-Prologue—I will draw a 
parallel trajectory between the machinic assemblage of different repetitions of the refrain 
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of tragedy in 2015-2016 “European” Greece, Greece’s unresolvable indebtedness to its 
international creditors and Deleuze and Guattari’s writings on Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the connections between the concept of tragedy and notions of “infinite” debt.  
Let’s go back to the very contradictory enunciations of the refrain of tragedy that I 
described in the first section of the Anti-Prologue. The left-wing government of SYRIZA, 
refugees, parliamentarians of Greece’s official opposition, street demonstrators and 
protestors, representatives of Greece’s international creditors, theatre artists: all these 
different bearers and agents of signification picked up the refrain of tragedy in order to 
both enunciate different experiences and initiate different performances of power and 
resistance.  
Furthermore, all of these various references to very different significations of 
tragedy implied an abstractly common reference to different conditions of indebtedness. 
Alexis Tsipras, right before the Greek elections of February 2015, communicated the vote 
in favor of the left-wing party, in terms of Greece’s potential exodus from the “tragedy” 
of its unending indebtedness. Both Wolfgang Schauble—Germany’s minister of 
finance—and Adonis Gewrgiadis—elected parliamentarian and member of the right-wing 
party of New Democracy—used “tragedy” in order to frame SYRIZA’s resistance to the 
upcoming third memorandum as a resistance that put Greece’s equilibrated condition of 
indebtedness in jeopardy. Christos Thivaios referred to “tragedy” during the “NO” 
demonstration in order to conceptualize indebtedness in terms of poetic creativity. The 
refugees, whose pictures were exhibited right in the middle of Istiklal Street in Istanbul, 
signified their condition as “tragedy” in order to shed light on the imperceptible and 
unwritten conditions of indebtedness that their “hosts” inscribed on their bodies. Finally 
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the Point Zero Theatre Group chose to stage the tragedy of Woyzeck right before the 
Greek elections of February of 2015 in order to shed light on the invisible aspects of the 
political that within frames of 21st century Europe are mainly exerted via both abstract 
and concrete imposed conditions of indebtedness.  
According to the conceptualization of TragedyMachine(s) that I introduced in the 
previous section, in 2015-2016 “European” Greece, very contradictory uses and 
enunciations of refrains of tragedy are synthesized with very contradictory and non-
dialectically related performances of power and resistance. Additionally, based on the 
concept of TragedyMachine(s), within frames of 2015-2016 Greece, these multiplicities 
of syntheses of uses of tragedy and various performances of power and resistance 
manifest themselves in terms of conditions of both abstracted and concretized 
indebtedness. Since both tragedies and performances come in multiplicities, conditions of 
indebtedness will also come in multiplicities.  
These multiplicities of conditions of indebtedness synthesize two very 
contradictory relations. The first relation has to do with the resolvable dialectics of 
exchange, according to which the creditor lends the debtor money and the debtor 
eventually pays the creditor back with a certain amount of interest. Based on this 
dialectical relation of resolvable exchange, the creditor demands to be repaid and the 
debtor either does or does not pay its creditor back. The second relation has to with the 
non-dialectically unresolvable type of exchange. According to this relation, the creditor 
demands from the debtor to pay them, but never fully repay them, so that the latter never 
manages to exit their condition of perpetual indebtedness. This non-dialectical relation of 
unresolvable exchange is a relation of creditor/ debtor power differentials that 
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perpetuates, sustains and thus never cancels debt. These two relations, the dialectical 
relation of creditor/ debtor resolvable exchange, and the non-dialectical relation of 
creditor/ debtor power differentials, are contradictory coexistent. It is not a question of 
choosing one versus the other. On the contrary it is a matter of understanding when the 
non-dialectical relation of creditor/ debtor power differentials, bears masks of dialectical 
relations of resolvable exchange, in order to camouflage its intensity.  
Nietzsche traced this contradictory synthesis of dialectical relations of resolvable 
exchange, on the one hand, with non-dialectical relations of creditor/ debtor power 
differentials, on the other, in attic tragedy. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche, 
conceptualizes attic tragedy in terms of “two very different tendencies”, that “walk side 
by side, usually in violent opposition to one another, to ever more powerful births, 
perpetuating the struggle of the opposition only apparently bridged by the word “art”: 
until finally, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic “will”, the two seem to be 
coupled, and in this coupling they seem at last to beget the work of art that is as 
Dionysiac as it is Apolline—Attic tragedy. ” (Nietzsche, 1993: 14) Although in his later 
work Ecce Homo Nietzsche argues that The Birth of Tragedy “smells offensively 
Hegelian”, I argue that, Nietzsche in his Birth of Tragedy—as opposed to what he 
claimed in his Ecce Homo—managed to conceptualize how multiplicities of forces 
perform in both dialectical and non-dialectical terms.  
Drawing upon Nietzsche’s statement reiterated in the last paragraph, I contend 
that, while the “violent opposition” between Apollo and Dionysus implies a dialectical 
tension between two opposites, the simultaneous emergence of “more powerful births” 
grasps multiplicities of tensions that perform in non-dialectical terms. Thus, I argue that 
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according to Nietzsche’s conceptualization of tragedy, the contradictory coexistence of 
Apollo with Dionysus helps us grasp the contradictory coexistence of dialectical with 
non-dialectical tensions. Later in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche, specifically argues that 
this non-dialectical tension that “overcomes us at the sight of this divine counterpart of 
the dialectic” (Nietzsche, 1993: 47). From this point of view, it is because of this 
“counterpart”, because of this mask of dialectic, that the non-dialectical force “overcomes 
us” Therefore, resistance, in order to be efficacious, needs to perform within the 
unmasked and non-dialectically oriented field of forces. To sum up, for Nietzsche, attic 
tragedy emerges as the contradictory synthesis of dialectical with non-dialectical forces. 
Additionally, according to the author of the Birth of Tragedy, attic tragedy sheds light on 
the dialectical masks that non-dialectical tensions use, in order to mask their intensity.  
One of the main conceptual arguments of this dissertation will be that Deleuze 
and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is founded upon these two conclusions. They specifically 
write in their Anti-Oedipus that, “we live today in the age of partial objects, bricks that 
have been shattered to bits, and leftovers (…) we no longer believe in the dull gray 
outlines of a dreary, colorless dialectic of evolution, aimed at forming a harmonious 
whole out of heterogeneous bits by rounding off their rough edges” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983: 42). It is my contention that there is a very important conceptual 
connection between Nietzsche’s “more powerful births” and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
“partial objects, bricks, bits and leftovers” They both understand that multiplicities of 
forces do not necessarily perform in terms of dialectical oppositions. They also 
understand that if one reduces the multiplicities of forces into dialectical and antithetical 
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oppositions, either intentionally hides or naively ignores the actual intensity of these 
multiplicities.  
Nietzsche and later Deleuze and Guattari drawing upon Nietzsche, link the non-
dialectical tensions between multiplicities of forces, with notions of infinite debt. Simply 
stated, if the non-dialectical opposition is not between Apollo and Dionysus and it is 
between creditors and debtors, then the more this relation is schematized as dialectically 
resolvable exchange that takes places between two opposites, the more the creditor/ 
debtor power differentials are perpetuated. Nietzsche continues exploring this non-
dialectical creditor/ debtor relation of power differentials in The Genealogy of Morals. He 
specifically writes that “the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor” 
(Nietzsche, 2013: 49) is founded upon a very strange logic of “compensation”: “The 
equivalence consists in this: instead of an advantage directly compensatory (…) that is, 
instead of an equalization in money, property or some kind of chattel, the creditor is 
granted by way of repayment and compensation a certain pleasure, a sense of 
satisfaction” (49-50) From this point of view, the creditor wants to keep enjoying the fact 
that he will never be fully repaid. Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Nietzsche’s grasp of 
this non-compensatory creditor/ debtor relation and argue that, “a time will come when 
the creditor has not yet lent while the debtor never quits repaying.” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983: 197) And the question emerges: Has that time come?  
If one takes into serious consideration that 21st century Europe is geopolitically 
divided into the “rich” and “productive” creditor/ North and the “poor” and “lazy” 
debtor/ South, and that the former imposes conditions of perpetual indebtedness onto the 
latter, then I contend that the answer is definitely yes. If Deleuze and Guattari, through 
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the works of Nietzsche, were farsighted enough to grasp contingent relations between 
tragedy and non-dialectical creditor/ debtor power differentials, then I contend that 
Greece’s current condition requires a deep consideration of their works.  
At this point, I would like to briefly summarize what I have been arguing since 
the beginning of the Anti-Prologue in order reframe this urgency before I move on to the 
first chapter of this dissertation. In the beginning of this Anti-Prologue I described five 
different moments during which “tragedy” was repeatedly picked up by five different 
bearers of signification in order to be coded differently. I argued that in 2015-2016 
Greece there is a non-causally contingent relation between different enunciations of 
tragedy and different initiations of performances of power and resistance. I argued that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of “refrain” and “the machine” could grasp this 
contradictory coexistence between repetitions of the word of “tragedy”, initiations of 
different performances of power and resistance and multiple notions of indebtedness. I 
came up with the concept of TragedyMachine(s) in order to argue that, in Greece within 
frames of 21st century European neoliberalism, all these heterogeneous elements are 
somehow “held consistently together.” Finally, I looked at how both Nietzsche and 
Deleuze and Guattari, grasped a contingent relation between tragedy and creditor/ debtor 
power differentials that never cancel and thus sustain debt.  
Drawing upon Nietzsche’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual contingency 
between tragedy and perpetual debt, it will be my contention throughout this dissertation, 
that 2015-2016 Greece’s current condition is contingently ready for a radicalized 
conceptualization of tragedy that could grasp how resistance could perform beyond 
conditions of indebtedness. If creditor/ debtor power differentials are not dialectically 
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resolvable then resistance should not be framed in dialectical terms. Moving across the 
ground that has already been laid by the five different uses of tragedy that I described in 
the beginning of the Anti-Prologue, this dissertation is looking at Greece within the larger 
European context of 2015 and 2016 in order to shed light on the non-dialectical aspects 
of both power and resistance.  
 
Chapter Break Down  
 In the first chapter of this dissertation titled “The Tragedy of Greek Debt Crisis” I 
further elaborate on the Anti-Prologue’s argument that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on 
Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy is in fact a strategy for understanding how the 
asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between creditor and debtor are hidden 
beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a resolution that nonetheless remains 
elusive.  
Drawing upon that thought process I understand the relations between Greece and 
its international creditors as creditor/ debtor power relations that are designed to remain 
unresolved. I closely examine the conceptual differences between Nietzsche’s and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s, on the one hand, and Hegel’s, on the other, understandings of 
tragedy. I argue that in 2015-2016 Greece, Hegel’s Antigone haunted the strategies of the 
government of SYRIZA and as a result SYRIZA understood and framed Greek debt as 
resolvable only to perpetuate Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors. 
Furthermore I investigate how Václav Havel’s Memorandum sheds light on the 21st 
century neoliberalism and European debt economy. 
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In the second chapter of this dissertation titled “Dromocratic Democracies” I draw 
upon the tensions between Austin’s notion of a “happy performative” and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concepts of “order word” and “collective assemblages of enunciation.” I 
closely examine why the NOs of both the “NO” demonstration—the demonstration that 
took place two days before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015—and the Greek 
referendum of 2015 did not succeed in their resistance against Greece’s international 
creditors. Furthermore I understand the “NO” demonstration as a theatricalized mergence 
of the demos with the state performed on the dromos (street). Drawing upon the works of 
Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt and Paul Virilio I investigate the revolutionary capacities 
of that mergence. Finally I elaborate on the conceptualizations of resistance that, in my 
contention, Eleni Efthimiou’s production of Anouilh’s Antigone—a production that took 
place one year after the Greek referendum of 2015—introduced.  
 In the third chapter of this dissertation I focus on the millions of people who flee 
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran and cross the Mediterranean on unsafe rubber-
hulled boats in order to reach the shores of Greece. I understand these crossings—known 
as Mediterranean crossings of the “boat people”—as performances that force the 
production of law on refugees and asylum seekers to perceive and include the lives of the 
“boat people” as lives defined by their bareness. I examine how these performances of 
bare life were rendered imperceptible, and thus dispossessed of their own bareness by the 
two EU-Turkey statements that were announced on November 29 2015 and on March 18 
2016, by the photography exhibition organized by St. Antony de Padua on Istiklâl 
Caddesi in Istanbul, and finally by the «Δρόµοι Επιβίωσης» (Roads of Survival) 
photography exhibition organized by the government of SYRIZA in Athens. Finally I 
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investigate how the MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND 
SELF-ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS that took place on July 23rd 2016 at 
Πεδίο του Άρεως (Pedio tou Areos) in Athens shed light on that dispossession.  
   In the fourth and last chapter of this dissertation titled “Theatres of 
Dramatization” I challenge Hans-Thies Lehmann’s notion of post-dramatic theatre 
through Deleuze’s concept of dramatization in order to look at Zero Point Theatre 
Group’s—one of the most popular Greek avant-garde theatre companies—production of 
Buchner’s Woyzeck and Yiannis Houvarda’s—a well-known Greek director—production 
of Aeschylus’ Ορέστεια.  
Drawing upon the concept of TragedyMchine(s) that this dissertation introduces I 
argue that if tragedy is to be understood as a concept that grasps how the 
disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its 
international creditors are hidden beneath the appearance and the seeming promise of a 
resolution that nevertheless remains elusive then the challenge that 21st century Greek 
theatre has to take is to destroy any illusions and promises of resolution. I trace this 
theatricalized destruction of illusions and promises of resolution in Zero Point Theatre 
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Chapter 1: The Tragedy of Greek Debt Crisis 
Stasis#1 
February 21 2017: My mom calls in order to talk about yesterday’s Eurogroup meeting on the Greek debt 
crisis. I am in Hyattsville, Maryland and my mom is in Athens, Greece.  
My mom: What do you think SYRIZA should do about the crisis? 
Me: Whose crisis?  
My mom: the Greek debt crisis 
Me: Mom, I think that if Greek debt was actually in crisis … in other words if Greek debt was dying then 
Greece should be super happy right? It is not the debt that is in crisis. This is just a story that people say in 
order to legitimize austerity politics. It is the debtor Greece that is in crisis.  
My mom: Funny … yes … if debt was in crisis then this would mean that we should be OK right? But you 
know people keep describing it like that. I mean as the “Tragedy of Greek debt crisis”: TV, newspapers, 
politicians … everyone.  
Me: I know  
Stasis#2 
“A debt is a debt is a debt.”  
That’s what a high official of the Federal Republic of Germany told Yianis Varoufakis during Varoufakis’ 
first official visit to Berlin (Varoufakis, 2016: xvii)  
1.1 The Need for a Non-Dialectical Philosophy of Tragedy in 2015-2016 Indebted 
Greece 
 Earlier in the Anti-Prologue I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on 
Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy is in fact a strategy for understanding how the 
disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between creditor and 
debtor are hidden beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a resolution that 
nonetheless remains elusive. It masquerades as a debt that can be resolved in order to 
conceal and legitimize its own un-resolvability. Looking at Greece within the larger 
European context of 2015 and 2016, this chapter will examine how both the government 
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of SYRIZA and Greece’s international creditors perpetuate Greece’s indebtedness to its 
international creditors through competing and often contradictory narratives that exist 
within what is called the “tragedy of Greek debt crisis.” I am interested in how those 
narratives shape both performances of power and resistance, especially with regard to the 
ongoing evaluations of Greece by its international creditors. Here the performances of 
power and resistance I argue play out in a disingenuous construction of the creditor/ 
debtor relationship that implies that Greece’s debt can be paid while essentially rendering 
it un-payable and hence as a permanent means of political leverage.  
 On a conceptual level, Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari traced this 
disingenuous construction of the creditor/ debtor relationship that renders debt infinitely 
un-payable, to Hegel’s “master/ bondsman” dialectic – commonly referred to as “master/ 
slave” dialectic—and in the manifestations of the latter in Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy. 
But before focusing on Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s critical differentiations 
from Hegel I would like to briefly elaborate on Hegel’s “master/ slave” schema and the 
relations between the latter and Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy in order to understand the 
kind of conceptualization of resistance that Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari move 
away from. It is my contention that this brief elaboration will lay the groundwork for the 
next section’s main argument: that in 2015-2016 Greece, Hegel’s Antigone haunted the 
strategies of the government of SYRIZA and as a result SYRIZA understood and framed 
Greek debt as resolvable only to perpetuate Greece’s indebtedness to its international 
creditors.  
 In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel, conceptualizes the bondman’s resistance 
against his master in terms of asymmetry, antithetical dependence and labor. During the 
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first formational phases of the “master/ slave” relation, Hegel argues that the master is 
more powerful and fully independent in relation to his slave. In other words for Hegel the 
“master/ slave” relation begins as an asymmetrical power relation between the strong and 
independent “master” and the weak and dependent “slave.” Hegel specifically argues that 
the master “is the power dominating existence, while this existence again is the power 
controlling the other (the slave), the master holds, par consequence, this other 
subordination”(Hegel, 1977:156). However, according to his ontology, any kind of “self-
consciousness”—including the self-consciousness of the master—needs to affirm its 
existence through its equally antithetical double. Hegel specifically argues that “self-
consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for 
another self-consciousness; that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged or 
‘recognized.’” (156) But in the case of the master/ slave relation the slave is not equal to 
his master. As a result the master’s need for recognition, or, to paraphrase Hegel the 
master’s fear of never being fully recognized, is what transforms the master’s initial 
strength and independency into dependency since the master’s asymmetrical power and 
domination over his slave keeps him from being affirmed and recognized by someone 
equal.   
For the Hegelian slave on the other hand, who is initially weaker and dependent 
upon his master, the more he labors for his master the more he understands that his 
master’s domination over him keeps his master from being fully recognized. Hegel 
specifically argues that, “by serving he [the slave] cancels in every particular aspect his 
dependence” (157). It is “through work and labor” that the slave becomes conscious of 
his independence and ends up “having and being a mind of his own” (157). Hegel 
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conceptualizes the slave’s independence in terms of intensified slavery, labor and 
service—what in Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is often understood as 
negative affirmation—and the master’s dependence in terms of intensified power, 
domination and fear: the master still controls the slave but is afraid that he will never be 
recognized by his (non)equally antithetical double and the slave still services his master 
but the more he labors the more independent he becomes. Therefore, based on Hegel’s 
schema, the asymmetrical power relations between the master and the slave become a 
mutual and resolvable exchange. The master’s power and domination comes with the 
price of fear and dependency and the slave’s independence comes with the price of 
slavery, labor and service.  
This transformation of the asymmetrical power relations between the master and 
the slave into a “give and take” kind of mutual and resolvable exchange is also present in 
Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy. Although much could be written on the relations between 
Hegel’s schema of “master/ slave” dialectics and Hegel’s philosophy of tragedy for now I 
would like to focus to Hegel’s interpretation of Antigone. I choose to focus on Hegel’s 
understanding of Antigone not only because according to Hegel Antigone is “the absolute 
example of tragedy” (Hegel, 1978:325) but also because—as I will argue in the next 
section—I contend that Hegel’s grasping of Antigone’s resistance against Creon 
influenced the strategies of SYRIZA during its negotiations with Greece’s international 
creditors. As a result SYRIZA founded its resisting strategies upon the assumption and 
the promise that the asymmetrical and disproportionate power relations between Greece 
and its international creditors can be transformed into some kind of mutual and resolvable 
exchange.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   45	  
But before focusing on SYRIZA I would like to go back to Hegel’s interpretation 
of Antigone in order to lay the conceptual ground for the next section’s argument 
regarding SYRIZA’s strategies in relation to Greece’s international creditors. Drawing 
upon Judith Butler’s statement that, “Antigone emerges as a figure for Hegel in the 
Phenomenology only to become surpassed in the course of Hegel’s description of what 
she does” (Butler, 2002:12) I would like to argue that Hegel saw in the Sophoclean 
Antigone what he needed to see in order to support his schema of the “master/ slave” 
dialectic. Just like in the case of the “master/ slave” dialectical schema where both the 
master and the slave need to affirm their “self-consciousness” (Hegel, 1977: 157) through 
the equalized and doubled other, Antigone and Creon need to challenge and eventually 
cancel their one-sidedness through confronting each other. According to Hegel in the 
case of the Sophoclean Antigone both Creon and Antigone’s “one-sidedness ends both in 
injustice, because they are one-sided, though at the same time both obtain justice too” 
(325) It is only when Antigone’s “one-sidedness” collides with Creon’s “one-sidedness” 
that each unjust “one-sidedness” is justly equalized and eventually balanced in relation to 
the other (325) For Hegel this balancing equalization between Antigone and Creon is 
“introduced in the shape of a Nemesis.” (325) As one etymology suggests Νέµεσις 
(Nemesis) comes from the root νέµω (nemo), which means to allocate or distribute. 
Additionally, according to Hegel Nemesis does not either emerge from within the 
collision nor it is immanent to the collision but comes as an externally imposed higher 
and unifying authority that drives the collision towards a higher goal.  
Therefore according to the conceptual limitations of the Hegelian schema, 
resolution happens as long as the conflict between two sides is an absolute oppositional 
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conflict driven by a higher unity. This higher unity equally distributes the power that 
initially emerged from asymmetrical power relations. It is this oppositional conflict 
driven by a higher unity that transforms any asymmetrical, disproportionate and non-
resolvable power relations into a mutually resolvable exchange. Besides, that’s why 
Hegel appreciates Sophoclean tragedy so much. Because according to Hegel the tragedies 
of Sophocles are “eternal patterns” or “models” (325) where the “powers which are in 
collision, in virtue of their one-sidedness, divest themselves of the one-sidedness 
attaching to the assertion of independent validity, and this discharging of the one-
sidedness reveals itself outwardly in the fact that this individuals who have aimed at the 
realization in themselves of a single separate moral power, perish.” (324-325) So for 
Hegel nothing can exist outside the collision between two antithetical doubles. He 
specifically argues that, “the necessity of the reaction however must not be occasioned by 
means of anything out of place or at cross purposes with the main action.” As a result 
resistance can only conceptualize itself in terms of antithetical opposition to the power 
which it resists.  
 According to Nietzsche this Hegelian conceptualization of conflict resolution in 
terms of antithetical opposition imprisons resistance within spheres of reactionary 
negation. Nietzsche argues that the Hegelian resistance of the “slave” always needs the 
“external stimuli” (Nietzsche, 2013: 19) of the power against which it reacts in order to 
understand and define its capacities. In The Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche argues that 
the (Hegelian)6 slave “says ‘no’ from the very outset to what is outside itself” (19) and he 
adds, the slave “requires objective stimuli to be capable of action at all—its action is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Not	  directly	  stated	  but	  clearly	  implied	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fundamentally a reaction.” (19) And while the slave defines his actions merely through 
the external “world” (19) of his master, “the master seeks its antithesis in order to 
pronounce a more grateful and exultant ‘yes’ to its own self.” (19-20) Therefore for 
Nietzsche, the Hegelian slave uses the externality of his master in order to limit his range 
of action and resistance; the master uses the externality of his slave in order to further 
himself.   
 But while for Hegel this particular exchange between the master and the slave 
“equalizes” (Hegel, 1978:325) their initial disparity, for Nietzsche it “masquerades” 
(Nietzsche, 1993:41) and thus perpetuates the non-resolvability of their power relations. 
Both Hegel and Nietzsche start from the assumption that the relations between the master 
and his slave are asymmetrical, lopsided and disproportionate. According to Michael 
Hardt “that’s where Hegel and Nietzsche go towards opposite directions” (Hardt, 
1993:42). But as I will be arguing throughout this chapter, Nietzsche’s direction is not 
conceptually anti-Hegelian. As opposed to Judith Butler who argues that, “references to a 
break with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has made the very 
notion of “breaking with” into the central tenet of his dialectic” (Butler, 2012:184) I 
contend that Nietzsche does not frame his ontology in dialectically anti-Hegelian terms. 
On the contrary Nietzsche understands Hegelian dialectics as a mask that carries to 
infinity any kind of asymmetrical power relations it claims or promises to equalize.  
 In order to support his understanding Nietzsche, like Hegel, looks at tragedy. But 
according to Nietzsche the Sophoclean tragedies are nothing but “appearances” 
(Nietzsche, 1993:46) that “heal the gaze seared” by the “terrible night” of the dangerous 
vainness of any seeming promise of a resolution that nevertheless remains elusive. 
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Furthermore for Nietzsche these Sophoclean “appearances” that conceal any kind of 
dialectical vainness are various manifestations of the “Apolline mask” (46). Therefore 
Nietzsche chooses to elaborate on the mythical productions of Apollo and Dionysus and 
on how the latters are “projected” (46) onto different notions of tragedy. In The Birth of 
Tragedy Nietzsche introduces the abstraction of Apollo in order to understand any kind 
of dialectical thinking that introduces seeming and illusionary promises of resolutions 
that remain elusive and the abstraction of Dionysus in order to conceptualize any kind of 
potential destruction of these illusionary promises of resolution.  
Although in his Ecce Homo Nietzsche asserts that The Birth of Tragedy smells 
“offensively Hegelian” (Nietzsche, 1993: xv) I contend that in The Birth of Tragedy 
through his abstract conceptualization of the tension between Apollo and Dionysus, 
Nietzsche really manages to grasp performances of resistance that do not define 
themselves in terms of dialectical oppositions. Nietzsche specifically talks about a 
“longing for illusion and for redemption by illusion” (25) that, as he argues, is one of the 
“inevitable products of the Apolline7 mask.” (45) Additionally, according to Nietzsche, 
that mask of Apollo “clings tightly to the bough of the dialectic.” For the author of The 
Birth of Tragedy “the Apolline tendency is cocooned within its logical schematism.” (69) 
And in The Birth of Tragedy, while Apollo, who, as Nietzsche reminds us etymologically 
is the “shining one” (16), introduces illusionary possibilities of dialectically resolved 
redemptions that “hone a sophistical dialectic for the speeches of the heroes” (54) that 
“speak only counterfeit, masked speeches” (54), Dionysus “appears in a multiplicity of 
figures” (51). It is because of these multiplicities that, for Nietzsche, Dionysus reveals the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The	  translation	  uses	  the	  term	  Apolline	  instead	  of	  Apollonian.	  I	  am	  using	  the	  term	  
Apollonian	  since	  I	  contend	  it	  is	  closer	  to	  the	  Greek	  Απολλώνιος	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“abysses” (67) of “something utterly irrational, full of causes without apparent effects, 
effects without apparent cause” (67) and destructs any dialectically Apollonian “sense of 
triumphant cheerfulness” (46). While Apollo introduces the illusionary possibility of 
dialectically resolvable redemption in dialectically concrete terms, Dionysus forces these 
illusions of dialectical concreteness “into self-destruction” (69) and as a result Dionysus 
reveals the concealed force of non-oppositional and non-dialectical difference.  
Deleuze was particularly interested in Nietzsche’s conceptualization of Dionysus 
as an abstract force that destroys any kind of dialectical masks. In his Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, Deleuze argues that “the dialectic proposes a certain conception of the tragic: 
linking it to the negative, to opposition and contradiction” (Deleuze, 1983: 11) and he 
adds, “Apollo is the divine incarnation of the principle of individuation. He constructs the 
appearance of appearance” (11). Deleuze’s Nietzschean Apollo is the force that in the 
case of an asymmetrical conflict or contradiction constructs fake “appearances” of 
individuation in order to, as Nietzsche describes, to “overcome his suffering” (Nietzsche, 
1993: 80) through the negative. Deleuze’s Nietzschean Dionysus on the other hand “is 
not content with resolving pain in a higher pleasure” (Deleuze, 1983:13) and does not 
“submit to the labor of the negative” (16) like Hegel’s slave and Antigone do.  
Therefore for Deleuze the Nietzschean tension between Apollo and Dionysus is 
not a Hegelian dialectical tension between the master and the slave or between Creon and 
Antigone. Deleuze argues that, “Dionysus and Apollo are therefore not opposed as the 
terms of contradiction but rather as two antithetical ways of resolving it” (12). During a 
contradiction between two asymmetrical forces Apollo is the one who introduces masks 
and promises of dialectical resolvability and mutual exchange and Dionysus is the one 
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who destroys these fake promises and deals with the contradiction in its full lopsidedness 
and disproportionateness.  
For Deleuze, and later for Deleuze and Guattari, this conceptualization of 
illusionary promises of resolvable and mutual exchanges—and their potential 
destruction—is one of Nietzsche’s biggest contributions with regards to a philosophy of 
difference that does not just grasp resistance within the limitations of the power it fights 
against. If according to Nietzsche, including Deleuze’s Nietzsche—asymmetrical power 
relations, use masks of resolvable conflict and mutual exchange in order to secretly 
perpetuate their asymmetry then the conflict remains unresolved. However non-
resolvable conflicts that emerge from asymmetrical power relations produce un-payable 
debt.  
According to Deleuze Nietzsche was the first one who looked at notions of 
tragedy and through his abstract concept of Apollo managed to grasp how any kind of 
dialectical framing of resolution perpetuates debt. In Deleuze’s terms Nietzsche was the 
one who turned to tragedy in order to “lay bare the condition of judgment” (Deleuze, 
1997: 126) and to understand “the adventure of debt as it becomes infinite and thus un-
payable”  (126). I contend that this notion of infinite and un-payable debt understands 
any kind of power asymmetry in terms of creditor/ debtor disproportionate and lopsided 
relations. This is why in Essays Critical and Clinical—a book that includes essays and 
articles that Deleuze wrote mostly during his collaboration with Guattari between 1970 
and 1993—Deleuze writes, “Nietzsche’s greatness lies in having shown, without 
hesitation, that the creditor-debtor relation was primary in relation to all exchange. One 
begins by promising, and becomes indebted not to a god but to a partner, depending on 
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the forces that pass between the parties” (127). Later, in Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that Nietzsche was the first one who was able to grasp the “debtor-creditor 
relationship, by eliminating every consideration of exchange” (180). They add, “this is 
how finite debt finds itself taken into an immense machinery that renders the debt infinite 
and no longer forms anything but one and the same crushing fate: ‘the aim now is to 
preclude pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a final discharge: the aim now 
is to make the glance recoil disconsolately from an iron impossibility.’ (Nietzsche, 1969: 
21)” (132). This is why I contend that resistance that is founded upon notions of 
“discharge” or even exodus or resolution is doomed to remain insufficient and 
unsuccessful. 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms this kind of insufficient and unsuccessful 
resistance does nothing but perpetuate the asymmetrically non-resolvable creditor/debtor 
power relations. They compare this kind of resistance to processes “of establishing each 
of the formal operations that will make it all possible: […] the linearization of the chain 
between masters and slaves” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 219). And the very crucial 
question emerges: How and by whom can that chain break?  
In the case of Greece, SYRIZA founded its resistance on the assumption and the 
seeming promise that the asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its 
international creditors can be equalized and lead to a mutual and resolvable exchange. As 
a result SYRIZA ended up becoming an “one-sidedness” fully absorbed by Greece’s 
international creditors. As I will argue in the next section, SYRIZA’s choice to found its 
resistance upon appearances and seeming promises of a mutual exchange was not a 
choice of the potential “not yet” that could challenge the “always already” actuality of 
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European debt and austerity politics, as in “The Performative Dialectics of Defeat: 
Europe and the European Left after July 13 2015” Athena Athanasiou suggests—an 
article that she published right after SYRIZA signed the third memorandum with 
Greece’s international creditors. On the contrary I will contend that SYRIZA’s resistance 
was conceptually limited and limiting from its very beginning. In order to do so I will 
draw upon this section’s elaboration on Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
differentiations from Hegel and I will place particular emphasis on the dynamic relations 
between SYRIZA’s public references to Antigone and SYRIZA’s public 
conceptualization, framing and staging of resistance. While SYRIZA’s public 
conceptualization of resistance will be traced in SYRIZA’s negotiating strategies and 
governmental programs, its public framing and staging of resistance will be traced in 
slogans, statements and in the directorial and dramaturgical choices that were made 
during SYRIZA’s public events, speeches and demonstrations.  
 Can SYRIZA perform outside the asymmetrical power relations between Greece 
and its international creditors in ways that structurally challenge, borrowing a phrase 
from Judith Butler and Athena Athanasiou (Butler and Athanasiou, 2013) European 
politics of “debtocracy”? This is the main question that the next section takes on. But 
before moving forward with the next section let me make something very clear: As 
someone who supported SYRIZA’s efforts during its negotiations with Greece’s 
international creditors, my intention is not to undermine SYRIZA. On the contrary this 
dissertation’s intention is to conceptually widen the field of resistance so that the political 
lefts of Europe can structurally challenge Europe’s debt and austerity politics. Besides, 
that’s what Alexis Tsipras—the Greek prime minister and president of the left party of 
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SYRIZA—promised to do right after he signed the third memorandum with Greece’s 
international creditors: to “widen the field of resistance.”8 
1.2 SYRIZA and The Tragedy of Greek Debt Crisis 
 January 2017: Ράδιο Αρβύλα (Radio Arvyla): a Greek live show that satirizes 
Greece’s political and social life.9 The show’s four hosts—Kanakis, Servetas, Kiousis 
and Panagiwtopoulos—comment on one of the thousands of videos of Tsipras being 
publically mocked and called a “traitor.”10 Just two years prior Tsipras was considered a 
hero and Greece’s only hope. According to Tsipras’ last speech before SYRIZA’s victory 
in the Greek snap elections of February 2015—a victory known as “first time left”—the 
left government of SYRIZA would help the Greeks to find an exit, a “way-out” from the 
“tragedy that they have been experiencing during the last years.”11 From January 2015 to 
June 2015 Tsipras and the government of SYRIZA performed in two different speeds: on 
the one hand SYRIZA continued paying Greece’s pre-agreed debt obligations on time. 
On the other hand SYRIZA resisted accepting the third package of severe austerity 
measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors: the European Commission 
(EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
SYRIZA’s resistance reached its peak when, on June 28 2015, Tsipras froze the 
negotiations with Greece’s international creditors and called for a Greek referendum. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Info	  (at)	  ennikos.	  “Η	  Ομιλία	  Τσίπρα	  στη	  Βουλή”	  Filmed	  [August	  2015]	  YouTube	  Video,	  
38:49.	  Posted	  [August	  2015].	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fmAEHwxMlmI	  
9	  Radio	  Arvyla	  Official	  Website.	  http://www.antenna.gr/minisites/radio-­‐arvila/home	  	  
10	  Ομάδα	  Αλήθειας.	  “Αποδοκιμασίες	  για	  τον	  Τσίπρα	  στην	  Κρήτη”	  Filmed	  [December	  2016]	  
YouTube	  Video,	  1:22.	  Posted	  [December	  2016]	  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-­‐
6NnreQbv8	  	  
11	  Η	  ΑΥΓΗ	  Η	  εφημερίδα	  της	  Αριστεράς.	  “Διακαναλική	  Συνέντευξη	  Τύπου	  ΣΥΡΙΖΑ”	  Filmed	  
[February	  2015]	  YouTube	  Video,	  1:14:40.	  Posted	  [January	  2015]	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iLIEIvIMGgo	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referendum took place on July 5 2015 and asked the Greek people to vote “YES” or 
“NO” to the austerity measures suggested by Greece’s international creditors. According 
to the results of the referendum, 61.31% voted to reject the austerity measures 
“proposed” by Greece’s international creditors. Right after the referendum Tsipras 
rejoined the negotiations and on July 15 2015 he ended up signing the third memorandum 
between Greece and its international creditors: a memorandum that is even more severe 
than the previous two. Within six months Tsipras “the hero” became Tsipras “the traitor.”  
What went wrong? Is Costas Douzinas, the “reluctant politician who was 
unexpectedly propelled from academia into the world of Greek politics as SYRIZA MP” 
(Douzinas, 2017), right to argue that part of SYRIZA’s challenges is to widen its range of 
resistance while following the same policies it strongly opposes? (Douzinas, 2017)?12 Is 
SYRIZA’s defeat the “not yet” actualized potentiality that does not “signpost a logical 
impossibility” as Athena Athanasiou suggests in “Performative Dialectics of Defeat”—an 
article that she published in Open Democracy on August 15 2015, when the Greek 
Parliament officially passed the third memorandum? Did Tsipras simply “jettison his 
radicalism to stay in power at all costs” as Costas Lapavitsas—a professor of economics 
at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London and former SYRIZA 
MP—argues in his article in The Guardian “One year on, SYRIZA has sold its soul for 
power”? Was SYRIZA a wave that started “talking left” but ended up “walking right” as 
Helena Sheehan—a Marxist historian and activist—claims (Sheehan, 2016)? 
With these questions in the background, this section looks at SYRIZA’s public 
conceptualizations, framings and staging of resistance. Earlier in the Interlude I drew 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Douzinas’	  book	  SYRIZA	  in	  Power:	  Reflections	  of	  a	  Reluctant	  Politician	  is	  about	  to	  be	  
published	  in	  August	  2017.	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upon Deleuze and Guattari’s understandings of Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy in order to 
understand how the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power relations 
between creditor and debtor are hidden beneath the appearance and seeming promise of a 
resolution that nonetheless remains elusive. In this section, I will trace how Hegel’s 
notions of Antigone haunted SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framings and staging 
of resistance. As a result, I contend that SYRIZA ended up masking the asymmetrical and 
non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors as relations 
that can be transformed into relations of mutual exchanges among equals. In response to 
the discourses that frame this stance of SYRIZA in populist terms (Cus and 
Papasarantopoulos, 2016) I contend that this “masking” was not a populist act but a 
choice that is interlinked to SYRIZA’s Hegelian’s orientation to resistance.  
SYRIZA based its public conceptualization of resistance around the assumption 
that Greece’s international creditors are interested in the repayment of Greek debt—an 
assumption that as I have been arguing since the beginning of this dissertation also 
presumes that the disparities between creditor and debtor can be resolved—and not in the 
perpetuation of Greece as a debtor. According to the governmental program of SYRIZA 
that Tsipras announced at the Thessaloniki International Trade Fair13 on September 6, 
2015—approximately four months before SYRIZA’s victory in the Greek snap elections 
of January 2015—Tsipras stated that, “We are going to negotiate within the existing 
frames of the European Union and the European institutions towards a new realistic 
agreement that would serve the [Greek] debt (…) in order to achieve the following: To 
cancel the majority of the face value of the (Greek) debt so that the debt becomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  Thessaloniki	  International	  Trade	  Fair	  is	  an	  annual	  commercial	  exhibition	  where	  the	  
prime	  minister,	  the	  official	  opposition’s	  president	  and	  other	  parties’	  presidents	  announce	  
their	  governmental	  programs.	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sustainable with strategies that do not burden the people of Europe [and that utilize] the 
collective European mechanisms. It happened for Germany in 1953. It should happen for 
Greece in 2015” (Καθηµερινή, 2015). Let’s break down some of the conceptual and 
material implications of these statements starting with notions of debt sustainability 
within the existing European structures.  
Sustainable debt is the “healthy” debt that is not dying, or, in other words the debt 
that is not and never going to be fully repayable, fully cancellable and resolvable. In 
Greek sustainable debt is translated as βιώσιµο—from the root bio—debt, which means 
the debt that is livable. As argued in the Interlude, this kind of never fully repayable, 
never fully cancellable and never fully resolvable debt is the “infinite debt” that in 
Nietzsche’s terms “precludes pessimistically, once and for all, the prospect of a final 
discharge” (Nietzsche, 1969:21) and in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms “eliminates every 
consideration of exchange” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 180). According to Maurizio 
Lazzarato this is one of the most important contributions of Deleuze and Guattari. In his 
thought provoking book The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal 
Condition, Maurizio Lazzarato argues that “by asserting its [debt’s] infinite nature (…) 
Deleuze and Guattari grasped very early on and throughout their work one of the major 
transformations of modern-day capitalism” (Lazaratto, 2012: 89) and he adds, “the power 
of debt leaves you free, and it encourages you and pushes you to act in such a way that 
you are able to honor your debts” (30). In my contention, within frames of contemporary 
European debt politics, notions of debt sustainability are funded upon a very cruel 
contradiction: nations-states are expected to repay debts that by default are designed to be 
un-payable and un-resolvable.   
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There is a plethora of European mechanisms that both conceptually and materially 
inscribe this cruel contradiction into the very core of the European Union. The next 
section places particular emphasis on the “informal”14 and, borrowing a phrase from 
Giorgio Agamben, “exceptional” aspect of these mechanisms and on the capacity of these 
mechanisms to use national parliaments as tools of legitimization and formalization of 
their informality and exceptionality. For now I would like to contend that, on a level of 
public discourse, one of the most successful mechanisms that manages to crystalize 
notions of debt sustainability as the “right” and, as I will argue in detail in the next 
section, as the “only” solution—also known as There Is No Alternative (TINA)—is the 
production of narratives of “ethos.” According to those narratives, the poor, lazy and 
unproductive European south needs to labor more in order to pay the price of its laziness 
and unproductivity to the rich, productive and hard-working north. Although I could cite 
innumerous Angela Merkel, Donald Tusk, Jeroen Dijsseloem, Jean-Claude Juncker and 
Wolfgang Scahuble’s quotes that perpetuate this narrative, I will wait until the next 
section where I am specifically focusing on Greece’s international creditors. For now I 
would like to recall an experience of mine that happened back in 2010: when Giorgos 
Papandreou signed the first memorandum with Greece’s international creditors and I had 
to migrate to the US in order to send money home.  
One of the three jobs that I did during the years 2010-2011 in the US was work at 
a Greek freight broker agency that imported the “Olympus” Greek yogurt from Greece. 
The freight broker agency was located inside an accountant’s office, owned by a Greek 
American whose parents migrated to the US almost 60 years ago. One day I was not 
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  European	  Council-­‐Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  “Eurogroup”	  	  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-­‐eu/eurogroup/	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doing so well because my parents and I struggled to pay the χαράτσι (haratsi): a very high 
real estate tax that after the first MOU was combined with the electricity bill. Anyone 
who did not pay the χαράτσι did not have electricity. When I communicated that struggle 
to the owner of the accountant’s office he simply replied “You had it coming you know? 
All these years just lazing and vacating while other European states work non-stop? I 
have to admit I am kind of happy” As someone who experiences Greece’s condition from 
within while being part of the “brain drain” who had to migrate in order to send money 
home, I would like to mention that, especially after the victory of the left party of 
SYRIZA, this narrative was the predominate narrative in the public discourse of Greece’s 
international creditors. This is why Tsipras in his programmatic statements promised that 
SYRIZA’s decisions would not burden “the people of Europe.” In order to put an end to 
the conceptual and eventually the structural production of this narrative, and to 
“convince” the rich North to recognize Greece as equal among equals, Tsipras and 
SYRIZA chose to perform within the frames that produce this narrative—the “existing 
frames of the European Union and the European institutions” like he said—and to thus 
perpetuate notions of Greek debt sustainability without publically re-assigning new 
meaning upon them.  
But the European Union is not a synthesis of equal nation-states. On the contrary, 
the European Union is a surplus economy that is founded upon non-resolvable 
asymmetrical power relations among the nation-states that assemble it. Αs Yianis 
Varoufakis—Greece’s former finance minister and current co-organizer of the Diem25 
movement in Europe—reminds us, within frames of the European monetary union “just 
as one person’s debt is another person’s asset, one nations deficit in another’s surplus.” 
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(Varoufakis, 2016: 9) As Varoufakis also reminds us, Nicholas Kaldor—a post-
Kaynesian economist—argued that, “it is a dangerous error to believe that a monetary 
and an economic union can precede a political union” (88). This why Varoufakis argues 
that “you can’t go from a European cartel to a European democracy” (97). Although the 
next section elaborates in detail on EU’s economical and political aspects for now I 
would like to draw upon Varoufakis and to argue that EU is a surplus economy that uses 
masks of “solidarity” and equality in order to make the debtor/ nation-states take the 
asymmetrical power relations with their creditors for granted—known as There Is No 
Alternative (TINA) narratives—without even challenging them.  
It is because of this emphasis on the monetary aspect of the European Union that 
according to the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, and Germany’s former minister 
of finance, Wolfgang Schauble, “debt write-off will not work in the currency union.” 
Tsipras tried to challenge the European Union’s emphasis on its monetary aspect by 
publically arguing that EU’s masks of political solidarity that serve its interests as a 
surplus economy are not masks but the actual conceptual constitution of the “original” 
European Union. But according to Tsipras this kind of European Union is lost, gone and 
forgotten. During the official proclamation of the referendum, Tsipras argued that the 
referendum would enhance Greece’s negotiating power so that the left government of 
SYRIZA could fight for a “sustainable agreement that respects democracy and the 
common European rules and that will lead to the final exodus from the crisis.”15 He also 
stated that, “there are no owners and guests in Europe.”16 But that was not the only time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Info	  (at)	  ennikos.	  “Οι	  δηλώσεις	  του	  Πρωθυπουργού	  για	  το	  δημοψήφισμα”	  Filmed	  [June	  
2015]	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Tsipras publically and officially conceptualized the constitution of the European Union as 
a politically oriented democratic constitution. The list of similar statements by Tsipras is 
long. 
The paradox here is that according to SYRIZA’s constitutional principles EU was 
never considered as a democratic political union but as a monetary union that would 
become a democratic union only after the multiple interventions of the various European 
lefts. Furthermore, according to SYRIZA’s radically left orientations, the monetary 
European Union is founded upon the segregation between “owners and guests.” Right 
after Pierre Laurent—head of the European Left—announced Tsipras candidacy for the 
presidency of the European Commission back in 2013, Tsipras’s in his acceptance speech 
stated that, “we were the ones [SYRIZA and the European left] who, even before the 
genesis of Eurozone, highlighted the flaws, inadequacies and destabilizing asymmetries 
of the plan. We kept declaring, and we were proved right, that there can be no union 
segregated by a monetary wall.”17 But even during his speech at the “NO” demonstration 
three days before the Greek referendum in 2015 Tsipras publically stated that “the 
Europe that we once knew, the Europe of its constitutional values has nothing in common 
with the Europe of the extortions and the ultimatums”18 As opposed to SYRIZA’s 
programmatic statements before SYRIZA’s victory in the Greek snap elections of 2015, 
Tsipras and the left government of SYRIZA chose to frame the “not-yet” democratic 
European potentiality as a forgotten actuality.  
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According to SYRIZA’s public conceptualization and framing of resistance, 
Greece—“the birthplace of democracy”19 as Tsipras stated in the speech that he gave 
during the “NO” demonstration—is what Europe needs so that it can find again its lost 
conceptual basis. During the same speech Tsipras introduced a parallel trajectory between 
the mythical abduction of Europe by Zeus and Europe’s current condition. According to 
Tsipras Zeus has now been replaced by the “technocrats”.20 Additionally, for Tsipras “in 
this land [Greece] where democracy was born, democracy will be reborn”21 These highly 
problematic nationalist aspects of Tsipras and SYRIZA’s public framing of resistance are 
the main focus of the third chapter where I am also examining the rise of the Greek 
extreme far right. For now I would like to emphasize that SYRIZA—a party of the 
radical left that fights nationalism and its manifestations—used notions of nationalism in 
order to publically argue that Europe’s current condition does not prove that there was 
something wrong with EU’s conceptual foundation but, on the contrary, that something 
went wrong with its actualization.  
Let me recount my steps in regards to Tsipras and SYRIZA’s public 
conceptualization of resistance in order to explain why I contend that ghosts of Hegel 
limited the conceptual capacities of the former. As opposed to the oppositional 
SYRIZA—when SYRIZA was an oppositional party—governing SYRIZA chose to 
publically frame and conceptualize its resistance against Greece’s international creditors 
not only by describing the European Union as a synthesis of equalities and not as an 
assemblage, borrowing a concept from Deleuze and Guattari, of asymmetrical power 
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relations—but also by framing everything that the left government of SYRIZA imagines 
for the European Union to become, as a lost gone and forgotten actuality. By doing so, 
SYRIZA masquerades the asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its 
international creditors as relations that are transformable to a mutually resolvable 
exchange.  
Therefore, while the oppositional SYRIZA highlighted the asymmetrical and non-
resolvable power relations between Greece and its international creditors, the governing 
SYRIZA, the SYRIZA that “negotiates” directly with Greece’s international creditors, 
choses to publically frame and conceptualize the asymmetrical and non-resolvable 
relations between Greece and its international creditors as relations between equals. In 
response to the narratives that describe Greece as the “lazy and poor South” that I 
described earlier in this section, the left government of SYRIZA wants to be reciprocally 
recognized by Greece’s international creditors as their equal. As a result, in the name of 
non-existing equality, SYRIZA introduces the seeming promise of a resolution that is 
doomed to remain infinitely elusive.  
 That brings us back to this section’s main argument: that particularly during the 
2015-2016 political turmoil, SYRIZA’s public conceptualizations, framings and staging 
of resistance, were haunted by Hegel’s specters—paraphrasing Derrida—of Antigone. 
The next sub-section elaborates on these hauntings in order to potentially “exorcise” them 
and to investigate what a non-dialectical reading of Antigone has to offer to praxes of 
resistance that have to and are asked to perform within 21st century frames of European 
neoliberalism. 
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1. 3 Antigone in Indebted Greece: An Unwritten Archive of Resistance  
 Drawing upon the thought process that I introduced in the first section of this 
chapter I contend that Hegel’s reading of Antigone, or better, the notion of history that 
Hegel constructs through his reading of Sophocle’s tragedy of Antigone, can be 
summarized in three conceptual steps: one, two equally oppositional forces collide with 
each other and thus complement each other’s one-sidedness (while they are both 
conscious and dependent upon the other’s one-sidedness), two, this collision is 
teleologically oriented towards a higher unity and that teleological orientation is driven 
by a both a higher and an external force of νέµεσις (nemesis, distribution/ allocation) and 
three, that externality of nemesis transforms the tension between the colliding forces into 
a mutual exchange.  
So for Hegel, tragedy—and on another level history, since Hegel looks at attic 
tragedy in order to theorize on history—continuously leads to a mutually resolvable 
exchange. The notion of tragedy that this dissertation proposes addresses the 
disproportionate and non-resolvable power relations between a creditor and a debtor. 
Furthermore, according to the concept of tragedy that this dissertation introduces, notions 
of exchange perform as masks that perpetuate the non-resolvable creditor/ debtor power 
relations.  
As argued earlier, in 2015-2016 Greece SYRIZA chose to do what Hegel did: it 
conceptualized its resistance against Greece’s international creditors in terms of a 
teleologically resolvable exchange. SYRIZA failed to understand that any promise of 
mutually resolvable exchange between Greece and its international creditors is nothing 
but a “mask”, an “appearance” that, in Nietzsche’s terms “hones a sophistical dialectic 
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for the speeches of the heroes” (54) and that “speaks only counterfeit, masked speeches” 
(Nietzsche, 1993: 54). By claiming that equality exists where equality does not exist, both 
Hegel and SYRIZA prevent any potential equality from actualizing itself mainly because 
they refuse to acknowledge its absence. According to David Graeber—the London 
School of Economic’s anarchist-activist who influenced the Occupy movement—debt is 
what happens “in the shadow of eventual equality” (Graeber, 2011:122) And he adds, 
“the fact that is perceived as equality makes things even more difficult” (191). As Butler 
reminds us, in the case of Hegel’s Antigone, Antigone desires to be recognized by her 
dead brother (Butler, 2000: 12). But while for Hegel Antigone’s quest for recognition 
where recognition is impossible is what is necessary for history to progress, for Butler 
this “impossibility” is what should make us ask what “would have made her life possible” 
(24). Hegel wants his Antigone to keep questing for a recognition that nevertheless 
remains elusive.  
Although SYRIZA, as I described earlier does not want to, it nonetheless 
introduces the seeming promise of a resolution and an equality that also remains elusive, 
and it does so by publically conceptualizing and framing its resistance in Hegelian terms. 
Because of this specific understanding of resistance SYRIZA did not manage to really 
ask what, paraphrasing Butler, “would have made its pre-victory programmatic 
statements possible” But if the promise of resolution remains elusive then what kind of 
“exodus from the tragedy of Greek debt crisis” did Tsipras promise?  
The kind of ironically inclusive exodus, that Hegel finds in his Antigone. For 
Hegel Antigone is the “everlasting irony of the community” (Hegel, 1977). Her exclusion 
is immanent to the community that casts Antigone as an outsider. SYRIZA, especially 
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during its negotiations with Greece’s international creditors staged no-exit kind of 
exodus. This exodus with no-exit, beyond masquerading the asymmetrical power 
relations between Greece and its international creditors as resolvable, also included 
masking Greece’s current condition as a “sovereign debt crisis” and not as a crisis that 
jeopardized Greece’s ability to continue being a good debtor.  
A good debtor slowly pays but never fully repays its debt. This means that 
Greece’s international creditors lend Greece not in spite of but because of Greece’s 
inability to fully repay its debt. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari describe 
this condition as the “tragic regime of infinite debt” where “nothing is ever over and 
done” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 587) Additionally, in Anti-Oedipus, they argue that 
“the infinite creditor and infinite credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and finite 
debts (…) A time will come when the creditor has not yet lent while the debtor never 
quits” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 197) From this point of view there is not an exodus 
from the tragedy of the Greek debt crisis simply because Greek debt is not in crisis. It is 
the good debtor Greece that is in crisis and a good debtor remains always inclusively 
excluded by its creditors.  
I contend that unfortunately the Greek referendum of 2015 also became part of 
SYRIZA’s no-exit exodus. Tsipras and the left government of SYRIZA did not conduct a 
referendum that asked the Greek people to decide whether they want to participate or not 
in the conceptual and structural production of its indebtedness. On the contrary the Greek 
referendum of 2015 referendum asked from the Greek people to vote “YES” or “NO” to 
the “proposal made to Greece by the EC, the IMF and the ECB during the Eurogroup 
meeting on June 25 2015.” And although both the official opposition and Greece’s 
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international creditors argued that the referendum was on Greece’s “membership”22 in the 
European Union–as Jean-Claude Juncker stated in his press conference on the Greek 
referendum on June 29 2015—Tsipras, right after the announcement of the referendum 
results—according to which 61.31% voted “NO”—stated that “I know really well that the 
order that you [the Greek people] gave me is not an order of exodus from Europe”23 As a 
result the Greek referendum of 2015 said “NO” to one of eurogroup’s specific proposals 
not to the conceptual and structural circumstances that produce this kind of proposal.  
Ironically enough three days after the Greek referendum, from within the 
European parliament Tsipras “legitimized” the “NO” result of the referendum through the 
figure of Antigone. He specifically referred to Sophocle’s Antigone and stated that, “since 
you referred to ancient Greek tragedy, I would like to remind you that one of the most 
important ancient tragedians, with his masterpiece Antigone taught us that there are 
moments when the greatest law of all human laws is justice for all human beings and I 
think that now is one of those moments”24 Ten days after the Greek referendum and 
seven days after his speech in the European parliament Tsipras and the left government of 
SYRIZA signed a third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors. Just like 
Hegel’s Antigone was always already dispossessed from the possibility of living, 
SYRIZA was always already dispossessed from the capacity to resist. In the speech that 
Tsipras gave in the Greek parliament on August 13, 2015—when the government of 
SYRIZA asked from the rest of the parliament to vote for the third MOU that Tsipras had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  PoliticsSpain.	  “Jean-­‐Claude	  Juncker	  Press	  Conference	  on	  Greek	  referendum	  1/2	  “	  Posted	  
[June	  2015]	  YouTube	  video,	  23:02.	  Filmed	  [June	  2015]	  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-­‐wmrAEtYJg8	  
23	  ΒΑΘΥ	  ΚΟΚΚΙΝΟ.	  “Δηλώσεις	  Α.	  Τσίπρα	  μετά	  το	  δημοψήφισμα”	  Posted	  [July	  2015]	  
YouTube	  Video,	  5:24.	  Filmed	  [July	  2015]	  	  
24	  CNS	  channel.	  “ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΛΟΓΙΑ	  ΑΛΕΞΗ	  ΤΣΙΠΡΑ	  ΣΤΟ	  ΕΥΡΩΚΟΙΝΟΒΟΥΛΙΟ	  8-­‐7-­‐2015”	  
Posted	  [July	  2015]	  YouTube	  video,	  13:46.	  Filmed	  [July	  2015]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   67	  
already signed with Greece’s international creditors on July 15, 2015—he said that “the 
dilemma that Greece’s international creditors imposed on SYRIZA during the 
negotiations was: a memorandum with euro or memorandum with drachma”25 finally 
implying that Greece’s international creditors wanted to prevent Greece from exiting its 
current condition of indebtedness to its creditors.  
From a theatre and performance studies perspective the two questions that in my 
contention need to be addressed ask, why in contexts of 21st century neoliberal Europe 
Hegel’s reading of Antigone becomes an integral part of SYRIZA’s public 
conceptualizations, framings and staging of resistance? Additionally, moving one step 
forward, would the exorcism of Hegel’s specters of Antigone introduce more efficacious 
praxes of resistance? Starting from the first question I would like to clarify one thing. The 
question does not intend to address the affinities between Hegelian theories and 
philosophies on the one hand and political lefts on the other. Besides the histories of 
those affinities are long and well known. The question intends to address the reasons why 
Hegelian readings of Antigone were so popular among Greece’s left government of 
SYRIZA especially when the latter tried to challenge and disrupt 21st century European 
debt economy.  
Drawing upon the thought process that this chapter introduces one could answer 
this question by arguing that neoliberalism creates its own resistance but does it in a way 
so that resistance never succeeds in disrupting neoliberalism. As a result a left 
government of a debtor nation-state is doomed to frame its resistance in terms of mutual 
exchange while 21st century European neoliberalism makes sure that a mutually 
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resolvable exchange between a debtor nation-state and its international creditors never 
happens. Drawing upon that thought process I would like to argue that exactly because of 
the very long histories of affinities between Hegelianism and political lefts, Hegelian 
readings of Antigone somehow belong to SYRIZA’s unwritten archive of resistance—
archive because of Tsipras’ vague reference to the textuality of both Sophocle’s Antigone 
and Hegel’s analysis of Antigone, and unwritten because these textualities perform on a 
level of specters and phantasms. I contend that when, during the assembly of the 
European Parliament on July 8th 2015 Tsipras referred to the non-textual aspect of the 
“greatest law of all human laws”26 the Greek prime minister called for a 
conceptualization of resistance that exists in a space where textuality is continuously in 
negotiation with its multiple specters and its potential actualizations.  
Certain theatre and performance studies discourse has shed light on the non-
causal, non-hierarchical—especially in terms of temporality—relations and very creative 
tensions between notions of textuality, spectrality and actualization. As Bill Worthen 
argues in “Antigone’s Bones” it is because of works like Diana Taylor’s The Archive and 
the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas that we deal with these 
tensions in terms of a “constant state of interaction” (Worthen 2008: 11). That “constant 
state of interaction” does not only take away any notion of prioritization of the text over 
the performance and vice versa but it also takes away any notion of inadequate 
similitude.  
Ironically enough both Taylor and Worthen refer to Antigone in order to offer 
some “ground” to this constant state of interaction. Firstly Worthen cites Taylor, 
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What changes over time is the value, relevance, or meaning of the archive, how 
the items it contains get interpreted, even embodied. Bones might remain the 
same, even though their story may change, depending on the paleontologist or 
forensic anthropologist who examines them. Antigone might be performed in 
multiple ways, whereas the unchanging text assures a stable signifier (Taylor 
2003: 19). 
And then Worthen draws upon Taylor’s notion of Antigone’s bones and writes, 
The purpose of acting is not merely to clothe Antigone’s bones with new flesh—
the zombie theory of drama—but to use writing as a means to render the present 
relation with an audience significant (Worthen 2003: 8).  
Even though the focus of this section is not acting but the praxes of resistance that, 
especially during SYRIZA’s negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, were in a 
“constant state of interaction” with the publically communicated specters of Hegelian 
Antigone, I contend that Taylor and Worthen’s arguments lay the ground for 
understanding how, even though SYRIZA’s resistance was publically framed in terms of 
very limited Hegelian schemata, Tsipras’ public references to a vague textuality of an 
unwritten archive put the limitations of these schemata in constant negotiation with 
performances that can potentially move beyond these limitations.  
 From this point of view the negotiations do not just take place between text and 
performance but also between the unwritten archive of public discourse of textuality and 
multiple performances. In my contention that unwritten archive is not conveyed, repeated 
and differentiated on a level of collective memory, knowledge or imagination but also on 
a level of assumption. Tsipras assumed that his references to Antigone and to Hegel’s 
analysis of Antigone would interact with and trigger certain performances of resistance. 
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What Tsipras fortunately missed is that the only thing he achieved by his assumption and 
his reference to this unwritten archive of SYRIZA’s resistance is that he shed light on the 
ongoing interactions between that unwritten archive and performances of resistance.  
 These interactions really challenge any text VS performance dichotomies since 
they clearly reveal the simultaneity and coexistence between the textual and the non-
textual and aspects of textuality. Worthen is right to alert us that this is not the same with 
understanding nontextuality in terms of performances that are resistant to text. In 
“Antigone’s Bones” Worthen argues that the latter are “concerned to model the 
nontextual transmission of history through forms of performance outside of or 
strategically resistant to writing” (22). And he adds, “writing bears its alterity to 
embodiment and subjection into the location and temporality of enactment” (27). In other 
words, writing is written in order to be altered, challenged, ignored, differentiated, 
betrayed, exorcised.  
 When from within the space of the European Parliament Tsipras framed 
SYRIZA’s resistance against Greece’s international creditors in terms of Antigone’s non-
textuality, he—I believe unintentionally—positioned resistance on a stage where 
textuality, specters of textuality and praxes of actualization never stop to negotiate with 
each other. That I contend answers the second question of this section: the question that 
intended to investigate the more efficacious praxes of resistance that, in 2015-2016 
Greece can potentially emerge from the exorcism of Hegel’s specters of Antigone.  
But Tsipras was not the only one who referred to the non-textual aspects of 
dramatic textuality. Larry Eliott in his article “Greek Debt Crisis: an existentialist drama 
with no good end in sight” published in the guardian on February 5 2017 argues that, 
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“Sartre’s Huis Clos [No Exit] has three damned souls arguing in a room for eternity. 
Greece has Tsipras, Schauble and Lagarde […]”27 The next section places particular 
emphasis on how Greece’s international creditors publically frame, conceptualize and 
stage their politics of debt.  
 
1.4 IMF, EC and ECB: Staging the “Ethography” of Un-payable Debt OR 
Memorandum Stage Right?  
Gross: Do you know Ptydepe?  
Hana: No  
Gross: Then how did you know this was an official memorandum?  
Hana: They say that in the first stage Ptydepe was used only for 
important official memoranda and that these are now being received 
by some of the stuff (Havel Memorandum 1967: 13). 
 
 Havel’s Memorandum sheds light on how memoranda produce memory that is not 
memory and that is rendered memory by force only to be forgotten as the new status quo. 
In the previous section I argued that Hegel’s Antigone haunted SYRIZA’s public 
conceptualizations, framing and staging of resistance in ways that restrained SYRIZA 
from introducing to the spheres of public discourse and performance the kind of language 
and concepts that could make explicit the implicit and aspects of the power that the left 
government SYRIZA was fighting against. As a result the left government of SYRIZA 
failed to publically grasp the disproportionate, lopsided and non-resolvable power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Eliott,	  Larry.	  “Greek	  Debt	  Crisis:	  an	  existentialist	  drama	  with	  no	  good	  end	  in	  sight”	  The	  
Guardian,	  February	  5	  2017	  https://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-­‐
blog/2017/feb/05/greek-­‐debt-­‐crisis-­‐existentialist-­‐drama-­‐schauble-­‐tsipras-­‐lagarde-­‐trump	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relations between Greece and its international creditors that, especially within frames of 
21st neoliberal Europe, are hidden beneath the appearance and the seeming promise of a 
resolution that nonetheless remains elusive.  
This section will place particular emphasis on how, within frames of 21st 
neoliberal Europe, Greece’s international creditors—the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the European Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB)—
publically conceptualize, frame and stage, and eventually legitimize, their neoliberal 
politics of debt. I will closely examine how these public conceptualizations, framings and 
staging of these politics are inscribed into a ongoing production of memoranda. I will 
investigate how this production of memoranda plays out in a disingenuous construction 
of a creditor/ debtor relationship that implies that Greece’s debt can and has to be paid 
while essentially rendering it un-payable and hence a permanent means of political 
leverage. Noam Chomsky in his Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order 
reminds us that according to George Kennan—the American diplomat and historian 
known for publically deconstructing his own policies that influenced the Marshall Plan—
“we should ‘cease to talk about vague and unreal objectives such as human rights, the 
raising of the living standards and democratization’ and must ‘deal in straight power 
concepts.’” (Chomsky, 1999: 15) Drawing upon Chomsky’s reminder of Kennan, this is 
exactly what this section does: it frames in terms of “straight power” the cruelty of the 
politics of debt that Greece’s international conceal behind masks of an “ethos of 
payback.”  
 Especially during SYRIZA’s negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, 
the latters use masks of “ethos” in order to legitimize, borrowing a phrase from Deleuze 
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and Guattari, the “schizophrenic” aspect of Greek debt. As I will argue later in this 
section I am using Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “schizophrenia” in order to 
understand Greek debt because on the one hand Greek debt is designed by Greece’s 
international creditors to never be fully repaid and on the other hand, in the name of an 
illusionary resolution and a vague notion of a “payback ethos” Greece’s international 
creditors demand its repayment.  
One of the most unacceptable, racist and sexist undertones of this, frequently 
unethical, vague notion of a “payback ethos” manifested itself through Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem’s—finance minister of Denmark, current president of the eurogroup and the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)—most recent statement about the European South. 
In an interview on March 20 2017 with the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine 
(FAZ) the Dutch finance minister stated that, “One [the southern European countries] 
cannot spend all the money in drinks and women and then ask for help.”28 As if the 
statement was not enough on its own when during the European Parliament press 
conference on March 26 2017 Dijsselbloem was asked whether he is going to apologize, 
he very clearly responded “No”29 But before focusing on more specific examples that 
come from the public and institutionalized stages on which Greece’s international 
creditors perform, and that are vaguely related to this unethical notion of “payback ethos” 
that divide Europe in the responsible North that shows solidarity to the lazy and selfish 
South that vacates, I would like to revisit Deleuze and Guattari in order to lay the 
conceptual ground that will serve as a theoretical lens for this section’s main arguments. 
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  Reporters.	  “Anger	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  Eurozone	  finance	  ministers	  says	  southern	  
Europe	  blew	  cash	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  Footbal/	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  Spanish	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This brief elaboration on the conceptual ground of this section’s arguments will shed 
light on the ways that these vague notions of “payback ethos”—notions that as one can 
see in Dijsselbloem’s case can often become unethically racist and sexist—find their way 
into the memorandums, structural reforms and austerity measures that the IMF, the EC 
and the ECB impose on Greece.  
 Earlier I borrowed Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “schizophrenia” in order to 
grasp how Greek debt is produced to be at the same time both payable—on a level of 
illusion— and un-payable—on a level of impossibility. Greek debt carries both the 
illusion of its capacity to be repaid—what, as I argued earlier in the Interlude, Nietzsche 
defines “redemption through illusion” (Nietzsche, 1933: 25)—and the impossibility of its 
resolution. Deleuze and Guattari understand this coexistence between the production of 
the illusion of a resolution and the production of the impossibility of that resolution, as 
schizophrenia. In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari 
describe schizophrenia as a process that produces “the illusion of substantiality but which 
is none other than [its] alienated form” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 94) But for Deleuze 
and Guattari it is not about making a choice between the illusion of resolution’s 
substantiality on the one hand and its impossibility on the other but about understanding 
the very real manifestations of their synthesis and coexistence.  
 In order to conceptualize this kind of contradictory coexistence, Deleuze and 
Guattari turn to tragedy. In Anti-Oedipus they draw upon Arthur Miller in order to go 
“against the [Hegelian] tragedy, against ‘the fatal drama of the personality’, against ‘the 
inevitable confusion between mask and actor.” (299) And this is where I contend that 
Deleuze and Guattari put Nietzsche in dialogue with Marx. I would like to briefly remind 
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us that in the two previous sections I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s focus on 
Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy is in fact a strategy for understanding how the non-
resolvable power relations between creditor and debtor are hidden beneath the illusion of 
a resolution that remains elusive.  
 It is that production of illusion of resolution—a production that as I contended 
earlier combines the illusion of resolution with its complete unfeasibility—that through 
the works of Marx, Deleuze and Guattari understand as the “hypocricy” (259) of the 
capitalism regime. They specifically argue in Anti-Oedipus that capitalism “produces an 
awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its 
vast powers of repression to bear” and they add, “it [capitalism] continually seeks to 
avoid reaching its limit while simultaneously tending toward that limit.” From this point 
of view the “real” becomes “more and more artificial” (34) According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, Marx managed to grasp this “hypocricy” of capitalism and this “artificiality” of 
the real through his notion of surplus value: “Marx termed the twofold movement of the 
tendency to a falling rate of profit, and the increase in the absolute quantity of surplus 
value, the law of the counteracted tendency.” (34) But if for Deleuze and Guattari Marx 
managed to grasp the coexistence between reality and artificiality, or the coexistence 
between the illusion of resolution and the impossibility of resolution, not in terms of a 
Hegelian oppositional synthesis but in terms of a “twofold movement” then Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Marx is a less Hegelian and a more Nietzschean Marx. Borrowing a phrase 
from Derrida, it is the “specter” (Derrida, 1994) of Deleuze and Guattari’s Nietzschean 
Marx that, in this section, is going to shed light on the memorandums, structural reforms 
and austerity measures that the EU and the Eurozone impose onto the European South.  
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But before I go there I would like to take some time and look for this Marx in 
Marx himself. This Marx is the Marx that understands the coexistence between the 
illusion and the impossibility of resolution of debt as the foundation of the non-resolvable 
creditor/ debtor power relations. Furthermore this Marx is the Marx that frames these 
non-resolvable creditor/ debtor power relations in terms of an obligatory “morality of the 
poor.” In his Comments on James Mill Marx understands two types of credit relationship. 
One of these two types occurs when “the man to whom credit is given is himself a man of 
means” (Marx, 2000: 29). In that case Marx argues that, “credit becomes merely a 
medium facilitating exchange.” (Marx, 2000: 29) For Marx this type of creditor/ debtor 
relation between people of the same class is not a power relation.  
The other type of credit relationship happens when “a rich man gives credit to a 
poor man whom he considers industrious and decent.” (29) In this case Marx specifically 
argues that, “all the social virtues of the poor man, the content of his vital activity, his 
existence itself, represent for the rich man the reimbursement of his capital with the 
customary interest.” And he adds, “owing to the fact that in the credit system the moral 
recognition of a man, as also trust in the state, etc., take the form of credit, the secret 
contained in the lie of moral recognition, the immoral vileness of this morality, as also 
the sanctimoniousness and egoism of that trust in the state, become evident and show 
themselves for what they really are.” (Marx, 2000: 29) I contend that in this moment, 
through this conceptualization of the immoral power relations that emerge from notions 
of “trust and morality” Marx differentiates himself from Hegel. Simply stated, Hegel’s 
reciprocal recognition, through the lenses of Marx becomes a permanent means of 
political leverage.  
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This kind of political leverage that emerges from non-resolvable creditor/ debtor 
power relations that produce both the illusion and the impossibility of a resolution 
becomes a constant script or, borrowing a phrase from Marx, a “borrowed language” for 
events that “first time occur as a tragedy the second as a farce” (Marx, 2002: 15). For 
Nietzsche this constant script is part of a system of “mnemotechnics” (Nietzsche, 2013: 
37). Nietzsche argues that, “when man thinks it necessary to make for himself a memory” 
(37) this system of “mnemotechnics” makes sure to “hypnotize the whole intellectual 
system through these ‘fixed ideas’” and becomes the means of freeing those ideas from 
the competition of all other ideas so as to make them unforgettable” (Nietzsche, 2013: 
37) For Deleuze and Guattari Nietzsche’s concept of “mnemotechnics” becomes a 
strategy for understanding capitalism not in terms of exchange but in terms “inscription” 
of infinite and unresolvable debt (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 185) Bridging this thought 
process to this chapter’s main argument that both the left government of SYRIZA and 
Greece’s international creditors use concepts and language that do not and cannot frame 
Greece’s condition of indebtedness in terms of power relations, this section will offer 
concepts and language that do otherwise.   
In the following paragraphs I will relate the thought process that I have been 
introducing since the beginning of this section to the ways Greece’s international 
creditors—the EC, the ECB and the IMF—publically conceptualized, framed, stages and 
eventually legitimized their neoliberal politics of debt. The Economist two days before 
the eurogroup that happened on February 20 2017 published an article that referred to 
another one of what Derrida would call Marx’s specters. According to the article “If 
history repeats itself first as tragedy then as farce, it continues thereafter as endless 
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iterations of Greek dramas.” 30 In the rest of the section I will closely examine the public 
concepts and language that Greece’s international creditors used in order to stage these 
dramas in the name of a vague and frequently unethical notion of “payback ethos.”  
When on June 28 2015 the left government of SYRIZA froze the negotiations 
with Greece’s international creditors and called for a Greek referendum that asked from 
the Greek people to say either “Yes” or “No” to the austerity measures “suggested” by 
Greece’s international creditors, IMF, EC and ECB representatives kept bombarding 
public and institutionalized stages with narratives according to which the “trust” between 
Greece and its creditors was broken. Although the list of examples is seemingly 
inexhaustible for now I would like to focus on the statements that Jean-Claude Juncker—
the president of the European Commission—made during the first European Commission 
conference on the Greek referendum. He publically stated that he feels “betrayed” and 
that the Greek government did not act based on the “True European Spirit, based on 
rules, based on mutual trust”31 As I argued earlier in this section for Marx this kind of 
demand of performing “trust” becomes a permanent means of political leverage.  
But the question is not if Juncker’s perception of “trust” and “ethos” demands 
“and the weak suffer what they must”—borrowing a phrase from Thucydides—kind of 
performances. The question is how this perception of “ethos”—an “ethos” that does not 
disrupt the already existing unethically asymmetrical power relations—finds its way into 
the memorandums, austerity measures and structural reforms that not just Greece’s 
international creditors, but also the European North, impose not just on Greece but also 
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  The	  economist.	  “Greece’s	  creditors	  are	  now	  the	  main	  impediment	  to	  solving	  the	  country’s	  
woes”	  February	  18	  2017	  http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21717043-­‐biggest-­‐
difference-­‐now-­‐between-­‐imf-­‐and-­‐europeans-­‐greeces-­‐creditors-­‐are-­‐now-­‐main	  
31	  PoliticsSpain.	  “Jean-­‐Claude	  Juncker	  Press	  Conference	  on	  Greek	  referendum	  1/2	  “	  Posted	  
[June	  2015]	  YouTube	  video,	  23:02.	  Filmed	  [June	  2015]	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on the European South. After the Greek referendum of 2015, Greece’s international 
creditors publically framed the obligatory future steps that the left government of 
SYRIZA had to follow in terms of “trust rebuilt.” The president of the eurogroup Jeroen 
Disjjelbloem, the president of the European Council Donald Tusk, the president of the 
European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, 
the finance minister of Germany Wolfgang Schaeuble: all stated that “the first goal is to 
rebuild trust in Greece”32 These narratives of “trust rebuild” defined the measures that the 
Greek government had to follow.  
Greece’s international creditors inscribed this “trust rebuild” into the measures 
that they imposed on Greece. According to the official Euro Summit Statement in 
Brussels on July 12 2015 “The Euro Summit stresses the crucial need to rebuild trust with 
the Greek authorities for a possible agreement (…) given the need to rebuild trust with 
Greece, the Euro Summit welcomes the Greek authorities to legislate without delay a first 
set of measures (…) Immediately, and only subsequent to legal implementation [of those 
measures] may a decision to mandate the Institutions to negotiate a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) be taken”33 In short, Greece’s European creditors publically 
conceptualize notions of “ethos” in terms of a “trust” that does not challenge the 
unethically asymmetrical power relations between Greece and its international creditors. 
Furthermore they inscribe this “ethos” into the memorandums that they impose on 
Greece. The word memorandum, as one etymology suggests, comes from the root 
memorare: to remember.  
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  Matthew	  Kaminski.	  “Tusk:	  Nobody	  here	  is	  an	  angel”	  July	  3	  2015	  
http://www.politico.eu/article/tusk-­‐nobody-­‐here-­‐is-­‐an-­‐angel-­‐european-­‐council-­‐president-­‐
polish-­‐politics-­‐grexit-­‐greece-­‐referendum-­‐crisis/	  
33	  EUROSUMMIT,	  “Euro	  Summit	  Statement	  Brussels,	  12	  July	  2015”	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This is exactly the thought process that I introduced earlier in this section. Let me 
recount my steps: I argued that Marx conceptualized the “immorally” asymmetrical—to 
paraphrase Marx—creditor/ debtor power relations in terms of an ethos of a “vile and 
egoistic” (Marx, 2009: 29) trust. I also argued that Nietzsche conceptualized the 
“inscription” of this “ethos of trust” in terms of a production of “mnemotechnics”: a 
production that through its inscription makes sure to “build a memory for the man” 
(Nietzsche, 2013: 37) Also a production that makes sure to “hypnotize” (37) concepts, 
language and ideas that challenge this specific production of inscription. This is what 
Deleuze and Guattari meant when they argued that within the capitalist regime “society is 
not exchangist, the socius is inscriptive” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 185). Furthermore 
for Deleuze “memorandum […] is at the same time afflicted with an essential forgetting, 
in accordance with that law of transcendental exercise which insists that what can only be 
recalled should also be empirically impossible to recall” (Deleuze 1994: 140). This is 
why earlier I drew upon Havel’s memorandum and argued that memoranda produce 
memory that is not memory and that is rendered memory by force only to be forgotten as 
the new status quo. Furthermore this is exactly what I define as “ethography”: a synthesis 
of vague notions of “ethos” that not only never challenge the unethically asymmetrical 
creditor/ debtor power relations but also inscribe those power relations onto texts that end 
up having the validity of a law.  
Within frames of 21st century European Union this production of “ethography” is 
related to the production and perpetuation of two kinds of narratives. The first one has to 
do with the “hypnotic” aspect of this “ethography” in terms of blocking the production of 
alternative conceptual solutions. These kinds of narratives are widely known as various 
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versions of the Thatcherian There Is No Alternative (TINA); Thatcher used to say that 
“there is no alternative” to market economy. EU’s representatives are currently 
reclaiming these narratives in order to convince everyone that neoliberalism is the only 
solution.  
The second one has to do with the “exceptional” –to paraphrase Agamben—
aspect of the law production that occurs within the European Union.  Although EU’s 
“exceptional” law production will be the main focus of the next chapter where I will 
extensively elaborate on performances of resistance, for now I would like to argue that 
within frames of 21st century European Union the decision making processes happen 
within “informal bodies”34, like the eurogroup, that are not minuted, are not answerable 
to any nationally elected parliament and have more power than the institutional 
formations of the European Union. As Agamben reminds, this kind of “exceptional” 
aspect of law production is characterized by the “provisional abolition of the distinction 
among legislative, executive, and juridical powers” (Agamben 2005: 8). This 
“exceptional” aspect of the law production that occurs within frames of 21st century 
European Union challenges the stories that neoliberalism tells itself—including the 
stories Greece’s international creditors tell themselves—regarding the boundaries 
between the political and the economical.  
As I briefly argued in the previous section 21st century neoliberal Europe is a 
surplus economy. This means that EU needs to create the political circumstances that can 
support, produce and reproduce this kind of surplus economy. This is what Noam 
Chomsky meant when, during his public “No debate” in New York public library on 
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  Council,	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  “Eurogroup”	  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-­‐eu/eurogroup/	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April 27 2016 with Greece’s former minister of finance Yianis Varoufakis, he argued 
that, “neoliberalism is not liberal and is not new.”35 As one can see in the examples that I 
mentioned earlier regarding the ways that Greece’s international creditors publically 
conceptualize, frame, stage and eventually legitimize their politics of debt, “measures” 
that are agreed during “informal” European meetings are imposed onto nationally elected 
parliaments.  
Greece’s international creditors claim to separate the political sphere from the 
sphere of economy. During his press conference on the Greek referendum of 2015 the 
president of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker stated that he “worked 
together with Jeroen Dijsselbloem for talks on a more political level as was the wish of 
the Greek authorities. This was not left to anonymous technocrats”36 But Juncker’s 
understanding of the “political” was not an understanding that focused on the decision-
making processes but an understanding that focused on the implementation of the 
decisions that had already been made. Within 21st century neoliberal Europe the 
separation between the political sphere and the sphere of economy is an illusion, a mask. 
That’s why according to Deleuze and Guattari “There has never been a liberal 
capitalism” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983: 253) If Deleuze and Guattari are right, then 
where can revolutionary resistance perform? This will be the main question of the next 
chapter.  
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  Diem25.official.	  “Yanis	  Varoufakis/	  Noam	  Chomsky,	  NYPL,	  26	  April”	  Posted	  [April	  27	  
2016]	  Youtube	  Video,	  1:43:16,	  Filmed	  [April	  26	  2016]	  
36	  European	  Commission.	  “Transcript	  of	  President	  Jean-­‐Claude	  Juncker’s	  press	  conference	  
on	  Greece”	  Brussels	  June	  29	  2015	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Chapter 2: Dromocratic Democracies 
2.1 Affirming Negation and Negating Affirmation: The “YES” and the “NO” 
Demonstrations Before the Greek Referendum of 2015 
On June 28th 2015 the newly elected Greek Prime Minister and President of 
SYRIZA Alexis Tsipras froze the negotiations with Greece’s international creditors and 
called for a Greek referendum scheduled for the 5th of July of 2015. According to 
Tsipras’s announcement the referendum would ask the citizens of Greece whether they 
accept (NAI, YES vote) or reject (ΟΧΙ, NO vote) the most recent proposal of austerity 
measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors. On Friday July 3rd 2015 two 
different and massive demonstrations were staged in the city of Athens: the ΝΑΙ (YES) 
demonstration and the OXI (NO) demonstration. Those who intended to vote YES joined 
the YES demonstration and those who intended to vote NO joined the NO demonstration.  
 The directorial and dramaturgical choices of the two demonstrations were, of 
course, completely different. The YES demonstration used the Παναθηναϊκό Στάδιο 
(Panathenaic Stadium) also known as Καλλιµάρµαρο (Kalimarmaro) as its stage in order 
to perform the Europeanness that the demonstration’s “ΝΑΙ: Μένουµε Ευρώπη” (YES: 
We are staying in Europe) slogan implicated. The Panathenaic Stadium served as the 
perfect stage for that performance of Europeanness for two reasons: One, it very clearly 
played back to the “neoliberalization” of a constructed ancient Greece (or, more 
accurately of many constructed ancient Greeces) that serve as a means of embellishment 
and thus legitimization of the infinite cruelty of European neoliberal politics; two, within 
frames of Olympian culture (frames that are very often founded upon and associated with 
notions of extreme nationalism and that very often flirt with right-wing and far-right 
politics) this specific stadium is “admired” and “celebrated” as the last Greek venue from 
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where the Olympic flame is handed over to the country/ host of the Olympic games. 
Therefore, by using the Panathenaic Stadium as its stage, the “YES” demonstration not 
only perpetuated but also counted on perpetuating the highly problematic narratives that 
frame Greece as an origin of Western civilization in order to convince the rest of Europe 
that it wouldn’t be able to maintain its “Westness” without Greece.  
 The political orientation of the “YES We Are Staying in Europe” demonstration 
was clearly a right-wing one. The demonstration was organized around speeches given by 
right-wing organizations and by voters and representatives of New Democracy. 
Furthermore, various Greek singers who have publically demonstrated their support for 
Greece’s political right performed during the demonstration. In addition to its right-wing 
orientation the “YES” demonstration was founded upon a non-literal reading of the 
question that the upcoming Greek referendum of July 2015 was going to address.  
According to this reading—a reading that was very common among various 
representatives of Greece’s official opposition and of the European Union as well as the 
majority of Greek press and media—a “YES” vote at the upcoming referendum would 
imply that Greece chooses to leave the euro—a process known as Grexit—and to return 
to δραχµή (drachma). As stated by one of the many facebook posts of the demonstration 
“The referendum […] asks us to choose between [saying] YES or NO to the common 
European currency, YES or NO to Europe. The dilemma is not [about voting] YES or 
NO to the proposal suggested by the government or by TROIKA” (Το Ποντίκι 2015). It 
is because of this kind of framing of the YES demonstration—especially because of its 
clear right-wing orientation—that I contend that this specific demonstration renders 
perceptible, and thus helps us grasp, the often very carefully concealed interdependencies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   85	  
between various national political rights of Europe and 21st century European 
neoliberalism.  
Although I will closely elaborate on the concealed interdependencies between 
various national political rights of Europe on a level of nation-state and 21st century 
European neoliberalism in the third section of this chapter for now I would like to briefly 
define the latter. Throughout both this chapter and dissertation I understand 21st century 
European neoliberalism as a debt economy that mainly profits from the—mostly always 
virtual—surplus value of indebted public life: health, education, access to water, 
electricity etc. Furthermore, as argued in the Anti-Prologue and Chapter 1, I contend that 
the European economy of debt is founded upon the asymmetrical power relations 
between certain nation-states that perform as creditors and certain nation-states that 
perform as debtors. Therefore the public life—the life of δήµος (demos, public)—that 
21st century European neoliberalism puts in debt is always-already organized in creditor/ 
nation-states and debtor/ nation-states.  
It is because of its profiting from indebting the nationally organized public life 
that the current European economy needs strong nation-states since, within frames of 21st 
century neoliberal Europe, it is the nation-states that are rendered responsible for 
applying the measures imposed by the EU and for making sure that certain public lives 
are profitably indebted. In this respect, we have a very clear conceptual sense of how the 
nation-state performs—what function it serves—within the structures of European 
neoliberalism. Consequently, the European Union is not opposed to the conceptual 
formation of the nation-state. On the contrary it needs it. This is a direct criticism of 
narratives and discourses that understand and promote the neoliberal European Union as 
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a market economy that is slowed down by the nation-state. This is exactly what Deleuze 
and Guattari mean when they write in Anti-Oedipus, “There has never been a liberal 
capitalism […] The State is thus induced to play an increasingly important role in the 
regulation of the axiomatized flows with regard to production and its planning the 
economy and its ‘monetarization’ and surplus value and its absorption (by the State 
apparatus itself)” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 253). For Deleuze and Guattari what is 
defined as “liberal free market”, is not “liberal”—which is also one Noam Chomsky’s 
most known arguments (Chomsky 1999)—it is not “free” and it is not “market.” On the 
contrary it needs the State in order to produce other kinds of flows of surplus value: flows 
that emerge from debt. 
In The Making of the Indebted Man Maurizio Lazzarato offers a similar 
understanding of Deleuze and Guattari. For Lazzarato “Deleuze insists on the point: an 
economy has never functioned as a market economy. Regardless of the social structure, 
an economy includes exchange and makes exchange networks work on the basis of 
money as purchasing power solely as a function of another flow”  (Lazzarato 2012: 83). 
Bridging the machinic philosophy of tragedy that the previous chapter introduced with 
this chapter’s argument that 21st century European neoliberalism and nation-state go 
together I contend that the synthesis of the neoliberal Europe with the formation of 
nation-state performs like a machine that produces the continuation and the disruption of 
flows of debt.  
As I argued earlier within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe the main target 
of that production of debt is public life. But very often that production of indebted public 
life is concealed beneath narratives and discourses that focus on a pseudo-oppositional 
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conflict between the market of the European Union and the nation-state. As very 
successfully—at least in my contention—Colin Crouch argues in The Strange Non-death 
of Neoliberalism, neoliberalism conceals putting public life in debt beneath masks that 
pretend that the actual tension lies between the free market, on the one hand, and the 
State on the other. According to Crouch, 
At the heart of the conundrum is the fact that actually existing, as 
opposed to ideologically pure, neoliberalism is nothing like as devoted to 
free markets as is claimed. It is rather devoted to the dominance of public 
life by the giant corporation. The confrontation between the market and 
the state that seems to dominate political conflict in many societies 
conceals the existence of this third force (Crouch 2011: 5). 
Furthermore, for Crouch, the privatization of public life is simultaneously an 
indebtedization of public life. In a section of the same book titled “Privatized 
Keynesianism: Debt in Place of Discipline” Crouch writes, “The general buoyancy of 
[this] economy [is] being sustained by debt” (109). Drawing upon Crouch I argue that 
within the current frames of neoliberal Europe the question that resistance should be 
addressing is not Market VS State but Debt Economy VS Public Life.  
 Using the State (κράτος) in order to put public life—the life of demos (demos, 
δήµος)—in debt leaves that demos utterly dispossessed of its κράτος (state). Additionally 
performances of support of neoliberal politics—like the “YES” demonstration—do not 
challenge but on the contrary perpetuate and enhance demos’ dispossession of its κράτος. 
As a result democracy is in danger. In such contexts, it is in fact difficult to envision 
democracy as an existing possibility. Earlier I made the case that the orientation of the 
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“YES We Are Staying in Europe” demonstration was clearly a neoliberal and a right-
wing one. Additionally I contended that the “YES” demonstration was founded upon a 
non-literal reading of the question that the upcoming Greek referendum was going to 
address. Bridging these arguments with the thought process that I unfolded above I argue 
that by directly refusing to say “NO” to European production of indebtedness, the “YES” 
demonstration not only affirmed the presence of demos in a public space in terms of what 
in the previous chapter I defined as the negativity of the debtor but it also eliminated the 
main process of democracy: disagreement. For the “YES” demonstration the demos of a 
debtor/ nation-state can only exist when it publically affirms both its condition of 
indebtedness and the dispossession of its κράτος (state).  
 Drawing upon the thought process that I unfolded above I contend that the “YES” 
demonstration lays the ground for us to identify the shared ground between Greece’s 
right-wing politics—and thus any praxis of “resistance” that is founded upon these 
politics—and the elimination of democracy in 21st century European neoliberalism. This 
is of great importance because within frames of 21st century Europe national rights gain 
power by pretending to resist European neoliberalism when in fact they actually support 
it.  
Although I will elaborate more on this matter in the third section of this chapter 
for now I would like to argue that the “YES” demonstration revealed this shared ground 
between national right-wing politics and European neoliberalism in three ways: one, by 
publically refusing to challenge European debt politics it affirmed Greece’s position 
within the European Union in terms of what in the previous chapter I described as the 
negativity of the debtor; two, it affirmed the demos’ dispossession of its κράτος (state) 
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since it chose to not even deal with the question of the referendum in literal terms; and 
three, it affirmed that within frames of 21st century European neoliberalism there is no 
space for a debtor/ nation-state to directly say “NO” to a measure imposed by the 
European Union. The “YES We Are Staying in Europe” demonstration performed 
affirmation in terms of negation since it affirmed Greece’s position in Europe through 
Greece’s indebtedness to its international creditors. As I argued in the first chapter of this 
dissertation when the debtor affirms its existence through its condition of indebtedness to 
their creditor this affirmative relation is an affirmative relation of negation. 
 The “NO” demonstration on the other hand performed negation in terms of 
celebratory affirmation of conflict and disagreement. The theatricality and the 
dramaturgical choices of the “NO” demonstration were completely different from the 
theatricality and the dramaturgical choices of the “YES” demonstration. The “NO” 
demonstration was staged on Syntagma (Σύνταγµα) Square—the Square that is right in 
front of the Greek Parliament and that in Greek means constitution.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   90	  
Historically the Syntagma Square has performed and still performs as the stage for 
various uprisings, protests, occupations and demonstrations. The first one was the 
uprising of September 1843. On September 3rd 1843 millions of Greek people and the 
army gathered outside the royal palace of King of Greece Otto—what today is the Greek 
Parliament—and forced the latter to grant a constitution. The Syntagma Square was 
named after the constitution that King Otto was forced to grant. 
 In terms of Athens’ spatiopolitical organization—the organization of the space of 
the polis—the Syntagma Square connects the Greek Parliament—the space that within 
frames of representative democracy is considered to be the space of the State (κράτος)—
with the αρχαία αγορά (ancient market)—the space that within frames of direct 
democracy is considered to be the space of the demos (δήµος). Therefore the Syntagma 
Square performs as a constant material reminder that in representative democracy the 
demos (δήµος) is by default dispossessed of its κράτος (State) and thus that the 
democracy (δηµοκρατία) that we know and experience is more undemocratic than it is 
democratic.  
 The utter un-democratization of democracy conducted and legitimized in the 
name of democratization is probably one of the biggest, not to say the biggest, challenge 
democracy has to face in 21st century Neoliberal Europe. For many scholars who focus 
on the interlinkages between neoliberalism and the elimination of democracy, the latter 
lies in the economization, liberalization and free-marketization of the political. In 
Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution Wendy Brown argues that, 
“neoliberal reason, ubiquitous today in statecraft and the workplace, in jurisprudence, 
education, culture and a vast range of quotidian activity is converting the distinctly 
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political character, meaning and operation of democracy’s constituent elements into 
economic ones” (Brown 2015: 17). But as argued above understanding the “undoing” of 
democracy—to paraphrase Brown—in terms of conceptual separation of the sphere of the 
political from the sphere of economy brings us back to the Market VS State question 
which, as I also contented above, is a question that ends up serving neoliberalism since it 
conceals the Debt Economy VS Public Life question. 
 Throughout this chapter I argue that it is not the economization of the political 
that un-democratizes democracy and that abandons the demos completely dispossessed of 
its κράτος (state).  In the next chapter I closely elaborate on the connections between 
neoliberalism, democracy and the spheres of the political and the economical. On the 
contrary here I am arguing that it is the “profitable”—at least on a level of clear 
intentions—indebtization of the demos—of the public life—by the European Union via 
the nation-state that continuously dispossesses demos of its κράτος (state) and therefore 
never ceases to put democracy in jeopardy.   
 By occupying Syntagma Square as its stage—a square that as I already described 
is spatiopolitically designed to remain inbetween the space of the state (Greek 
Parliament) and the space of the demos (ancient market) without really fully belonging in 
any of these two spaces—the “NO” demonstration claimed a new space for a new 
mergence of the demos and the state. Throughout this dissertation I understand the 
mergence of the demos with the state as a blurring of the demos with the state (with its 
κράτος) that; one, does not homogenize and erase difference but allows new differences 
to emerge; two, that resists any impositions of externally oriented wholes; and three, as a 
constant process of becoming where none of the merged elements exceeds the others. 
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 Going back to the “NO” demonstration, I contend that the “NO” demonstration 
publically and collectively conceptualized this innovative mergence of the demos and the 
state as a praxis of resistance against the indebtization of the demos by the EU via the 
state. Earlier I argued that the theatricality and the dramaturgical choices of the “NO” 
demonstration were, as expected, completely different from the theatricality and the 
dramaturgical choices of the “YES” demonstration. In the paragraphs above I focused on 
the connections between the staging of the “NO” demonstration and public 
conceptualizations of resistance oriented around a new mergence of the demos and the 
state. In the comments which follow, I am tracing the conceptualizations of resistance 
that the “NO” demonstration introduced in terms of its script, performance and affect.  
 In terms of its script, the “NO” demonstration was framed around a very literal 
reading of the question “do you reject or approve the proposal made to Greece by the EC, 
ECB and IMF during the eurogroup of June 25th 2017” that the upcoming Greek 
referendum was going to address. As opposed to what happened in the case of the “YES” 
demonstration, the literal reading of the upcoming referendum’s question performed by 
the “NO” demonstration not only directly rejected the non-democratic indebtization of 
the demos by the EU via the nation-state—an indebtization that as argued above 
constantly hinders democracy—but also claimed the public space of the Syntagma 
Square in order to perform disagreement. At this point I would like to remind us that 
earlier I contented that the elimination of democratic potentialities in neoliberal Europe is 
founded upon the production of indebted public life and the elimination of space for 
disagreement. The “NO” demonstration challenged both the production of indebted 
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public life and the elimination of space for disagreement in ways that the demonstration 
itself claimed and created space for new democracies to emerge. 
 The establishment of space for the emergence of new democracies was also 
supported by the two slogans of the “NO” demonstration: “We Shall Stop Them with the 
No of Dignity, of Democracy, of Life” and “NO We Are Writing History.” According to 
the demonstration that creation of space for emerging democracies requires poetic praxis. 
Christos Thivaios—one of the many artists who performed during the “NO” 
demonstration and who have publically expressed their left orientations—publically 
replaced the production of indebtedness with praxis of ποίησις (poiesis, creation) by 
shouting into the microphone “because we owe more to our poets than we owe to our 
creditors.”  
A few songs after Thivaios’ performance, the TV monitors that were placed 
around the Syntagma Square and that until this moment were live streaming the 
performances that were happening during the demonstration, started live streaming 
Alexis Tsipras who together with other ministers and elected parliamentarians of the 
SYRIZA-ANEL government, stepped out from Maximos Mansion—the official seat of 
the prime minister of Greece that is located right next to the Greek Parliament and the 
Syntagma Square—and joined the crowd of 20000 people that had gathered for the “NO” 
demonstration. When Tsipras made it to the demonstration the host of the demonstration 
Giorgos Kimoulis—one of the most respected Greek actors and someone who has also 
publically expressed their left orientations—introduced Tsipras by saying “Greece’s 
international creditors rejected the proposal submitted by SYRIZA because of five words: 
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Alexis Tsipras: Greece’s Prime Minister” implying that there is no space for political left 
and disagreement in the “democratic” frames of neoliberal Europe.  
I contend that this whole process was a theatricalized mergence—a mergence in 
theasis, or, in other words a mergence designed to be seen and witnessed—of the demos 
with the state. In terms of affect that theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state 
was a celebratory affirmation of the disruption of the money flow that was coming both 
from Greece’s international creditors and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to 
Greece. One should take into serious consideration that after Tsipras’ called for the Greek 
referendum on June 28th 2015 the ESM stopped providing the Greek banks with money 
causing their immediate closure. On the day of the “NO” demonstration the banks had 
remained closed for a week. As a result people were not getting paid, grocery stores were 
running out of groceries, hospitals were running out of supplies etc. The banks remained 
closed until August 13th 2015, when Tsipras, in spite of Greek people’s resistance, ended 
up signing a third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors. 
Let me recount my steps. In the comments above I described how by publically 
and collectively saying “NO”, the “NO” demonstration celebrated disagreement and 
conflict in terms of affirmation in ways that within frames of 21st century European 
neoliberalism—frames that as I have been arguing since the beginning if this dissertation 
eliminate any space for conflict and disagreement hindering democracy—created space 
for new democracies to emerge. In contrast to the “YES” demonstration, the “NO” 
demonstration refused by directly saying “NO” to imposed indebtedness, to define 
resistance in terms of what in the previous chapter I defined as the negativity of the 
debtor.  
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At this point I would like to argue that refusing defining resistance negatively 
brings us to a new affirmation. Furthermore I argued that through theatricalizing the 
mergence between the demos (δήµος) and the state (κράτος) the “NO” demonstration not 
only created the space for new democracies (δηµοκρατία) to emerge but also introduced a 
new subject of resistance. Finally, I made the case that this revolutionary subject of 
resistance that came from the theasis of a new synthesis of the demos with the state had a 
direct affect in the continuation and the disruption of money and debt flows produced by 
both the Greek nation-state and Greece’s international creditors.  
In the next two sections I further elaborate on these revolutionary aspects of the 
“NO” demonstration. I argue that we currently lack the theoretical tools that can grasp 
and clearly address the efficacy of the future-life, in terms of resistance, of these aspects. 
I draw upon the works of Deleuze and Guattari in order to propose theoretical tools that 
in my contention can fill this discursive void. I trace this void on two different levels: on 
a level of language and theories of performatives and on a level of performance theory 
and performance as a process of production of new subjects of resistance that can actually 
challenge 21st century European Neoliberalism. Finally, in the third section of this 
chapter I will closely examine how the tension between the “YES” and the “NO” 
demonstrations echoes the “YES” of Creon and the “NO” of Antigone in Jean Anouilh’s 
Antigone. 
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2.2 The “NO” of the “NO” Demonstration and Greek Referendum: Celebrating an 
Infelicitous Performative 
 According to the results of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 the turnout was 
62,5%: a turnout that far exceeded the turnout of the Greek snap legislative elections of 
January 2015, which was 56,6%. Some 61,31% of the referendum’s voters voted “NO” 
rejecting the austerity measures “suggested” by Greece’s international creditors; 38,69% 
voted “YES” and only 5,8% of the votes were blank or invalid. In spite of Greek people’s 
vote and resistance—as described earlier the Greek banks had remained closed and thus 
money stopped circulating for approximately two and a half months—on July 13th 2015, 
the Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras and the government of SYRIZA-ANEL ended 
up agreeing to a third memorandum of understanding between Greece and Greece’s 
international creditors. On August 13th 2015 the Greek Parliament approved that 
memorandum agreement. 
 Why did such a decisive vote ultimately perform in ways that were clearly at odds 
with the expressed wishes of the voters? This is the question that this section addresses. 
In the comments which follow I draw upon the tensions between J. L. Austin’s notion of 
“happy performative” and Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of “order word” and 
“collective assemblage of enunciation” in order to introduce theoretical tools that shed 
light on the successful aspects of that “NO” so that the latter lay the ground for new 
praxis of resistance and democracies to emerge.  
 Let me start with J. L Austin and his theory on performatives. J. L. Austin made 
explicit that to say something is to do something. As Lazzarato writes J. L. Austin helps 
us understand how “the enunciation accomplishes rather than describes an action” 
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(Lazzarato 2014: 170). In How To Do Things With Words Austin writes, “The term 
performative […] indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an 
action” (Austin 1967: 6). But Austin points out that uttering is not enough. On the 
contrary for Austin,  
it is always necessary that the circumstance in which the words are uttered 
should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly 
necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also 
perform certain other actions, whether ‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or 
even acts of uttering further words (8).  
So although for Austin to say something is to do something this does not necessarily 
mean that the doing is in sync with the implicit or explicit intention of the saying. In 
order for that sync to be achieved the uttering needs to take place in “appropriate” and 
commonly shared contexts and settings that would trigger a certain continuation of 
expected and proper actions. 
 In addition to the importance of the proper contexts and settings Austin also 
emphasizes the importance of the “properness” of the uttering subject. He specifically 
writes, “The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for 
the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” (34). Furthermore, for Austin, if the 
performative is not performed within proper contexts, in proper ways and by proper 
subjects it is doomed to remain “unhappy” and “infelicitous.” Austin calls “the doctrine 
of the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion of such utterances, the doctrine of 
Infelicities” (14). The very crucial question that in my contention emerges from Austin’s 
thought process asks what happens when the intention of the performative is to challenge 
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and change the expected, materially crystalized and structuralized and naturalized even 
properness of the contexts within the performative is performed, of the ways in which the 
performative is performed and finally, of the subject by which the performative is 
performed? What happens when the intention of the performative is to succeed in not 
being properly performed? In other words what happens when the intention of the 
performative is to affirm and celebrate its—to paraphrase Austin—“unhappiness” and 
“infelicity”?  
 In order to answer the questions addressed above I would like to understand the 
“NO” of the “NO” demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 through 
Austin’s lens. Before doing that I would like to closely elaborate on the contexts, on the 
ways and on the subjects that 21st century neoliberal European Union and, most 
importantly, 21st century neoliberal eurozone considers proper. As I have been arguing 
throughout the previous chapter, in the 21st century’s neoliberal European Union and 
eurozone the proper context for any decision-making processes is the eurogroup which 
according to the Consillium Europa official webpage is “an informal body where the 
ministers of the euro area member states discuss matters relating to their shared 
responsibilities related to the euro” (Consillium Europa). Furthermore, according to the 
same official web-page, “The eurogroup usually meets once a month, on the eve of the 
Economic and Financial Affairs and Council meeting. The commissioner for economic 
and financial affairs, taxation and customs and the president of the European Central 
Bank also participate in the eurogroup meetings” (Consillium Europa). What the official 
definition of the eurogroup leaves out is that this “informal body of meetings” is not 
minuted and most importantly not answerable to any elected parliament.  
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It is because of eurogroup’s “informality” that the latter has more power than any 
other formally recognized institutional formation of both the European Union and the 
eurozone. But the eurogroup’s structural and institutional informality does not stop at the 
eurogroup. It spreads to other levels and formations like for instance the euro-working 
group: the eurogroup’s sub-cabinet. During their public debate at the New York Public 
Library, a few months after Varoufakis “resigned” from being Greece’s minister of 
finance, Noam Chomsky and Yianis Varoufakis had the following dialogue:  
- Yianis Varoufakis: […] there is the real ruler of the European Union, a 
gentleman named Thomas Wieser, nobody’s heard of him, he holds 
the real power. 
- Noam Chomsky: What is his position? 
- Yianis Varoufakis: He is the head of the Euro Working Group which is 
the cabinet under the Eurogroup 
- Noam Chomsky: The nonexistent group 
- Yianis Varoufakis: They are the shadow cabinet of the nonexistent 
Eurogroup […] 
- Noam Chomsky: How does the Eurogroup get established? […] 
- Yianis Varoufakis: I think it just sprung out, out of the shell like, you 
know, Aphrodite in Cyprus […] (Yianis Varoufakis 2016)  
According to the current structure of neoliberal European Union and eurozone the 
properness of the contexts within which a performative takes place is founded upon non-
democratic vagueness. 
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 The same non-democratic vagueness haunts the “proper” ways in which a 
performative is supposed to be performed in order to be a successful performative—or in 
Austin’s words a happy performative—within contexts of the European Union and the 
eurozone. One would expect that if the European Union is as democratic as it claims to 
be that a referendum would be the most proper way for an utterance to be performed. But 
right after Tsipras called for the referendum the majority of European leaders publically 
rejected Tsipras’ decision as a “loss of the shared trust” between Greece and its 
international creditors. One of the many examples was President Donald Tusk’s remarks 
on July 13th 2015 right after prime minister Tsipras ended up signing a third 
memorandum of understanding between Greece and its international creditors. President 
Tusk specifically said, “I welcome the progress and the constructive position of Greece 
that helps to bring back trust among eurozone partners” (European Council 2015). So, 
within non-democratic European contexts, referendums—the demos direct participation 
in decision-making processes—are considered to disrupt the trust that the creditors show 
to their debtors so that the debtors never challenge the asymmetrically non-resolvable 
creditor/ debtor power relations. 
Within non-democratic European contexts that, as I have already argued, are 
founded upon the production of surplus value that emerges from the asymmetrically non-
resolvable creditor/ debtor power relations, the demos of a debtor/ nation-state is only 
included in order to pay the imposed debt and the government—or in other words the 
State—of a debtor/ nation-state is only included in order to implement on a national level 
the measures decided by the creditors. Therefore, within in this kind of debt economy, the 
only proper subjects that can perform an utterance happily and successfully are the 
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creditors: hence the participation of the European Central Bank in the “nonexistent” and 
“informal” body of the eurogroup.  
Let me summarize the contexts, the ways and the subjects that the 21st century’s 
neoliberal European Union and most importantly 21st century neoliberal eurozone 
considers “proper” for an utterance to succeed: the context is the nonexistent and non-
transparent informal space of the eurogroup; the ways are the ways of the creditors that 
utterly exclude the demos of the debtor/ nation-states and the subjects are the creditors 
that utterly exclude the elected governments of the debtor/ nation-states. Keeping 
Austin’s arguments in mind, one legitimately could argue that both the “NO” 
demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 did everything wrong. Instead 
of the “informal” body of the eurogroup that excludes the demos, the “NO” 
demonstration chose the public squares, parks and streets of Greece and the referendum 
as the setting of elections that is founded upon the demos for their contexts. Both the 
“NO” demonstration and the Greek referendum chose the way of the newly introduced 
mergence of the demos with the State and not the way of the creditors.  
This is where we come back to the initial question that this section addressed: 
How does a performative succeed in its improper performance and production? How can 
it challenge the properness within which this specific performative is expected and/ or 
demanded to perform while remaining in sync with its direct intentions? To phrase that 
question in terms of the “NO” of the “NO” demonstration and Greek referendum, how 
could that “NO” succeed in saying “NO” to the condition of indebtedness imposed on 
Greece by its international creditors and simultaneously revolutionize and actually 
replace the informal and non-democratic space of the eurogroup with Greece’s public 
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spaces and elections, on the one hand, and the creditors with this newly introduced 
mergence of the demos with the state, on the other?  
Within the larger context of this chapter’s arguments, this question reveals the 
limitations of Austin’s theory. Granted, by getting really close to understanding change 
and transformation in terms of one’s affirmative failure to adjust to structuralized 
contexts and ways that one wants to challenge, Austin succeeds in not falling into the 
structure VS agency trap that has haunted and monopolized European discursive 
production of theory for more than one century. Still, he never elaborates on intentional 
change or its efficacy. Lazzarato articulates, and in a way summarizes, that critique very 
clearly when in Signs and Machines: Capitalism and the Production of Subjectivity 
writes, “What is strongly emphasized [in Austin’s theory] is the ‘conventional’ function 
of language as a reproduction of social obligations, in other words, its function of 
reproducing already instituted social relations” (Lazzarato 2014: 171). But how do we get 
from there to change? How do we get from there to a “NO” of a demonstration or a 
referendum that succeeds in its resistance? 
Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Austin in order to take Austin towards a different 
direction. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia they argue that 
Austin’s famous theses clearly demonstrate that the various extrinsic 
relations between action and speech by which a statement can describe an 
action in an indicative mode or incite it in an imperative mode etc are not 
all there is. There are also intrinsic relations between speech and certain 
actions that are accomplished by saying them (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
77). 
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So for Deleuze and Guattari Austin’s emphasis on the performative aspects of 
communication does not just reveal the extrinsic or external relations between speech and 
action—what Lazzarato describes as “already instituted social relations”—but it also 
underscores the sense in which a performative, in order to succeed, must both rely on and 
produce “implicit or non-discursive presuppositions” (77) that are commonly shared and 
left unsaid. This concept can be identified as an “unspoken performative.” 
 In Deleuze and Guattari’s work, this implicit aspect—in terms of unsaid non-
discursiveness—of a performance of any kind of utterance becomes the concept of order-
word. For the authors of A Thousand Plateaus order-words are “not a particular category 
of explicit statements (for example, in the imperative), but the relation of every word or 
every statement to implicit presuppositions, in other words, to speech acts that are and 
can only be accomplished in the statement” (79). What I contend is of particular 
importance here is the relationally internal aspect of this implicitness. It is because of the 
internality of the implicit that the latter lays the ground for conceptualizations and praxes 
of resistance that are not founded upon imposed externalities. 
 One could argue that this is the ultimate manifestation of self-governmentality. I, 
on the contrary, contend that this is not the case for two reasons: one, because “order-
word” grasps internality in its emergence and production and not in its enclosing, two, 
because “order-word” is never one but always many. Deleuze and Guattari argue, “the 
relation between the statement and the act is internal, immanent, but it is not one of 
identity” (79). And they add, “indirect discourse is not explained by the distinction 
between subjects; rather, it is the assemblage, as it freely appears in this discourse, that 
explains all the voices present within a single voice” (80). Therefore the collective 
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production of the internal relationality and implicitness of an “order-word” assembles all 
the multiplicities—all the different implicit significations, meanings etc—together 
without organizing them under an external authority of the whole.  
 Why “order-word” then? Why include “order” in the conceptualization of the 
latter? As argued earlier, Deleuze and Guattari drew upon Austin in order to push Austin 
in a different direction. In How to Do Things With Words Austin writes, “both 
grammarians and philosophers have been aware that it is by no means easy to distinguish 
even questions, commands, and so on from statements by means of the few and jejune 
grammatical marks available, such as word order, mood, and the like […]” (Austin 1965: 
1). What Austin implies here is that it is impossible to isolate an explicit statement from 
its implicit undertones that relate for instance to mood and word order. Through their 
concept of “order-word” Deleuze and Guattari place particular emphasis on the 
obligatory aspect of that implicitness; an implicitness that is both collectively produced 
and always multiple.  
 In Deleuze and Guattari’s works that collectively produced and always multiple 
aspect of the “order-words” transforms into the concept of the “collective assemblage of 
enunciation.” For Deleuze and Guattari “the order-words or assemblages of enunciation 
in a given society (in short the illocutionary) designate this instantaneous relation 
between statements and the incorporeal transformations or non-corporeal attributes they 
express” (81). And they add, “The notion of collective assemblage of enunciation takes 
on primary importance since it is what must account for the social character” (80). But 
this social character is founded upon internal relations and internal relations only. The 
minute these relations become externally imposed they no longer are either collective or 
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assemblages since they establish hierarchies. I contend that Deleuze and Guattari came 
up with the concepts of “order-word” and “collective assemblage of enunciation” not 
only in order to fill Austin’s gap—the one Lazzarato points out regarding the 
perpetuation of the existing structures—but also in order to grasp the emergence of 
collective, non-hierarchical and always multiplied performances of utterances of 
resistance. 
 I contend that the “NO” of the “NO” demonstration and the Greek referendum 
falls under this category of collective, non-hierarchical and always multiplied 
performances of utterances of resistance. As described above that “NO” was produced by 
the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state. One could argue that this “NO” 
was a response to a governmental call. But even if this was the case both the demos and 
the state recalibrated themselves during this theatricalized mergence. The crowd of the 
20000 people that gathered on Syntagma square in order to merge with the state and 
collectively dramatize their resistance included citizens, non-citizens, supporters of both 
the far left and the far right, immigrants, refugees as well as many elected 
parliamentarians that belonged to a wide range of political parties.  
 Each one was performing their own “NO”. But just like Deleuze and Guattari 
argue in A Thousand Plateaus “rather, it is the assemblage […] that explains all the 
voices present within a single voice” (80). The “NO” of the far-right was completely 
different from the “NO” of the far-left, the “NO” of the citizens was completely different 
from the “NO” of the non-citizens, the “NO” of the immigrants was completely different 
from the “NO” of the refugees, the “NO” of the government of SYRIZA was different 
from the “NO” of the rest of the parties of the parliament and so on. Both the “NO” 
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demonstration and the Greek referendum were celebratory and collective performances of 
all the multiple versions of all these “NOs.” Going back to the interlinkages between 
Nietzsche and Deleuze and Guattari that this dissertation’s Anti-Prologue introduced I 
contend that these celebratory and collective performances of these “multiplicities” of the 
“NO” reveal the non-dialectical aspects of the latter.  
Grasping the non-dialectical aspects of all the “NO” multiplicities is important 
because, as argued in the Anti-Prologue, this kind of grasping does not limit the 
conceptual planning of resistance in frames of reactionary negation that is one, externally 
related to what it resists against and two, ends up perpetuating what it resists against. 
Drawing upon the previous chapter’s thought process I contend that the “NO” 
performative that was performed by the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the 
state did not succeed in being unhappy because the state ended up removing itself from 
its mergence with demos. Furthermore, the state also decided to turn the unhappy 
“NO”—an unhappiness that, as argued, entailed the joy of affirmation—to a happy 
“NO”—a happiness that, as also argued, entailed the misery of negation—in order to fit 
the frames of European debt economy. The next section elaborates further on the kind of 
resistance that can be potentially performed by a different mergence of the demos with 
the state.  
2.3 Dromocratic Democracies: Demos and the State on the Dromos  
 In the previous section I described how in the midst of the Greek bailout 
referendum 2015 the demos merged with the state and the state merged with the demos in 
order for this mergence—a mergence that was very theatricalized—to say “NO” to 
Greece’s international creditors. As I also argued above the performance of this “NO” 
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utterance was collective non-hierarchical and multiplied. This section puts this 
demos/state mergence within contexts of 21st century European neoliberalism and 
European debt economy in order to closely examine the efficacy of the demos/state 
mergence as a resisting and potentially revolutionary agent.  
 As I have been arguing since the beginning of this dissertation, the 21st century 
European debt economy is founded upon asymmetrically non-resolvable creditor/ debtor 
power relations. Within frames of this economy the demos is only included in order to be 
the infinite tax-payer, and the state is only included in order to implement the measures 
decided among and by the creditors. Therefore the relations between EU formations on 
the one hand and the demos of a nation-state and the nation-state on the other are not just 
relations of power differentials but also relations of dependency. Earlier I drew upon 
Crouch in order to demonstrate how these relations of dependency are hidden beneath 
Market VS State narratives.  
 It is worth returning to Crouch in order to further elaborate on these relations of 
both power differentials and dependency between EU formations on the one hand and the 
demos of debtor/nation-states and debtor/nation-states on the other. In the Strange Non-
death of Neoliberalism Crouch argues that while “neoliberalism claims to be about free 
markets” (Crouch 2011:2) that’s not really case. For Crouch one of the most indicative 
examples that support this argument was the financial crisis of 2008: when the markets 
and most importantly the banks collapsed and it was decided that the nation-states, and 
most importantly the low and middle classes of the demos of these nation-states, should 
save both the market and the banks. Crouch writes, “Although it was the behavior of the 
banks that caused the 2008-9 crisis, they emerged from it more powerful than before. 
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They were considered so important to the early twenty-first-century economy that they 
had to be protected from the consequences of their own folly” (1). And he adds, 
“Whereas the financial crisis concerned banks and their behavior, resolution of the crisis 
has been redefined in many countries as a need to cut back, once and for all, the welfare 
state and public spending [therefore the banks] depended in part on the contributions of 
taxpayers to the rescue operation” (1-2). Although it might sound a bit over-simplistic, 
for the banks to be “saved” certain nation-states had to be in more debt so that the former 
could absorb the surplus value of this debt-production. 
 According to Crouch this relation between the banks and the market, on the one 
hand, and indebted nation-states on the other, is a relation of “interdependency”(8-9). 
That “interdependency” is performed at the expense of public life and social rights: “The 
European Union held to a model of balancing a competitive economy against strong 
social rights as a so-called ‘European social model’”(18). Furthermore, according to this 
model, in order for that “competitive economy” to thrive public life—the life of demos—
needs to put in debt. Therefore, as argued earlier, the tension is not between the 
supposedly “free” market and the static state, but between the supposedly “free” market 
and public life. In other words EU needs the nation-state in order to put its demos in debt. 
 It is because of these relations of dependency that I contend that discourse that 
perpetuates the Market VS State tension falls right back into the neoliberal trap. This is 
why I find Deleuze and Guattari’s work particularly important. One of the most important 
contributions of Deleuze and Guattari to political theory is their understanding of 
capitalism as a “state capitalism” that is founded upon the state’s “capturing” of the 
surplus value that emerges from taxes, rent and profit—in other words from debt—and 
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not upon the market (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:442). In A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari introduce a non-neoliberally oriented 
language that not only grasps both the relation of dependency between capitalistic 
formations—like for instance the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund—and the formation of the nation-state but that also articulates how this relation of 
dependency is built upon the production of debt. They specifically draw upon Marx in 
order to argue that, “Marx made the observation in the case of capitalism: there is a 
violence that necessarily operates through the State, proceeds the capitalist mode of 
production […] and makes possible the capitalist mode of production itself” (447). For 
Deleuze and Guattari the capitalist mode of production is interlinked with the production 
of debt. Furthermore the state is the one that is responsible for that production of debt. 
Within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe though the formation of the nation-state 
looses its monopoly over the production of debt. Debt is now produced by creditors—like 
the European Central Bank or the International Monetary Fund—that need the formation 
of the nation-state so that the latter implements the decisions of the former. So the 
international creditors do nor replace but are dependent upon the formation of the nation-
state.  
 In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari grasp this specific interrelation of 
dependency through the concept of apparatus of capture: “we shall call [apparatuses of] 
Capture this difference or excess constitutive of profit, surplus labor, or the surplus 
product” (446). Furthermore, as they argue in Anti-Oedipus this praxis of capturing 
surplus “labor” and “product”—which in my contention is another way of saying surplus 
value—is a “system of cruelty” where “debt becomes infinite” (Deleuze and Guattari 
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1983: 337). And within this system of cruelty of the apparatuses of capture—which 
according to Deleuze and Guattari are rent, profit and taxation (Deleuze and Guattari 
1987: 442)—“capitalism has from the beginning mobilized a force of deterritorialization 
infinitely surpassing the deterritorialization proper to the State [which] has been 
deterritorializing to the extend that it makes the earth37 an object of its higher unity38, a 
forced aggregate of coexistence, instead of the free play of territories among themselves” 
(453). And they add, “Thus the States, in capitalism are not cancelled out but change 
form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a worldwide axiomatic that 
exceeds them” (453-454). Within frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe the 
international creditors exceed the formation of the nation-state but do not replace it. On 
the contrary they change the nation-state’s role.   
 It is because of that very critical and nodal position of the State that I contend that 
the mergence of the demos with the state that this section proposes can emerge as a 
resisting and revolutionary agent or subject that can actually challenge and disrupt frames 
of neoliberal capitalism. Bridging that contention to the unsuccessful and completely 
ignored “NO” of the NO demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015, it was 
the state that chose to leave its mergence with the demos and to go back to being a 
formation exceeded and used by Greece’s international creditors. In other words it was 
the state and not the demos that stopped being part of a potentially revolutionary agent 
that could actually challenge the frames of 21st neoliberal Europe. It is important for us to 
remember that when the government of SYRIZA signed a third memorandum with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  In the First Chapter I drew upon Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of Nietzsche in 
order to understand that process as a process of geopolitical inscription (graphein) on the 
face of the earth (γαία)  
38	  in our case this supposed “higher unity” is the European Union  
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Greece’s international creditors, the banks of Greece had remained closed for almost one 
month. In spite of that the demos was ready to take its chances. 
 Let me elaborate more on the revolutionary potentialities that the demos/ state 
mergence entails within frames of European debt economy. In order to do so I would like 
to draw upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of War Machine. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
War Machine should not be confused with military institutions. On the contrary Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that, “One of the fundamental problems of the State is to appropriate 
this war machine that is foreign to it and make it a piece in its apparatus, in the form of a 
stable military institution […]” (253). The War Machine is everything the State is not and 
for that reason the latter tries to pin it down—to “slow it down” in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
terms—and appropriate it. Earlier I argued that in the case of the Greek bailout 
referendum of 2015 the state chose to exceed its mergence with the demos and as a result 
was fully appropriated and defeated by Greece’s international creditors. In the next 
paragraphs I closely examine how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of War Machine 
informs the notion of the mergence of the demos with the state that this dissertation 
introduces on a level of revolutionary praxes of resistance.  
 Although elaborating in detail on Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the War 
Machine could be a topic for a whole another dissertation for now I would like to 
underline War Machine’s revolutionary capacities in terms of coexistence, movement and 
space: 
The war machine, with infinitely lower ‘quantities’, has as its object not 
war but the drawing of a creative line of flight, the composition of a 
smooth space and of the movement of people in that space (456) […] but 
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the regime of the war machine is on the contrary that of affects, which 
relate only to the moving body in itself, to speeds and composition of 
speeds among elements (441). 
Let me break down some of Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary here. As Eugene Young, 
Gary Genosko and Janell Watson remind us (Young, Genosko and Watson 2013), in 
Dialogues, Deleuze understands “lines of flight” as a “collective historical 
determination” (Deleuze 1997:23) and that in Anti-Oedipus lines of flight are translated 
as “lines of escape” (Young, Genosko and Watson 2013:81) because that specific concept 
intends to grasp “something that flows or flees, that escapes the binary organizations, the 
resonance apparatus […]” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 238). Furthermore in Kafka: 
Toward a Minor Literature Deleuze and Guattari describe “lines of flight” as processes 
“always repelled, always kept outside, moving too fast to really be captured” (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1986: 45). To sum up “lines of flight” are collective processes that both 
escape and challenge the status quo. 
 As I have been arguing throughout this chapter this is what the NO demonstration 
and the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 were about: about a collective process, shared 
among the demos and the state that intended to both escape and challenge the status quo. 
For Deleuze and Guattari the stage for these “lines of flight” is a “smooth space.” In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, a smooth space is a non-hierarchical space, or in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s words a “de-stratied space” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 474) that is not 
“instituted by the State apparatus” (474). Although smooth space is not a space instituted 
by the State “these two spaces” (474)—the smooth and de –striated space, on the one 
hand and the space is that is instituted by the State on the other—need to exist “in 
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mixture” (474-475) in order for the lines of flight to successfully produce affect: what, as 
Young, Genosko and Watson write, for Deleuze and Guattari, does not only entail 
“dynamic and kinetic relations between bodies” but also the “capacity for action and 
novelty” in terms of “an affirmation of the necessity of chance” (Young, Genosko and 
Watson 2013:61). So in order for an affect to be affective it needs to be produced by a 
collective revolutionary process (lines of flight), to take place on a smooth space that is 
both State and non-State instituted and to finally affirm the chance of novelty. 
Going back to the main focus of this section, I contend that the theatricalized 
mergence of the demos with the state and the state with the demos that happened right 
before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 effectuated everything Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of War Machine intends to effectuate: it was a collective process that 
intended to materially challenge the structures of 21st century European debt economy; it 
established a non-hierarchical space that was defined by both the demos and the state; 
and finally it introduced the demos/ state mergence as the new and potentially efficacious 
resisting and revolutionary agent. The very crucial question that in my contention 
emerges asks how would that revolutionary agent look like?  
In order to answer that question I would like to draw upon the work of Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri since they very successfully ground Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts onto more materially concrete epistemological paradigms and come up with a 
state-form that can really challenge 21st century neoliberalism. In Labor of Dionysus: A 
Critique of State-Form—a book dedicated to Guattari—Hardt and Negri draw upon 
Deleuze and Guattari’s works on Nietzschean Dionysus in order introduce a new state 
theory. Quick parenthesis: in the first chapter of this dissertation titled “The Tragedy of 
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the Greek Debt Crisis” I argued that Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of Nietzsche’s 
concept of Dionysus lays the ground for political praxis that can disrupt current frames of 
European debt economy. I contend that in Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of State-Form 
Hardt and Negri extend the Nietzsche-Deleuze and Guattari chain of Dionysean thought 
into a very tangible non-state state theory. Hardt and Negri’s main argument regarding 
the 21st century European nation-state is that the latter is founded upon an aporia, 
The first and fundamental paradox (from which all of others derive) 
consists in the fact that, in the ideal type of this figure of the State, the 
hegemony of civil society39is made to serve in the absence of civil society 
itself […] in order to affirm the preeminence of an idea of the image of 
civil society, the postmodern state […] annuls every social power and 
obliges it to find meaning only in the form of the State (Hardt and Negri 
1994: 268) 
But for Hardt and Negri it is because the European nation-state—a formation that is a 
necessary part of European debt economy—uses the mask of a state with social rights in 
order to fully eliminate the social state—a thought process similar to the one that was 
introduced in the first chapter of this dissertation—that the realm of this pseudo-socius 
will fully disappear. 
 That disappearance of the realm of the pseudo-socius—what Hardt and Negri call 
“evacuation of the social”—will create space for the political to prevail. Hardt and Negri 
argue that, “the extinction of the social and the totalization of the political are given as a 
definitive result of capitalist development” (269). Hardt and Negri admit that an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  In Hardt and Negri’s work civil society is the social state 
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argument like that is a “repetition of the traditional Marxist vision in that it sees the 
withering away of the State in the society of mature capitalism” (269). Additionally, 
according to Hardt and Negri this is the moment when “democracy is realized” (269). Let 
me clarify something very important. Hardt and Negri’s argument is not that full 
democracy and the domination of the political will emerge because capitalism is rotting.  
On the contrary Hardt and Negri’s point is that the celebratory affirmation—what 
in their introduction they call “the practice of joy” which is an abstract reference to 
Nietzsche’s philosophy—of the fact that the absence of human, social and civil rights is 
founded upon masks of presence of human, social and civil rights is one of the main 
prerequisites for full democracy to actualize itself: for the demos and the state to be 
merged without anything exceeding them; neither notions of whole nor the state. In my 
contention that’s what Hardt and Negri mean when they say they trace “the Dionysian 
powers of the netherworld” (Preface). That’s what in my contention the “NO” 
demonstration and the Greek referendum intended to do. The state—the government of 
SYRIZA—decided to exceed the demos/ state mergence and to turn “NO” into a “YES” 
to everything, as the first celebratory anniversary of the “NO” demonstration that took 
place on Syntagma square on July 3rd 2016 addressed. But the “NO” performed by the 
theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state remains.  
 I will further elaborate on that aspect of performance in the last part of this section 
where my focus is performance theory. For now I would like to closely examine what 
kind of spaces can stage these kinds of performances of resistance. Earlier I drew upon 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of smooth space in order to describe how the demos 
merged with the state in a non-state state space. I also briefly introduced interconnections 
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between this kind of spaces and notions of speed and mobility. As Deleuze and Guattari 
remind us Paul Virilio is really good at grasping that (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 1987). 
In Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology Virilio introduces the concepts of 
dromology and dromocracy: “there is no democracy, only dromocracy; there is no 
strategy, only dromology” (Virilio 1977: 69). What Virilio means is not that we need to 
replace the demos with the dromos—coming from the Greek δρόµος meaning street—but 
that the demos needs to take over multiple speeds, and to theatricalize this taking over of 
multiple speeds, in order for its resistance to be efficacious. Let me elaborate further on 
that since Virilio’s emphasis on the street allies with the site of the “YES” and “NO” 
demonstrations that have been the focus of this chapter.  
 According to Virilio what is unique in the case of the dromos is that it is the 
perfect spectacle of multiple speeds. Virilio writes, “the spectacle of the street is traffic 
[…] movement of progression, of procession […] the street is like a new coastline and 
the dwelling a sea-port from which one can measure the magnitude of the social flow, 
predict its overflowings […] situated between two speeds of transit, acting as brakes 
against the acceleration of the incursion” (33). This notion of staged multiple speeds 
brings us back to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of machine since both concepts grasp 
the production and the disruption of various flows.  
 I contend that the “NO” demonstration—just like Virilio’s dromos—was also in 
between two speeds. On the one hand, through the theatricalized, immediate mergence of 
the demos with the state it intensified the speed of the smooth space: what Deleuze and 
Guattari describe a “moving too fast to really be grasped” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 
45). I think that an indicative “proof” of that kind of speed was EU not taking the 
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referendum into serious consideration. I also think that this imperceptible aspect of the 
demos/ state mergence provides the latter with revolutionary capacities that were left 
fully unexplored because the government of SYRIZA decided to sign a third MOU 
between Greece and Greece’s international creditors. On the other hand, the same 
demonstration was a celebration of the slowing down of the money and debt flow from 
and to Greece’s international creditors. As I described earlier in this section, during the 
summer of 2015 the Greek banks remained closed for approximately 2.5 months. 
Understanding street demonstrations in terms of multiple speeds helps us grasp the 
relations between the streets and our lived material realities on a level of change, affect 
and transformation. This kind of understanding challenges theories that consider street 
demonstrations as separate spaces and processes that do not have the capacity to affect 
the material realities around them.  
This section defines as dromocratic democracies the democracies that unfold from 
new mergences of the demos with the state on the street. The last question that this 
section deals with asks what kind of performance theory can grasp the revolutionary 
capacities of a new demos/ state mergence that is staged on the streets: what this section 
defines as dromocratic democracies. On a conceptual and ontological level the answer is 
easy: those performance studies theories that don’t limit performance within linearly 
oriented understandings of space and time but those that grasp performance in terms of 
multiple affects and spatiotemporalities and that, most importantly, do address the 
political stakes of that grasp within neoliberal contexts.  
Earlier I described how in my contention the performance of the “NO” utterance 
by the mergence of the demos with the state that happened in Greece right before the 
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Greek bailout referendum of 2015 was a performance of multiple affects and 
spatiotemporalities. That staging of the mergence of the demos with the state as a 
resisting and revolutionary agent calls for performance studies theories that do not simply 
understand performances of resistance in terms of state opposition. In Social Works 
Shannon Jackson argues that, “if our critical language only values agency when it is 
resisting state structures then we can find ourselves in an awkward position” (Jackson 
2011:12). I think that the “NO” demonstration is the perfect example of that awkward 
position.  
 In order for performance studies theory to both conceptualize and grasp 
efficacious performance of resistance against neoliberalism it needs to put each 
performance in its neoliberal context. This in fact is what scholars like Maurya 
Wickstrom have suggested. In Performance in the Blockades of Neoliberalism: Thinking 
the Political Anew, Wickstrom argues that if we keep framing resistance in neoliberal 
language—a language that can very successfully appropriate notions of representation, 
identity, voicing the voiceless, visibility, majority etc—we end up enhancing neoliberal 
realms. Wickstrom writes, 
[…] in my discomfort with the way in which theatre made about, for, or 
with refugees or asylum seekers—the displaced of the world—was almost 
always about their ‘plight’, almost always represented itself as giving 
‘voice to the voiceless’, and advocated for these ‘victims’ through 
humanitarianism, human rights or development positions. For me, these 
practices were beginning to ring hollow […] what was and is missing from 
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them is what is obscured or misrecognized when it appears: a fundamental 
axiom of Equality (Wickstrom 2012: 2).  
Although one might think that this quote is more suitable for the next chapter titled 
“Imperceptible Performances” because of the latter’s focus on the increased flows of 
people who flee their countries in order to stay alive I contend that Wickstrom’s point 
informs this chapter’s thought process in very important ways.  
 Wickstrom calls for performance studies discourse that reveals and challenges the 
neoliberal undertones and aspects of notions of representation, voicelessness, visibility/ 
invisibility and so forth. In response to Wickstrom’s call, in this chapter I introduced 
connections between the works of Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri and Virilio in 
order to also argue that today, probably more than ever, we are in need of theorizations 
and conceptualizations of performances of resistance that intend to really destroy the 
most well crafted masks of neoliberalism.  
 The next and last section of this chapter—a section that performs as a non-
concluding “epilogue” for the entire chapter—will focus on Elenis Efthimiou production 
of Jean Anouilh’s Antigone that took place in one of the spaces of the National Theatre of 
Greece during the summer of 2016. In my contention this particular production staged 
notions of state and time in ways that trigger theatre and performance studies discourse to 
engage in critical discussions that grasp the interrelations between time and the neoliberal 
formation of the nation-state.  
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2.4 Anouilh’s Antigone One Year After the “NO” of the Greek Bailout Referendum  
 The catchphrase of the one-year celebratory anniversary of the “NO” 
demonstration that took place on Syntagma Square on July 3rd of 2016 was: “SYRIZA 
turned our ‘NO’ to a ‘YES’ to everything.  
 
Earlier I argued that the government of SYRIZA turned the unhappy “NO” performative 
into a happy performative, completely emptied from its revolutionary capacities because 
SYRIZA (the state) decided one, to distance itself from the demos/state mergence that 
both the “NO” demonstration and the Greek bailout referendum performed and two, to 
make the “NO” performative fit the non-democratic structures of EU’s debt-economy.  
According to the program of Antigone: a play written by Jean Anouilh, directed 
by Eleni Efthimiou and produced as part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival of 2016, 
The youth and the senility confront with each other in order to reveal a 
society [that is] scared […] Creon comes as a savior and says “YES” to 
authority and as a humble laborer [of authority] manages people 
(Πρόγραµµα Φεστιβαλ Αθηνών Επιδαύρου 2016: 111).  
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In the comments which follow, I argue that, through choosing as its stage one of the 
spaces that are usually run by the National Theatre of Greece, and through putting 
Creon’s negatively affirmatory “YES” within frames of multiple speeds, this particular 
production of Anouilh’s Antigone introduced relations between Anouilh’s text and 
Greece’s current realities in ways that revealed the interdependencies between the 
neoliberal version of nation-state and multiplicities of spatiotemporalities.  
 In order to elaborate on this argument I need to briefly talk about Anouilh’s text. I 
contend that Anouilh’s Antigone really challenges Hegel’s dialectical reading of the 
Sophoclean Antigone since the French playwright creates a non-dialectical and non-
oppositional tension between Creon and Antigone. Creon on the one hand, just like it is 
stated in program of Efthimiou’s production, is the one who says “YES” to authority,  
- Creon: One morning I woke up and I was King of Thebes. And God 
knows, I would have chosen anything but that, anything but power …  
- Antigone: You could have said no  
- Creon: I could. But, I would have seemed like a workman refusing a 
job, it wouldn’t have been honest. So I said yes.  
- Antigone: Well that’s your problem. I haven’t said yes. What have 
your politics got to do with me, your politics and your pragmatism, 
your pathetic stories I can say “no” to whatever it is that I hate, and be 
responsible only to myself. But you, with your crown and your guards 
and your whole entourage, you have no choice but to put me to death 
… because you said “yes.” (Anouilh 2002: 31). 
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Antigone on the other hand dies fully dispossessed of her capacity to say “no” and also 
the one who dies in search of a “no.”  
In Anouilh’s Antigone Creon kills Antigone because he wants not only to silence 
her no but most importantly to make her “no” irrelevant. While Antigone does everything 
in her power in order to say no,  
- Antigone: I am here to say no to you and die (33) 
Creon begs her to change her mind so that he does not have to kill her  
-     Creon: That’s too easy, saying no.  
- Antigone: Not always.  
- Creon: Oh yes it is. To say yes you have to roll your sleeves up and sweat and 
plunge both arms into like up to the elbow. Saying no is easy even if it means 
you have to die. All you have to do is wait, wait to go on living or wait to be 
killed. It is the coward’s way out 
He does not authoritatively and directly forbid her to say “no.” He does not want to 
punish the no. Antigone wants her “no” to be punished. This is why Antigone says to 
him,  
- Antigone: Don’t feel sorry for me. Don’t soften. Be strong. Do what 
I’m doing. Do what you have to do. And if you are human, do it 
quickly. That’s all I ask. I can’t be this brave forever. 
Creon on the contrary does not want just to eliminate any possibility for a “no” to emerge 
but mainly to empty Antigone’s “no” of all its resisting and revolutionary capacities.  
 This is why according to Anouilh’s text both Polynices and Eteocles are,  
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- Creon: Two crooks, that’s all, plotting against us and against each 
other. Who murdered each other over a division of the spoils. With the 
difference that I, for reasons of state, had to make a hero out of one of 
them. So I had their bodies found on the battlefield. And we 
discovered them […] so I picked the more presentable corpse for my 
State funeral and ordered the other to be left where it lay. To be frank I 
don’t really know which was which. And guess what, I don’t really 
care. (36) 
In Efthimiou’s production of Anouilh’s Antigone that emptying of Antigone’s 
“no” from all its resisting and revolutionary capacities by the state was staged in one of 
the spaces that belong to the National Theatre of Greece, or in other words the State 
Theatre of Greece: the space of the Rex theatre—which is a very old inside theatre. As 
part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival 2016 the state space of the Rex theatre hosted 
Efthimiou’s production of Anoulih’s Antigone: a production that in my contention was a 
direct critique to “SYRIZA’s turning our ‘NO’ to a ‘YES’ to everything.” Furthermore, 
during the same Festival, the National Theatre of Greece staged Sophocle’s Antigone on 
the stage of the ancient theatre of Epidaurus.  
So, during the summer of 2016 two different Antigones were running: one 
produced by the National Theatre of Greece and staged on the ancient theatre of 
Epidaurus, and one produced by Efthimiou and staged on the state space of the Rex 
theatre: an inside theatre space that the National theatre of Greece owned but not 
occupying. I was only able to go to Efthimiou’s production of Antigone. From even 
before I entered the theatre space I found particularly interesting that there was no poster 
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of the production outside the theatre. Additionally there was no program or playbill for 
sale and outside the theatre was kind of dark. Everything outside the theatre space felt as 
if it was dying. The same feeling was also conveyed inside the theatre space. Although it 
was the middle of July—summer in Greece is particularly hot—there was no air 
condition. The Rex theatre is a very old theatre space with thick red carpets and veiled 
seats. As a result the building’s temperature was really high.  
As opposed to the space of the audience that was extremely hot the stage was 
surrounded by fans that were on during the entire performance. I contend that this 
simultaneous coexistence of these two different speeds and air flows: the static one of 
the audience space and the mobile one of the stage somehow related to the multiple 
temporalities that, as I argued earlier, the neoliberal nation-state imposes on its citizens. 
This particular production of Anouilh’s Antigone dramatized this kind of contradictory 
coexistence of two different speeds through staged notions of time and staged notions of 
age.  
The first ones were manifested via the use of “time specific objects”—like Eleni 
Efthimiou called them40—on stage. Although the majority of the sets on stage resembled 
an asylum—from the stretchers to the white tiles on the walls—the guard’s shed had a 
small Christmas tree in it. Additionally the walls had many clocks stock at five o’clock 
on them. So somehow the speed of the play—or on another level the implied speed of an 
asylum—was contradicted by the static time references of the Christmas tree and the 
clocks.  
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  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15VGBonqbrU	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The multiple notions of age manifested themselves through the infantilization of 
Antigone, Haemon and Creon’s assistant over Creon. While Creon was this very old, 
dying body, Creon’s assistant was a kid and Haemon and Antigone were particularly 
young and playful. For the director of this production, Eleni Efthimiou, “playfulness” 
could potentially be an answer to a state and a “society that eats its own flesh” (Greek 
Festival 2016). But that dying state has the capacity to make that playfulness fit in 
structures that render it inactive. Just like the government of SYRIZA asked from the 
Greek people to vote “NO” at the Greek referendum and then the same government of 
SYRIZA turned that “NO” into a “YES” to everything Anouilh’s Antigone ends with 
Creon saying to his very young assistant, 
- Creon: I’ll say it to you. The others don’t understand. When there is a 
job to be done you can’t just put your hands in your pockets and ignore 
it. And okay, people say it’s dirty work and they are right. But 
someone has to do it, don’t they? 
- Page: I don’t know sir  
- Creon: Of course you don’t. You are lucky. I hope to God you never 
find out. You’re in quite a hurry to grow up, aren’t you? 
- Page: Oh yes sir. 
- Creon: Well don’t be. You are mad. Never grow up. Five o’clock. 
We’ve got something at five o’clock. What was it at five o’clock … 
remind me. 
- Page: Council meeting sir.  
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- Creon: That’s right. Council meeting. Five o’clock. Well we mustn’t 
be late, must we?  
Just like Creon asked from his assistant to remain young while making him fit the 
structures of the upcoming meeting, the “NO” of the Greek bailout referendum of 2015 
was turned into something irrelevant and inactive the minute it entered the eurogroup 
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Chapter 3: Imperceptible Performances Migratory Flows at the Thresholds of 
European Debt-Economy 
3.1 The EU-Turkey Statements: Stages of Imperceptibility  
 The flows of forced migration that emerged from the Syrian War are considered 
to be the largest migratory flows since World War II. It was not until 2015 and 2016 that 
these migratory flows reached Europe in large numbers. In order to survive the war, 
millions fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran, passed through Turkey, crossed 
the Mediterranean on rigid-hulled inflatable boats and reached the northeastern Greek 
islands in the Aegean Sea. Those crossings of the Mediterranean on rigid-hulled 
inflatable boats are known as Mediterranean crossings of the boat people.  
 Disrupting narratives that associate migration with hiding, the boat people of the 
Mediterranean crossings wanted to be seen. They often punctuated their inflatable boats 
right before they reached the shores of the Aegean islands in order to force the gaze of 
international law to perceive them as what they really were—stateless, nationless lives in 
utter jeopardy—and to actually create the circumstances for what should otherwise be 
undeniable and taken for granted; their right to apply for asylum. However, the European 
Union dispossessed these lives of that right to apply for asylum through the so-called EU-
Turkey statements or EU-Turkey deal in ways that were imperceptible to the gaze of 
International Law.  
 Let me briefly explain how. In short, according to the EU-Turkey statement that 
was released to the press on March 18 2016—and that was subsequent to the one that had 
been announced on November 29 2015—“All new irregular migrants crossing from 
Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey” (European 
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Council, Council of the European Union March 2016). Interdisciplinary scholarship that 
combines Legal Studies with European Union Studies, International Affairs and Refugee 
Studies has demonstrated that the EU’s decision to forcibly return migrants to Turkey, 
their transit country, is contradictory to and inconsistent with the “non-refoulement” 
principle of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (Laura Batalla Adam 
2017, Kelly M. Greenhill 2016). According to the “non-refoulement” principle “a refugee 
should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or 
freedom. This is now considered a rule of customary international law” (UNHCR 2001-
2017). The EU-Turkey statements eluded the gaze of the international law and, more 
particularly, the principle of non-refoulement by implying that Turkey is a safe country.  
 However Turkey upholds a geographical limitation on the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. According to this limitation, within Turkish territory the Convention only 
applies “to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe” 
(United Nations 1951). This means that the migrants who were forcibly returned from 
Greece to Turkey—which were the majority of the migrants who made it to the shores of 
Greece—cannot apply for asylum since they originated from non-European countries 
(Batalla Adam 2017: 53, Kivilcim 2016: 196). As a result these potential asylum seekers 
were, and are to this day, detained in Turkey under a status of temporary protection.  
 Legal Studies scholars and Anthropology researchers and ethnographers have 
showed that both on an institutional and a practical level the status of temporary 
protection permanently prohibits the ones detained in the refugee camps of Turkey not 
only from applying for other international statuses but also from accessing any kind of 
services that relate to their survival both directly and indirectly, like for instance 
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healthcare, education and access to the job market (Kivilcim 2016). As a result due to the 
EU-turkey statements Turkey becomes a “buffer zone” (Hürsoy 2017) or a “container or 
buffer state” (Keyman 2016) in which all the forcibly returned migrants that initially fled 
their countries in order to survive the war are left to die.  
 In addition to taking into serious consideration Turkey’s geographical limitation 
on the Refugee Convention, before defining Turkey as a “safe third country,” one should 
also keep in mind that Turkey is currently an active participant in the Syrian War—the 
Turkish military intervention started on August 24 2016 and since then the Turkish army 
has been bombing Syrian Kurds in the name of anti-ISIL war (Žižek 2016). In addition, 
since 2014, Turkey has been building a 828km wall and fence across its border with 
Syria. Just in 2016 dozens of Syrian refugees—including children—have been reported 
“shot dead” by Turkish border guards while trying to cross this wall (Independent 2016, 
Spiegel 2016, Aljazeera 2016, New York Times 2016). The tragic irony is that the EU 
relied on Turkey not being a safe third country for all the forcibly returned migrants so 
that Turkey could do EU’s dirty job of filtering the rapidly increasing migratory flows.  
In exchange Europe promised to lift the visa requirement for Turkish citizens. As 
per the EU-Turkey statement of March 2019 “the fulfillment of the visa liberalization 
roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to 
lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016” 
(European Council, Council of the European Union 2016). To cut a very long story short, 
EU had Turkey do its dirty work so that the former would maintain its pseudo-
humanitarian masks of Western civilization and democracy. The EU-Turkey statements 
transferred asylum seekers from Greece to Turkey so that the former are permanently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   130	  
caught in a “temporary” status of protection and that are indefinitely prohibited from 
applying for, and thus for finding asylum in Europe.  
As I argued in the beginning of this essay, the Mediterranean crossings of the 
boat-people—the ones who managed to pass through Turkey and reached the Greek 
islands that are off the shores of Turkey on rigid-hulled inflatable boats—forced the gaze 
of international law to perceive them as what they were; bare, nationless, stateless lives in 
utter jeopardy. The boat people put their lives in danger and crossed the Mediterranean 
on unsafe boats in order to create the circumstances for what should be an undeniable 
fact: their right to apply for asylum.  
Europe’s inhumane response to these rapidly increasing inflows of bare lives was 
to return these lives to Turkey: where the absolute vulnerability of the latter is 
imperceptible to the gaze of International Law. This European cruelty was one more 
reminder of what Giorgio Agamben argues in Homo Sacer; that “Western politics first 
constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life” 
(Agamben 1998: 7). In the case of the EU-Turkey statements this production of cruelty 
started from before the forcible return of the migrants to Turkey. It started from the 
detainment of the migrants in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece.  
Due to the ban that the government of SYRIZA instituted on journalists, 
representatives of various organizations and academic researchers on February 29th 2016 
the only relatively direct information we could get from the hotspots and refugee camps 
of Greece came from reports of various NGOs and Human Rights Organizations that 
worked there. According to the report that Αίτηµα (Etima) NGO—an NGO that provides 
free legal assistance to asylum seekers and refugees in Greece—published in April of 
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2017, after the announcement of the EU-Turkey statement on March 18 2016 both the 
hotspots that were located on the Greek islands off the shores of Turkey and the camps 
that were located in the periphery of the city of Athens performed as detainment centers 
that restrained the migrants from applying for asylum.  
The Αίτηµα report specifically describes how, following March 20 2016, the 
registration of incoming migrants was delayed “up to 8 months on the islands” and “up 
until 10 months on the mainland” (Αίτηµα 2017). As a result the incoming migrants that 
had just passed through Turkey and risked their lives in order to reach the shores of 
Greece were returned to Turkey without ever getting anywhere near the Greek asylum 
services. Similar cases have been also reported by international NGOs. As Batalla Adam 
states in “The EU-Turkey Deal One Year On: A Delicate Balancing Act” Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) reports at least thirteen cases of asylum seekers that had asked to apply for 
asylum in Greece and that were forcibly returned to Turkey before doing so (Batallla 
Adam 2017: 47).  
Therefore I contend that the crucial question that needs to be addressed asks why, 
in spite of the intense efforts of scholarship, activists and various organizations to stop 
the deal by addressing its contradictions to and inconsistencies with the International 
Law, the deal could not be stopped. I argue that the focus of the spheres that intend to 
stop the deal needs to change from asking weather the deal is illegal or not to asking one, 
how the deal performs having the validity of law while it is nothing but a series of 
informal of press releases and two, how the deal performs legality by escaping the gaze 
of international law because it is inconsistent with the later. These are the two questions 
that this chapter takes on.  
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It is because of this necessary shift in focus from notions of legality and illegality 
to notions of gaze and imperceptibility that I contend that the current discursive approach 
of the EU-Turkey statements in particular and the flows of forced migration that emerged 
from the Syrian War more broadly needs to be complemented with a Performance 
Studies, and more specifically a Performance Philosophy methodology. In order to lay 
the conceptual ground for this methodology I would like to refer to the three asylum 
seekers, two Pakistani and one Afghan, who attempted to challenge the legality of the 
EU-Turkey statements in the General Court of the European Union.  
On February 28 2017 the General Court of the European Union released a 
statement to the press according to which “the General Court declares that it lacks 
jurisdiction to hear and determine the actions brought by the three asylum seekers” 
(General Court of the European Union, Press Release No 19/17 2017). The press release 
explained this “lack of jurisdiction” by stating that the three asylum seekers claimed that 
the EU-Turkey statement is an international agreement that “infringes the rules of the 
FEU Treaty.”  
In brief, the Court responded one, that the claim of the three asylum seekers falls 
under the umbrella of the Article 263 TFEU and therefore the Court “lacks jurisdiction to 
hear and determine the actions pursuant to Article 263 TFEU, and, accordingly dismisses 
them,” and two, that “neither the European Council nor any other institution of the EU 
decided to conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of the 
migration crisis.” In other words, according to the General Court of the European Union 
the EU-Turkey statements could not be processed formally because they were not 
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produced by any of the formal EU institutions. They were nothing but informal press 
releases.  
 The Court’s response proves what has been this chapter’s main argument; that the 
EU-Turkey statements operate by performing multiple evasions of the gaze of the legal 
apparatus. These performances of evasion might involve the appropriation of different 
terms, countries, categories of people, categories of institutions or non-institutions, spaces 
that slip outside of juridical frameworks etc. The EU-Turkey statements established 
multiple and simultaneous stages of imperceptibility not only by rendering the ones who 
fled their countries in order to survive the War and its innumerous consequences 
imperceptible to the gaze of International Law but also by rendering themselves 
imperceptible to any kind of legal apparatuses and institutions that could actually 
challenge these statements.  
 If the EU-Turkey statements are unstoppable because they are not perceptible—
or, to paraphrase the press release of the General Court of the European Union they 
simply do not exist within—to any kind of legal apparatus or formal institution, where 
does that leave the field of resistance? One could argue on the same stages of 
imperceptibility. In Homo Sacer for instance Agamben argues that the bareness of the 
lives of the refugees will force Western politics to finally treat bare life as the life that is 
“no longer separated and excepted either in the state order or in the figure of human 
rights” (Agamben 1998: 134). Reframing Agamben’s argument in terms of gazing and 
imperceptibility, one would hope that the bare lives of refugees that are rendered 
imperceptible by and to the gaze of Western politics will force the latter for stop founding 
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itself on notions of imperceptibility once and for all by forcing Western politics to 
confront their limits.  
 However the EU-Turkey statements prove that these notions of imperceptibility 
can also be used and appropriated by the ones who have the power to include/exclude 
certain lives over others in the polis, which in our case is the European Union. 
Furthermore Agamben’s assumption that the existence of refugees will automatically 
push the Western politics to its limits in ways that inclusion and exclusion will be 
rendered irrelevant somehow neglects or leaves unaddressed the—to some extend very 
cruel—implication that the extremely vulnerable ones are the ones who should labor for 
revolutionizing the status quo without the collaboration of those who are always-already 
part of the polis. Paraphrasing Schmitt, it is also the one who has the power to 
include/exclude that should critically reflect upon and challenge this power.  
Earlier I made the case that the EU-Turkey statements operate by performing 
multiple evasions of the gaze of the legal apparatus via establishing different stages of 
imperceptibility. I contend that the challenge that we need to take on is to come up with 
theoretical tools that grasp, address and shed light on these evasions. I also contend that a 
Performance Philosophy methodology, that reads the works of Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari through the lens of performance and that is informed by the current frames of 
European debt-economy can provide us with some of these tools needed to respond to 
this challenge successfully.  
 
3.2 Performances of Imperceptibility, Performances of Exception and Nomadic 
Detainments 
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 Since the beginning of this dissertation I have been arguing that the European 
economy of the 21st century is a debt-economy founded upon the non-resolvable power 
relations between creditor nation-states and debtor nation-states. In order to actualize this 
economy the European Union has created a number of informal bodies or meetings that 
have more power that EU’s formal institutions. These informal bodies are not minuted, 
are not answerable to any kind of formal institution or nationally elected Parliament, and 
are imperceptible to the existing legal apparatuses. They produce informal statements or 
agreements that are usually announced as press releases and that end up having more 
validity than law.  
 It is because of this imperceptibly informal organization of Europe that during 
their public debate in New York Public Library on April 27 2016 Noam Chomsky and 
Yianis Varoufakis—former Greek minister of finance and current co-organizer of the 
Democratizing Europe movement (Diem25)—described EU’s informal meetings, for 
instance the Eurogroup or the Euroworking group, as “nonexistent groups” (Yianis 
Varoufakis 2016). Ironically enough, by announcing that “neither the European Council 
nor any other institution of the EU decided to conclude an agreement with the Turkish 
Government on the subject of the migration crisis” (General Court of the European 
Union, Press Release No 19/17 2017) the General Court of the European Union framed 
the EU-Turkey deal in terms of “non-existence.”  
 Therefore it seems that the concept of imperceptibility—a concept that once 
actualized it allows something to exist but that also renders it simultaneously 
imperceptible to and thus non-existent for certain gazes—is a core concept of the 21st 
century European debt-economy. Furthermore, enacted imperceptibility allows 
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something to perform nomadism and to move from one discursive sphere or category to 
another, from one geopolitical territory to another and from one legal apparatus to 
another. In A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “Becoming imperceptible means many things (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 279) 
[…] it is jumping from one plane to the other” (282). This “jumping” describes how the 
EU-Turkey deal performs; it jumps from planes of formal institutions to planes of 
informality, from planes of law to planes of press releases, from formally defined 
geopolitical territories to territories that it constructs as “container or buffer” zones and so 
forth.  
 In order for this leap to be efficacious it needs to one, not to be limited to pre-
established formations or conceptions—earlier I made the case that the EU-Turkey deal 
did not fall under the umbrella of any of the existing formations of the EU—and two, to 
establish new connections and conditions that cannot be perceived by any of the already 
existing formations or conceptions—like for instance the EU-Turkey deal turned Turkey 
into a “container or buffer” state that rendered the detained migrants imperceptible to the 
gaze of international law.  
 A number of Deleuze Studies scholars have elaborated on those two aspects of 
efficacious imperceptibility. Mark Bonta and John Protevi for instance talk about 
imperceptibility’s capacity to “enter into becomings” (Bonta and Protevi 2004: 98) and 
Stamatia Portanova describes imperceptibility as something that is not “capturable” 
within existing ranges of perception (Portanova 2013: 242). In Demystifying Deleuze Rob 
Shields and Mickey Vallee remind us that “one cannot become imperceptible if tied 
down to pre-established self-perceptions” (Shields and Vallee 2012: 92) and that 
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according to Deleuze and Guattari  “to become imperceptible is to ‘make a world’” (91). 
In Deleuze and Contemporary Art Stephen Zepke and Simon O’Sullivan write that 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of imperceptibility “has been cynically described as 
‘what you don’t see is what you get’” (Zepke and O’Sullivan 2010: 118). Furthermore 
the same scholars remind us that scholars like Galloway and Thacker, who focus on the 
common ground between Deleuze Studies and Media Studies, understand 
imperceptibility as “tactics of non-existence” (118). A close elaboration of the above 
conceptualizations of imperceptibility could possibly lead to the conclusion that both 
Deleuze and Guattari and scholars who focus on the works of the former frame the 
concept of imperceptibility mainly in terms of praxes of resistance.  
 However—as the EU-Turkey statements prove—imperceptibility cannot be just 
enacted as a performance of resistance. On the contrary it can also perform as a tool of 
power. The EU-Turkey statements performed in all of the ways I summarize above: they 
entered “new becomings,” they made “new worlds” and they appropriated “tactics of 
non-existence.” But the goal of all these performances of imperceptibility was to create 
spaces in which those who fled their countries in order to survive the war could literally 
be filtered out and forgotten by the rest of the world. As I argued earlier the academics, 
activists, NGOs, Human Rights Organizations and politicians who fought for stopping 
the deal lacked the conceptual and theoretical tools that would allow them to grasp how 
the EU-Turkey statements perform. As a result, in spite of the intense efforts to stop the 
deal the deal could not be stopped.  
 One of the main intentions of this chapter is to provide the necessary conceptual 
lenses that can shed light on the imperceptible performances of the EU-Turkey 
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statements. As I described earlier when the so-called European Migration Management 
Support Teams—like for instance FRONTEX (European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency) or EASO (European Asylum Support Office) for instance—in collaboration 
with military operations like the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean 
(EUNAVFORMED) and the Greek asylum services started implementing the EU-Turkey 
statements, the majority of the spheres that attempted to stop the implementation of the 
deal framed the latter as illegal or contradictory to and inconsistent with the international 
law. I contend that the conceptual ground of these approaches is founded upon notions of 
exception that understand the EU-Turkey statements as statements that operate outside 
the law and that perform suspension of the law. I also contend that, once applied to the 
case of the EU-Turkey statements, the lens of exception leaves certain stakes of the 
statements unaddressed.  
 Let me explain why by briefly elaborating on one of the most important and most 
referenced works of our century on the state of exception; Giorgio Agamben’s State of 
Exception. In this work Agamben locates the suspension of the law in the liminal spaces 
between the sphere of the political, on the one hand and the juridico-constitutional 
sphere, on the other. He asks, 
if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as 
such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional 
grounds (De Martino 1973, 320) then they find themselves in the 
paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood 
in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal form of what 
cannot have legal form (Agamben 2005: 2).  
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To a certain extent that is exactly what happened with the EU-Turkey statements; 
they ended up having the validity of law without being law. However, the EU-
Turkey deal was not produced by a political sovereignty. This is why I contend 
that in order to understand how the EU-Turkey statements perform we need 
conceptual tools that add on the lens of exception. On the contrary the EU-Turkey 
deal was produced by a debt-economy that uses the sphere of the political in order 
to assemble different nation-states together via non-resolvable creditor/debtor 
power relations.  
It is because of this very unclear blurring of the lines if the spheres of the political 
with spheres of economy and juridico-constitutional spheres that the General Court of the 
European Union released a statement to the press on February 28 2017 regarding the 
“actions brought by three asylum seekers against the EU-Turkey agreement,” saying that 
even if the agreement was formally concluded by the “Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States of the EU and the Turkish Prime Minister”—something that, as the 
Court makes really clear, “has been denied by the European Council, the Council of the 
European Union and the European Commission”—the Court “does not have any 
jurisdiction to rule on the lawfulness of an international agreement concluded by the 
Member States” (General Court of the European Union, Press Release No 19/17 2017). 
In brief, according to the Court, even if different European nation-states and Turkey came 
to an agreement, EU and its institutions would have nothing to do with that agreement 
that by the way not only has EU’s name on it but also states EU’s commitments to 
Turkey regarding the visa liberalization processes for Turkish citizens.  
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 This is not a moment of political sovereignty acting independently of or 
superseding the juridical sphere. This is a moment of an economy using the sphere of the 
political and the juridico-constitutional in order not only to enhance its power of 
decision-making but also to render this enhancement of power imperceptible. As Susi 
Foerschler points out in “Quo Vadis Europe”, right after the press release of the statement 
on March 2016, “academics heatedly debated whether it was a binding international 
agreement under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties that would have merited 
involvement of the European Parliament under Article 218 TFEU or merely a non-
binding press statement” (Foerschler 2017: 1). The Court’s response proves that the right 
answer to this question is the second answer.  
Furthermore, as opposed to Agamben’s argument regarding the “paradoxical 
position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms,” (2) the 
EU-Turkey deal introduces itself in legal terms. By stating that the return of the migrants 
from Greece to Turkey “will take place in full accordance with EU and international law” 
(European Council, Council of the European Union March 2016) the deal defines itself 
through the law that it then renders meaningless and irrelevant. Therefore the EU-Turkey 
deal does not perform as an exception to the international law. On the contrary it claims it 
is in accordance with the international law in order to perform on levels, ways and 
territories that are imperceptible to the latter.  
  The irony behind these performances of imperceptibility is that they immobilize 
the migratory flows of those who fled their countries in order to survive the war through 
detaining them in the hotspots and camps of Greece and Turkey while allowing the 
powers that control these flows to move. Although forced displacement is often 
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associated with movement and nomadism there is nothing mobile about the migratory 
flows of 21st century. On the contrary the migratory flows that emerged from the Syrian 
War are forced into series after series of nomadic detainments: from one hotspot to 
another, from one camp to another, from one detainment center to another.  
 The notion of nomadic detainment captures the connections between the forced 
production of flows of speed and the forced production of abrupt disruptions of these 
flows. Although the concept of nomadism has been theorized by Deleuze and Guattari 
extensively, just like in the case of the concept of imperceptibility, it has been mainly 
theorized as praxis of resistance. In Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Deleuze 
and Guattari argue that the nomad performs outside existing formations, conceptions and 
conventions. They specifically describe the nomad as “a hunter [that] follows the flows, 
exhausts them in place, and moves on with them to another place” (Deleuze and Guattari 
2004: 162) and that “is everywhere apparent but remains different to conceptualize” 
(390). The problem that we are currently facing is that the roles have been reversed. 
Performances of resistance become the “exhausted” flows that are forcibly moved from 
one place to another and the 21st century European debt-economy in general and the EU-
Turkey statements in particular become the nomads that exhaust and detain them.  
 What is it to be done then? If there is nothing that can stop the EU-Turkey 
statements—the Court’s response to the three asylum seekers literally says that no formal 
action can actually challenge the deal—and if the migratory flows that are being forcibly 
moved from one detainment center to another in order to die are too exhausted to even 
stay alive, how can we address the ways in which the statements perform in ways that 
actually affect their implementation? This chapter proposes to come up with conceptual 
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tools that actually grasp and capture how these statements perform. But since the 
statements are designed to remain un-captured by existing concepts this chapter suggests 
new conceptual tools that emerge from the dynamic interplay between the works of 
Deleuze and Guattari and a Performance Studies approach informed by the current 
frames of European debt –economy. In other words if the power of the EU-Turkey deal is 
founded upon performances of imperceptibility then what needs to be done is to make 
that imperceptibility perceptible and exhaust its power.  
From a level of ontology to a level of research practice the majority of 
Performance Studies is dedicated to shedding light onto the imperceptible through tracing 
the actual, very material manifestations of that imperceptibility. As Performance Studies 
scholar Diana Taylor argues in The Archive and the Repertoire; Performing Cultural 
Memory in the Americas this tracing needs to examine “cultural expressions” not in terms 
of “textual analysis” but as “embodied and performed acts [that] generate, record and 
transmit knowledge” (Taylor 2007: 20). Building on Taylor’s work I contend that one of 
the ways in which we can address the material manifestations of the imperceptible 
performances of the EU-Turkey statements is through closely investigating the “cultural 
expressions” that, especially during the years of 2015 and 2016—when the migratory 
flows of those who fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran in order to survive the 
war increased radically—“generated, recorded and transmitted knowledge” regarding the 
“embodied and performed acts” of the migrant body. The next section focuses on one of 
these cultural expressions: the photography exhibition of St. Antony de Padua on İstiklâl 
Caddesi in Istanbul, Turkey.  
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3.3 The Infinitely Indebted Migratory Body: The Photography Exhibition of St. 
Antony de Padua in Istanbul  
 Istanbul, June 2016: I am on İstiklâl Caddesi—the street that connects Taksim 
Square with the Galatasaray High School, the Galata Tower and the area around the 
Galata bridge. This specific route has staged numerous demonstrations and protests such 
as the annual Istanbul pride and the Gezi Park protests. In addition to Galata’s High 
School, Tower and bridge area, İstiklâl Caddesi is also surrounded by numerous 
restaurants, taverns, hookah cafes and stores, buildings of various embassies, art and 
theatre spaces, academic institutions, mosques, synangogues and churches. One of the 
churches is the Roman Catholic church of St. Antonio di Padova, also known as St. 
Anthony of Padua Church, Sent Antuan Bazilikasi. 
On my way from Taksim Square to the bridge of Galata I run into a photography 
exhibition organized by the church of St. Antony of Padua. The exhibition was located in 
the church’s yard. Above the yard’s main entrance there was a poster of a picture taken 
during Pope Francis’s visit at the reception and identification center (hotspot) of Μόρια 
(Moria) located on the Greek island of Λέσβος (Lesbos). Lesbos, also known as 
Μυτιλήνη (Mytilini), is located in the northeastern part of Aegean Sea and is very close 
to Turkey. Because of its geopolitical location, the island of Lesbos—together with the 
islands of Chios (Χίος), Samos (Σάµος), Leros (Λέρος), Kalimnos (Κάλυµνος) and Kos 
(Κώς)—is administered in such a way that it performs as a geopolitical filter and 
detainment center for those who fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran in order 
to survive the war.  
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A picture of Pope Francis and the ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew holding a 
crying baby titled “The Tragedy of Our Century: Refugees” was located above the main 
entrance of the exhibition. This picture was also supplemented by the following text from 
Matthew 25:35: “I was hungry, you gave me food; I was thirsty, you gave me water; I 
was a stranger, you accepted me;” That specific picture made me think of two things: 
one, that a contemporary understanding of tragedy has very useful insights to offer into 
the kinds of performances that the migratory body is expected and asked to perform, and 
two, that these obligatory performances are closely related to notions of access to a polis. 
Let me start with the first.  
The concept of tragedy that this dissertation proposes understands the relations 
between a creditor and a debtor as disproportionate, lopsided, asymmetrical non-
resolvable power relations hidden beneath promises of resolution that are designed to 
remain elusive. I contend that the power relations between asylum seekers and asylum 
providers are also non-resolvable power relations hidden beneath the promise of an 
asylum that may or may not be granted. But even when asylum is granted the power 
relation is not resolved. On the contrary the asylee is rendered infinitely “indebted” to its 
asylum provider for being granted asylum. As a result the former needs to keep 
performing submission to the latter within the frames that the latter defines in order to 
keep paying but never fully repaying their “debt.” 
Attic tragedy made this non-resolvable power relation between the asylum 
seeker/asylee and the asylum provider obvious and explicit. The ικέτης (suppliant) had to 
perform ικεσία (supplication) in order to be granted άσυλο (asylum, a safe space that 
cannot be violated) either by gods or by mortals. Aeschylus reminds us not only that one 
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has to perform supplication in order to be granted asylum but also that the asylum 
providers expect and demand these performances of supplication. In Aeschylus Ικέτιδες 
(The Suppliants) right before the ΔαναΪδες (Danaids) flee Egypt in order to seek for 
asylum in Άργος (Argos), their father Δαναός (Danaus) gives them the following advice: 
“And remember to be submissive: you are an alien, a fugitive, and in need. Bold speech 
does not suit the weak” (Αισχύλος 12). Furthermore when the king of Argos, Πελασγός 
(Pelasgus)—decided to try and convince both the Argive gods and the city of Argos to 
grant asylum to the Danaids he advised the latter to make their performances of 
supplication more obvious by leaving “suppliant boughs, the signs of your [Danaids’] 
distress” outside all the temples of the city (Αισχύλος 26). The Danaides had to perform 
indebtedness to both the gods and the city of Argos in order to be granted asylum. 
As opposed to the concept of tragedy that this dissertation proposes, according to 
which the non-resolvable creditor/debtor power relations are hidden beneath masks of 
resolution, by dramatizing the destruction of these masks, attic tragedy made these power 
relations explicit and perceptible. Within contemporary frames the ικέτης becomes an 
asylum seeker. The term asylum seeker masks the performances of submission that the 
asylum provider demands from the asylum seeker to perform beneath a teleologically 
charged promise of a safe space—a safe topos—that may or may not be found. While the 
term itself implies that one needs to perform submissive indebtedness to their asylum 
provider in order to be granted asylum, “asylum seeker” conceals that demand of the 
asylum provider beneath performances of “seeking.” As a result the term “asylum 
seeker” renders the seeker responsible for finding a safe topos that only the asylum 
provider can give.  
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That, in my contention, is the ultimate aporia of the term asylum seeker: it asks 
from the asylum seeker to find something that is designed not to be found but to be given. 
The asylum seeker is doomed to keep looking for a topos that can only be given to the 
former by their asylum provider. Even when this topos is given it is not really given. The 
asylee has to keep performing submissive indebtedness to their asylum providers in order 
to prove that they still deserve the “safe” topos that was given to them. These non-
resolvable power relations between the asylum seeker and the asylum provider establish 
asylum as an a priori non-safe topos for the former. Bridging this thought process to the 
overall argument of this dissertation, the non-resolvable power relations between an 
asylum seeker and an asylum provider is another TragedyMachine that produces infinite 
debt while simultaneously rendering it imperceptible.  
Within frames of 21st century European debt-economy that production of the 
imperceptible infinite debt that the asylum provider imposes on the asylum seeker 
materializes itself in two ways: cheap labor and intensified and very directed circulation 
of money. Although this chapter will not elaborate in detail on the mechanisms of the 
European debt-economy that turn the human flows of those who flee their countries and 
seek for asylum in Europe into flows of profit, for now I would like to argue—as I have 
been arguing since the beginning of this dissertation—that a debt-economy needs debt in 
order to be profitable and that the “weaker” one is the more indebted they become.  
Therefore within the frames of cruel European debt economy asylum seekers—at 
least before the debt crisis of 2008 and the increased flows of those who flee Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran during the years of the Syrian War—were evaluated 
based on how profitable their condition of indebtedness to their asylum providers—
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European nation-states answerable to the European Union—could be for the latter. Even 
though I find Žižek’s book on refugees titled Refugees, Terror and Other Troubles with 
the Neighbors: Against the Double Blackmail extremely problematic in terms of many of 
its, often unacceptable assumptions, it does address the refugee condition in terms of 
cheap labor and money circulation. Žižek argues, “The way the universe of capital relates 
to the freedom of movement of individuals is thus inherently contradictory: it needs ‘free’ 
individuals as cheap labor forces, but it simultaneously needs to control their movement 
since it cannot afford the same freedoms and rights for all people” (Žižek 2016: 61). Until 
the multiple debt-crises and the Syrian War, Europe rendered this criterion—at least in 
terms of the documents, policies and law production that made it to the spheres of public 
discourse—hard to grasp, hard to concretize and imperceptible.  
This imperceptibility was maintained by the interviews between asylum seekers 
and asylum providers. Interviews between institutional bodies of each potential asylum 
provider/ European nation-state and the ones who apply for asylum were supposed to 
“evaluate” each application for asylum based on the applicant’s vulnerability. If this is 
really the case the all the asylum seekers need to do is to follow Pelasgus’ advice and 
make the “signs of their distress” obvious. The fact that, because of the two cruel and 
inhumane EU-Turkey statements that were announced on November 29 2015 and on 
March 18 2016, the millions who fled Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran crossed 
the Mediterranean on extremely unsafe rigid-hulled, inflatable boats were returned to 
Turkey, proves that this is not really the case.  
If Pelasgus’ advice applied in frames of 2015-2016 Europe and Greece then the 
millions of dead bodies and the millions of leaky rubber-hulled boats that the 
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Mediterranean washed up on the shores of Greece would perform as “signs of distress” 
successful enough to convince the asylum providers that the lives of those who flee their 
countries were in extreme danger. But as the EU-Turkey statements prove, in 2015-2016 
Europe and Greece, the extreme vulnerability of the asylum seekers was not the primary 
concern of the asylum providers. On the contrary the two EU-Turkey statements rendered 
the vulnerability of those who flee Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran 
imperceptible via returning them back to Turkey: where both the 1951 Refugee 
Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol apply only partially. In Greece during the 
years of 2015-2016 the millions of people who crossed the Mediterranean on unsafe 
rubber-hulled boats in order to survive were returned to Turkey—to a topos—where their 
vulnerability is imperceptible to the gaze of both the Convention and its Protocol.  
Because the photography exhibition of St. Antony de Padua on İstiklâl Caddesi in 
Istanbul, Turkey intended to transmit and reproduce these non-resolvable power relations 
between the migrants and their potential asylum providers it depicted the ones detained in 
the hotspot of Moria as bodies infinitely indebted to their “saviors.” As a result, like attic 
tragedy but unintentionally, this specific photography exhibition rendered the 
imperceptible, non-resolvable power relations between the migrants, on the one hand, and 
their potential asylum providers on the other perceptible. Relating that thought process to 
the crucial question regarding the efficacy of resistance that the previous section 
addressed, it is important to capture moments in which power systems that perform on a 
level of imperceptibility render themselves perceptible.  
That thought process takes us to the second focus point of this section: the 
economy of the migrant body that is granted access to the polis. The text from Matthew 
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25:35 that supplemented the pictures of the photography exhibition organized by the St. 
Antony de Padua framed the ones depicted in the pictures as lives that were ready to 
access the European economy because they were ready to perform submission to their 
“saviors” that covered their basic needs. Hannah Arendt has theorized extensively this 
interplay between notions of economy and notions of access to the polis.  
For Arendt the formation of Greek polis lays the conceptual ground for us to 
grasp the life that does not become “fully human” until it enters the polis. In The Human 
Condition Arendt argues that the “mastering of the necessities of life in the household 
was the condition for freedom of the polis” (34). And although Arendt’s intention is to 
demonstrate how, as she writes in The Origins of Totalitarianism, “we are not born equal; 
we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee 
ourselves mutually equal rights” (Arendt 1973: 299) this section proposes a reversed 
understanding of Arendt’s argument.  
For Arendt the sphere of the polis—the poli(s)tical sphere—equalizes the 
inequalities of the economical sphere; the sphere where the οίκος (ecos, household) is 
under νοµήν (allocation). The reading of Arendt’s argument that this section proposes 
understands the polis as the publically perceptible sphere that perpetuates the economical 
inequalities via concealing them and rendering them imperceptible. Drawing upon this 
reversed understanding of Arendt I contend that being granted access to the polis is not 
just founded upon rendering the economical inequalities imperceptible but also upon the 
imperceptible and non-resolvable power relations between those who can cover their 
basic needs—their necessities of life—only through covering the necessities of lives of 
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others and those who have their necessities of life covered by others so that they can 
carelessly enjoy the privileges of the polis. 
I contend that the photography exhibition of St. Antony de Padua made these 
power relations very explicit. By making these power relations explicit the exhibition did 
not just creat possibilities for further enactments, performances and embodiments of these 
relations but it also introduced possibilities for their disruption. The next section closely 
investigates how the MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND 
SELF ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS that took place on July 23rd 2016 at 
Πεδίο του Άρεως (Pedion tou Areos) in Athens disrupts the further embodiment of these 
relations and frames the migratory body not in terms of power relations and performances 
of submission but of equality.   
3.4 MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND SELF 
ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS 
 
  
Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane  
 Especially during the years of 2015 and 2016—when the flows of those who flee 
Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and Iran kept increasing—numerous anarchist groups 
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and groups of anarchists occupied abandoned buildings and houses all over Greece so 
that the refugees who were detained in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece under 
the most inhumane “living” conditions could live elsewhere. These occupations were 
self-organized units within which the refugees themselves created and produced the 
circumstances and laws that defined their own lives: what as one Greek etymology 
suggests is grasped by the notion of αυτονοµία (autonomy). But in order for the 
autonomy of these self-organized collectives to be preserved and maintained the 
collectives had to remain imperceptible to the gazes of the municipality, press and media, 
volunteers, neighbors, law, police, citizens etc.  
 This is why I contend that this autonomy was founded upon an aporia: On the one 
hand these collectives were fighting for “smashing the borders”—outside almost every 
collective there was a “smash the borders” banner—while on the other hand the same 
collectives raised their own borders in order to maintain their autonomy via rendering it 
imperceptible. When I tried to enter the collective “Housing Refugees Squat” on 26 
Notara Street in Exarcheia, Athens, I was immediately told by the person who guarded 
the building—member of the anarchist group “Ρουβικόνας” (Rouvikonas) that was 
responsible for this particular occupation—“better not.” One could easily argue that this 
resembled the ban the government of SYRIZA-ANEL instituted on journalists, 
researchers and organizations prohibiting the latter from accessing the hotspots and 
refugee camps of Greece. But these collectives did not raise their borders and did not use 
detainment practices for no reason. What happened in the city of Thessaloniki on July 
23rd 2016 was the biggest proof of that. 
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 On July 23rd 2016 the municipality of Thessaloniki forced the anarchists and the 
refugees that were occupying the city’s abandoned orphanage, the abandoned building on 
Nikis (Νίκης) Avenue and the abandoned building on Karolou Dil (Καρόλου Ντηλ) 
known as the Hurriya collective to vacate these buildings. Needless to say that these three 
occupations were three of Greece’s most crowded and most functional occupations. In 
the morning of July 23rd 2016 the municipality of Thessaloniki in collaboration with the 
city’s police started by force vacating and eventually demolishing the city’s orphanage 
and proceeded with force vacating the other two buildings. This process ended in 
seventy-four arrests. 
 Later in the day numerous protests and demonstrations took place all over Greece 
responding to the brutality performed by the municipality and the police of Thessaloniki. 
One of these demonstrations was the MARCH IN SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ 
REFUGEES AND SELF ORGANIZED SOLIDARITY PROJECTS that took place at 
6:00pm on July 23rd 2016 at Πεδίον του Άρεως (Pedion tou Areos). I was part of the 
demonstration. During the MARCH refugees that were living in various collectives and 
occupations of Athens performed as the demonstration’s avant-garde. But, as opposed to 
military avant-gardes, this particular avant-garde was guarded.  
More specifically, demonstrators who held banners that were hanging from 
wooden sticks were “guarding” the demonstration surrounding from the sides both the 
demonstration’s avant-garde and the rest of the demonstrators that were following the 
former. The ones who were “guarding” the demonstration were prohibiting the ones who 
were spectating the demonstration from recording and from taking pictures of the 
MARCH. Furthermore, some of the demonstrators were occasionally diverging from the 
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crowd of the MARCH in order to write “Smash the Borders” with graffiti sprays on the 
walls of various buildings in the city of Athens.  
Let me break down the multiple levels of perceptibility and imperceptibility that 
this particular demonstration produced. By “guarding” the avant-garde—the refugees and 
the migrants who led the MARCH—the demonstration made the former’s detainment 
perceptible and it thus rendered them simultaneously perceptible and imperceptible to the 
gaze of the MARCH’s spectators. Additionally, by banning the MARCH’s spectators 
from recording and from taking pictures of the MARCH—in other words from 
reproducing representations of the MARCH—the demonstration on July 23rd 2016 did 
not just make perceptible the limits of reproduction and representation—limits that, as 
argues in the previous section, when concealed and masked become means of political 
leverage—but it also introduced resistance in non-reproducible and non-representational 
terms.  
Furthermore, the writing on the walls inscribed traces of the MARCH onto 
various buildings of the city of Athens. The “Smash the Borders” graffiti in combination 
with the guards of the demonstration restraining the spectators of the demonstration from 
reproducing and representations of the MARCH made very perceptible that all that 
remains from performance is traces that are relationally distant to the performance itself. 
It also made very perceptible that performances of resistance need to exist both on a level 
of relationality and a level of distance. Finally the MARCH made also perceptible that in 
an era that criminalizes solidarity, self-organization and autonomy any performances of 
solidarity, self-organization and autonomy need to become gaze-less and imperceptible. 
In the following paragraphs I will further elaborate on these four different levels of 
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perceptibility and imperceptibility that this demonstration produced. In order to do so I 
would like to refer to Peggy Phelan’s elaboration on the ontology of performance.  
In Unmarked: The Politics of Performance Phelan conceptualizes the ontology of 
performance in terms of non-reproducibility, non-representability and disappearance. She 
writes, “Performance’s only life is in the present. Performance cannot be saved, recorded, 
documented or otherwise participate in the circulation of representations of 
representations; once it does so it becomes something other than performance” (Phelan 
1993:129). And she adds, “Performance’s being […] becomes itself through 
disappearance” (130). Furthermore, according to Phelan, it is because of performance’s 
ontological resistance to reproduction and representation that other arts that intend to 
represent—either because they are counting on representation’s innate failure to fully 
represent (what, as I argued in the previous section, happened in the case of the  «Δρόµοι 
Επιβίωσης» exhibition) or because they are “genuinely” trying to cover the distance 
between the original and the simulacrum—are lured by both performance art and 
performance. 
In Unmarked Phelan refers to Sophie Calle’s art as one of the most indicative 
examples of that lure. In brief when some of the paintings from the galleries of the 
Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston were stolen, Calle—who had photographed 
the galleries before the thievery—asked from the visitors and staff of the museum to 
describe the missing paintings and, as Phelan describes, she then “transcribed those texts 
are placed them next to the photographs of the galleries” (138). For Phelan, Calle’s act of 
placing the descriptions next to the photographs was itself a performance because Calle’s 
act of intention was not to reproduce or fully represent that that was lost. On the contrary 
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Calle’s act performed as a constant reminder that something was lost. Phelan specifically 
writes, “The description itself does not reproduce the object, it rather helps us to restage 
and restate the effort to remember what is lost […] The disappearance of the object is 
fundamental to performance; it rehearses and repeats the disappearance of the subject 
who longs always to be remembered” (145). Although the intention of this section is not 
to focus on the role of memory in performance, mainly because I contend that a 
discussion like that needs to include cognitive science and most importantly not to 
assume that everyone’s experience of memory is the same, I find Phelan’s emphasis on 
performance’s capacity to use reproduction and representation in order to reveal the 
failure of both to fully reproduce and to fully represent an emphasis of great importance. 
As argued earlier the MARCH did exactly that: it produced multiple levels of 
perceptibility and imperceptibility in order to reveal the innately pseudo aspects of both 
reproduction and representation. By rendering the demonstration’s avant-garde—the 
refugees that were initially detained in the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece and that 
they then managed to leave the camps and to live in occupied buildings—perceptibly 
detained and thus both perceptible and imperceptible at the same time, and also by 
prohibiting the spectators from recording and from taking pictures of the demonstration, 
the MARCH revealed the non-reproducibility and the non-representability of the realities 
of the refugees who were detained in Greece only to be returned to the places from which 
they left in order to survive. As a result the MARCH publically conceptualized resistance 
in non-representational terms. Additionally the MARCH made also perceptible that when 
performances of solidarity are criminalized then these performances need to be rendered 
gaze-less and imperceptible.  
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When representation becomes a permanent means of political leverage only 
performance can make perceptible that representation is nothing but a mask that is 
founded upon a promise of representation that is designed to remain elusive. The question 
that emerges is what kind of performance? Based on what I have been arguing not just in 
this chapter but also since the beginning of this dissertation the kind that neither pretends 
to reproduce nor pretends to represent. On the contrary the one that affirms its resistance 
to representation in order to directly address the multiple levels on which perceptibility 
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Chapter 4: Theatres of Dramatization  
4.1.1 Drama Has Always Been Post- 
 If tragedy is to be understood as a concept that grasps how the disproportionate, 
lopsided and non-resolvable power relations between Greece and its international 
creditors are hidden beneath the appearance and the seeming promise of a resolution that 
nevertheless remains elusive then the challenge that 21st century Greek theatre has to take 
is to destroy any illusions and promises of resolution. This chapter will trace this 
theatricalized destruction of illusions and promises of resolution in two theatre 
productions that took place in Greece both before and after the victory of the left 
government of SYRIZA in the snap elections of February 2015: in Zero Point Theatre 
Group’s (Οµάδα Σηµείο Μηδέν) production of Buchner’s Woyzeck and in Yiannis 
Houvardas’ production of Aeschylus Ορέστεια (Oresteia).  
But before moving forward with the rest of the chapter I would like to situate my 
call for conceptualizing and creating theatre in terms of non-resolution, within Lehman’s 
discussion of “postdramatic” theatre. Lehmann’s term “postdramatic” has become one of 
the key terms that theatre and performance studies scholars use in order to refer to the 
kind of theatre that blurs the imaginary lines between the doubles introduced and 
imposed by representational thinking: actor and spectator, original and simulacrum, 
reality and illusion etc. In order to communicate the applicability and popularity of his 
term Lehmann writes, “The term and subject of ‘postdramatic theatre’ that I introduced 
into the debate some years ago have been picked up by other theoreticians” (Lehmann 
2006:26). In the comments to follow I will draw upon Deleuze’s “The Method of 
Dramatization” and Foucault’s “Theatrum Philosophicum” in order to argue that that the 
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epistemological paradigm within which Lehman performs contradicts and hinders his 
own argument. I contend that this discussion of the epistemological tensions between 
Lehmann on the one hand and Foucault and Deleuze on the other lays the conceptual 
ground for this section’s main argument: that the Zero Point Theatre Group’s production 
of Woyzeck in Greece right before the snap elections of January 2015 dramatized the 
destruction of notions of resolution and exodus and the conceptualization of resistance in 
terms of inbetweenness that starts at degree zero. 
In short for Lehmann dramatic theatre is the representational theatre that produces 
illusions on stage. For that reason, according to Lehman, dramatic theatre is the theatre 
that is bound to linear storytelling. Postdramatic theatre, on the other hand, is the theatre 
that comes after that. Lehman specifically argues that, “the adjective postdramatic 
denotes a theatre that feels bound to operate beyond drama, at a time ‘after’ the authority 
of the dramatic paradigm in theatre” (27). Although I agree with Lehman’s intellectual 
intention with regard to the urgent need for concepts that do not imprison theatrical praxis 
within notions of imposed linearity, inadequate similitude, and productions of illusion, I 
contend that a term that by definition is founded upon presuppositions of linear time 
(post-) can’t get us there.  
One might argue that Lehmann does not need to be non-linear in his 
historiography in order to write about non-linear theatre. I on the other hand contend that 
by temporalizing theatre based on a imposed and linearly progressive form, Lehmann 
renders what he defines as “dramatic” theatre always dispossessed of its drastic 
capacities. Let me be more specific. Lehman assumes that the notion of “drama” is bound 
to representation, linearity, and already established linguistic patterns. As a result he not 
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only completely ignores the Greek etymology that suggests that δράµα (drama)—coming 
from the root δράω-δρω which means to act—is not bound to language or text, but also 
he utterly neglects the discourse that is founded upon the drastic understanding of drama 
that the Greek etymology suggests. This kind of discourse focuses on drama’s capacities 
to perpetually resist any imposed notions of doubles.  
According to more drastic and dramatic understandings of drama, concepts of 
doubles can refer to a relationship between an original and its simulacrum, or to a 
relationship between reality and its illusions or even to a relationship between two 
antithetic forces that move history progressively and linearly by introducing seeming 
promises of resolution that nevertheless remain elusive. Zero Point Theatre Group’s 
production of Woyzeck dramatized the destruction of these promises of exodus and 
resolution and it introduced alternative conceptualizations of resistance. But before I 
elaborate on the conceptualizations of resistance that in my contention this particular 
production of Woyzeck introduced I would like to go back to the relations between drastic 
understandings of drama and notions of similitude.  
One of the most important examples of discourse that focuses on these relations is 
the lecture that Deleuze gave on “The Method of Dramatization” in 1967. For Deleuze 
the process of dramatization destroys any Platonic residues regarding notions of 
representation, similitude, and linearity. Therefore, in his efforts to move away from 
Platonism Deleuze states that “under dramatization the Idea incarnates or actualizes itself, 
differentiates itself. Thus the idea must already present characteristics in its own content 
which correspond to the two aspects of differentiation” (Deleuze 1967: 90). I contend that 
this understanding of dramatization as a drastic process of differentiation that dissolves 
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itself into non-oppositional multiplicities of masks is one of the most discursively 
unexplored and simultaneously most important potential contributions of Deleuze—and 
later of Deleuze and Guattari—to the field of theatre and performance studies. This 
dissolution into non-oppositional multiplicities is particularly important since it grasps 
the elusiveness of any promises of exodus and resolution. 
For Deleuze and Guattari the process of dramatization produces masks of 
multiplicities that cannot be reduced to schemata of oppositional doubles. One year after 
his lecture on “The Method of Dramatization” Deleuze returns to the notion of 
dramatization in Difference and Repetition. He specifically describes dramatization as 
“the differentiation of differentiation” (Deleuze 1994: 217) that cannot be reduced to 
schisms between the original and its simulated representation. Deleuze turned to drama, 
and the process of dramatization, in order to find difference without representation. For 
Deleuze, and later for Deleuze and Guattari, notions of representation understand 
difference as second-rate simulacra. For Deleuze the theatre of differentiation “is opposed 
to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to 
representation which refers back to the concept” (10). He adds: “in the theatre of 
repetition [differentiation] we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act 
without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a 
language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized 
bodies, with masks before faces, with specters and phantoms before characters—the 
whole apparatus of repetition [differentiation] as a ‘terrible power’”(10). It is the 
dramatization of this “terrible power” that refuses to understand difference in terms of 
simulated representation.  
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Foucault became so fascinated by Deleuze’s notion of dramatization that in 
“Theatrum Philosophicum”—an essay that Foucault published one year after Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition—Foucault stated that, “perhaps one day this century will be 
known as Deleuzian” (Foucault 1997:216). Drawing upon Deleuze’s description of the 
theatre of repetition Foucault in the same essay argues that one of the “stages” on which 
“this series of liberated simulacrum is activated is that of the theatre, which is multiplied, 
simultaneous, broken into separate scenes that refer to each other and where we 
encounter, without any trace of representation (copying or imitating) the dance of masks, 
the cries of bodies and the gesturing of hands and fingers.” He adds: “the philosophy of 
representation—of the original, the first time, resemblance, imitation, faithfulness—is 
dissolving” (Foucault 1997: 220). The theatre of dramatization resists and destroys 
notions of representation and similitude through producing differentiated multiplicities 
that cannot be reduced to constructed and imposed schemata of oppositional doubles. 
Deleuze and Foucault’s understanding of drama does everything that Lehmann’s 
term of “postdramatic theatre” wants to do (and does not) and also it performs in an 
epistemological paradigm that is fully liberated from notions of linearity, representation 
and resolution. In the comments which follow I address the political stakes of this 
liberation. Even Lehman in his later works—although he never abandons the notion of 
“post-dramatic”—he understands political praxis in terms of non-resolution. In an essay 
titled “A Future for Tragedy? Remarks on the Political and the Postdramatic” Lehman 
relates the “dimension of the political” to a Dionysean “transgression” that “may find 
articulation without dramatic structure” (Lehmann 2013:85) in order to distance 
“postdramatic tragedy” from Hegel’s understanding of tragedy as conflict resolution. He 
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specifically argues that the tragedy of today is “no more drama” (105). Although I agree 
with Lehmann that today—probably more than ever—we need to relate notions of the 
political with notions of tragedy that are conceptually free from seeming promises of 
resolution, I think that epistemologies like Lehmann’s—including their epistemological 
traditions and genealogies—established these kinds of promises of resolution in the first 
place. Through focusing on Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck (2014) 
the next section imagines new ways of shaping the political. From Lehman’s “no more 
drama” we move to “no more resolutions.”  
 
4.1.2 Zero Point Theatre Group: Woyzeck Degree 0  
December 2014, Athens, Greece: SYRIZA—the Greek coalition of radical left—
is becoming more and more popular. Everyone is waiting for the “first time left” that will 
“do things differently.” SYRIZA’s campaign publically framed the party as the future 
government that would resolve the conflict between Greece and its international creditors 
and that would lead Greece to its exodus from the crisis. Drawing upon the thought 
process that I introduced in the Introduction this section argues that Zero Point Theatre 
Group’s production of Woyzeck—a production that took place in Athens two months 
before the Greek snap elections in January 2015—widened the field of resistance by 
dramatizing the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus.  
Zero Point Theatre Group is a Greek avant-garde theatre company that since its 
creation in 2009—when the at the time Greek government of PA.SO.K was in the process 
of signing the first Memorandum of Understanding between Greece and its international 
creditors—has been staging plays that are directly related to conceptualizations of 
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revolutionary praxes and resistance. In Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of 
Woyzeck (2014) this dramatization of the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus 
manifested itself both on a spatiotemporal and a conceptual level. On a level of both time 
and space, all the directorial, dramaturgical and staging choices “radiated” 
(Στεργιόπουλος 2014)—to borrow a phrase from Despoina Hatzipavlidou, one of the 
members of the group—an infinite condition of inbetweeness without edges, ends, or 
antithetically symmetrical extremes. Everything about Zero Point Theatre Group’s 
dramatization of Woyzeck (2014) was simultaneously edgeless and in-between. The 
production itself was the middle part of a trilogy that included In the Penal Colony by 
Franz Kafka and We by Yevgeny Zamiatin. According to Savas Stroubos—member and 
director of Zero Point Theatre Group—the assemblage of these three plays performs like 
a “trilogy of de-humanization” (Κακουριώτης 2014): An de-humanization without a 
clearly polished beginning or end.  
The building where Zero Point Theatre Group rehearses and performs is located 
in the area of Metaxourgeio in Athens: where brothel owners and drug dealers build their 
long and successful careers via and on the bodies of the dispossessed, the undocumented, 
the homeless, the destitute; where the streets perform both as beds and tombs; where the 
State always looks the other way. And that’s the thing about the building of Zero Point 
Theatre Group: it forces you to be affected. On your way to Leonidou 12—the street on 
which Zero Point Theatre Group’s space is located—you cannot just look the other way. 
Even if you choose not to perceive or to notice what is happening around you, even if you 
choose to look the other way like the State does, the smells of commodified sex, of piss 
and of the dying and rotting bodies haunt you. Everything around you is dying and rotting 
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without ever becoming fully dead. There is neither a specific starting point nor a clearly 
defined telos. In Metaxourgeio everything feels like it is dropped out of nowhere and that 
it can only proceed in media res.  
This surrounding condition of perpetual inbetweenness is also conveyed within 
the space in which the Zero Point Theatre Group rehearses and performs. That space is 
located under a three-level, old, unoccupied office-space building. While on the outside 
the building’s roller door gives the impression of a store or a garage, when you move 
towards the inside, the aesthetics of the space change completely. The room’s white walls 
and the floor’s cold tiles in combination with the wooden benches that are placed with 
their backs against the room’s two parallel walls situate you in some kind of a waiting 
area. But the surrounding polyphonies and multiplicities of signs and references make it 
impossible for you to wait for something specific and thus to find an exodus that can put 
an end to your waiting. You are caught perpetually in-between the empty office-space 
building, the storage, the garage, the waiting room and the knowledge that you just 
walked into a theatre space that dramatizes the very fact that everything around you 
performs as a mask.  
The stage—a narrow wooden passageway that is made of the same wood as the 
benches and that is placed in parallel to the walls with the benches—is part of that 
dramatization. Because of this staging of the stage Woyzeck, Adres, Maria, the Doctor, 
the Captain, the Showman and the Drum Major have no other option but to appear and 
disappear from stage middle. While the one edge of the wooden passageway is blocked 
by the room’s wall, the other is blocked by the building’s roller door. The staging of the 
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wooden passageway does not allow access to its oppositional edges. As a result the actors 
can only access the stage from the middle—in media res.  
In addition to the actors that can only access the stage from the middle, the stage 
itself is both parallel to and in-between the walls with the benches on which the audience 
is seated. Because of the spatial dynamics audience members are situated close not only 
to those next to them but also to those across from them. It is impossible to look at the 
stage without simultaneously looking at the audience on the benches across you. No 
matter if it is performed on the wooden passageway or on the wooden benches every 
breath, every sound, every gesture, every facial expression, every posture, is 
accompanied by either intentional or unintentional witnessing. This dramatization of both 
intentional and unintentional witnessing and/or spectating resists and eventually destroys 
any oppositions between the supposedly clearly defined off-stage originals on the one 
hand and their supposedly clearly defined on-stage simulacra on the other. I contend that 
this is why the stage and the benches are made of the same material. Everything around 
you performs as masks. Zero Theatre Group’s dramatization of Woyzeck (2014) 
intensifies these multiplicities of masks and thus destroys any oppositional schemata that, 
because of their conceptual incapacity to grasp multiplicities in terms of difference, end 
up reducing multiplicities to antithetic oppositions. 
Any oppositional or dialectical dualisms are dramatized as one of the many masks 
that are destroyed only to reveal more masks. This dramatized dissolution of constructed 
oppositions into material multiplicities destroys the essentialization of dualisms. What I 
find particularly fascinating about this production of Woyzeck (2014) is that Zero Point 
Theatre Group dramatized this destruction of any supposedly resolvable oppositional and 
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dialectical tensions through the staged presence of the Showman. In this production, the 
Showman, the Doctor, and Adres, are performed by the same actor—Despoina 
Hatzipavlidou. For Hatzipavlidou while the Doctor is the “victimizer” and Adres is the 
“victim” the Showman is the always in-between “zero point that, just like the name of our 
group, emits a more philosophical logos” (Στεργιόπουλος 2014). However, in my 
contention this “zero point” is not the average of two extremes.  
Bridging Hatzipavlidou’s quote with the concept of dramatization and the notion 
of edgeless inbetweenness that this article introduces, I contend that the Showman’s 
“point zero” dramatized by Zero Point Theatre Group did not perform as the symmetrical 
middle of two opposites. On the contrary, I contend that, because the Showman was 
embodied by the same actor who embodied the Doctor and Adres, the Showman 
destroyed any assumed or imagined antithetical symmetry between the edge of the 
Doctor, on the one hand, and its oppositional edge of Adres, on the other. Although 
according to one of her interviews, Hatzipavlidou approached the Showman as the 
“middle” (Στεργιόπουλος 2014) of the Doctor/Victimizer - Showman – Adres/Victim tri-
symmetry, I argue that the dramatization of this, simultaneously assumed, imagined, 
embodied and taken for granted tri-symmetry by the same body scattered its oppositional 
masks into multiplicities that do not and cannot fit any schemata of linear organization. 
The Showman, who by definition produces masks, “dethroned” the Doctor and Adres 
from their oppositional extremities. As a result the Showman also destroyed any seeming 
promises of resolution that come along with these extremities.  
 In addition to the casting and staging of the Doctor/ Showman, this destruction of 
seeming promises of resolution was also dramatized by the Zero Point Theatre Group’s 
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understanding and translation of Büchner’s text. The group worked with Iwanna 
Meitani—the production’s translator—during the rehearsals. As a result Meitani’s 
translation was based on Büchner’s text but the choices regarding the sequence of the 
scenes were made within the rehearsal space during the group’s rehearsals. According to 
Zero Point Theater Group’s director, Savas Stroubos, Büchner’s play calls for multiple 
and new “sequences of scenes” (Στρούµπος 2014). Furthermore for Stroubos Woyzeck’s 
“fragmented and shattered flow” is related to the “fragmented rhythm of all the images 
that are stored in the mind of a delusional pariah whose name is Woyzeck” (Στρούµπος 
2014). Zero Point Theatre Group’s emphasis on the interplay between the sequence of the 
scenes and the experience of madness was also part of the group’s creative process. As a 
result the sequence of the scenes changed, not based a constructed notion of resolution or 
an intended telos of resolution, but on the group’s experimentation with various 
embodiments of madness.  
 Therefore both the audience and the actors on stage were always caught in 
between various spatiotemporalities: the forest now, the street yesterday, the tavern in the 
future, the infirmary, the captain’s office and so forth. The sequence of the scenes that 
both Meitani and the group chose emerged during the rehearsals. According to Stroubos, 
“the group follows a very intense psychosomatic process” and embodies “the dimensions 
of human existence that everyday life tends to push back and to hide” (Στρούµπος 2014). 
Madness is one of those dimensions. It was the group’s collective experimentation with 
madness that defined the sequence of the scenes.   
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Let me briefly recount my steps: In the beginning of this section I argued that 
Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck (2014) presaged the non-efficacy of 
SYRIZA’s promises of exodus from and resolution of the crisis through dramatizing the 
destruction of notions of exodus and resolution. I also argued that, through this 
dramatized destruction of notions of exodus and resolution, Zero Point Theatre Group’s 
production of Woyzeck (2014) conceptualized resistance in terms of an infinitely edgeless 
inbetweenness and thus liberated resistance from reactionary thinking. I traced this 
edgeless inbetweenness in the Metaxourgeio area of Athens, where Zero Point Theatre 
Group rehearses and performs, inside Zero Point Theatre Group’s space and finally in the 
dramatization of the Showman and the sequence of the scenes. Finally, I contended that 
Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck (2014) called for concepts that 
understand multiplicities in terms of difference and not in terms of dualisms.  
In the introduction I argued that the concept of dramatization that Deleuze 
introduces in “The Method of Dramatization” does exactly that: it understands 
multiplicities in terms of difference without reducing them to oppositional doubles. 
Therefore I contend that the concept of dramatization can grasp the notions of infinitely 
edgeless inbetweenness that Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck (2014) 
introduces. In the following section I argue that this notion of edgeless inbetweenness 
that Zero Point Theatre Group dramatized through Buchner’s Woyzeck (2014) in Greece 
two months before the snap elections of January 2015, widens the conceptual capacities 
of resistance by introducing a non-oppositional, and thus a non-resolvable—at least in 
terms of oppositions—understanding of the tensions between power and resistance. In 
order to do so I explore how this edgeless inbetweenness has been communicated in the 
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works of Deleuze and Guattari on Büchner and Wozzeck, Lukács on Woyzeck, and 
Adorno on Wozzeck. I contend that the dialogue between these four theorists lays the 
ground for a close examination of the political stakes of the conceptual differences 
between notions of inbetweenness that are designed in order to choose between two ends 
and notions of inbetweenness that take the risk and choose to fully destroy ends.  
 
4.1.3. Zero Point Theatre Group’s Woyzeck In-Between Lukács, Adorno and 
Deleuze and Guattari 
It is this kind of edgeless inbetweenness that Deleuze and Guattari find in the 
works of Büchner. Comparing Büchner with Lenz and Kleist in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987) they write “But Kleist, Lenz and Büchner have 
another way of travelling and moving: proceeding from the middle, through the middle, 
coming and going rather than starting and finishing” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 25). 
For the authors of A Thousand Plateaus this kind of “travelling and moving” understands 
and “knows” how to “move between things, establish a logic of the AND, overthrow 
ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and beginnings” (25). They also 
add: “The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up 
speed. Between things, does not designate a localizable relation going from the one thing 
to another and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that 
sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its 
banks and picks up speed in the middle” (25). Before I elaborate more on Deleuze and 
Guattari, I would like to bring Lukács and Adorno into my discussion of this notion of 
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Woyzeck’s edgeless inbetweenness in order to hopefully offer some matter-real “ground” 
to this topos where things “speed up.” 
Long before A Thousand Plateaus, in German Realists in the Nineteenth Century 
(1993) Lukács argues that the ones who understand Woyzeck in terms of “demonic 
inbetweenness” are part of what the former understands as the “demonic-dramatic 
lineage” (72) of “Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche” (90). As one 
Greek etymology suggests, demon (δαίµων) is the one who remains always inbetween. In 
my contention though Lukács finds Buchner more inbetween than Lukács wants to admit. 
In “The Real Georg Buchner and his Fascist Misrepresentation” Lukács argues that, 
“what [Buchner] seeks politically, the concretization of the ‘poor’ in the revolutionary 
proletariat, does not exist in his reality, the reality of Germany.” And he adds, “He 
[Buchner] cannot therefore find a dialectical conception of history even in his consistent 
materialism” (Lukacs 1993:86). But for Lukács—and this is where Lukács and Deleuze 
and Guattari understand Buchner differently—Buchner does not dramatize this absence 
of a materially concrete dialectical conceptualization of history. On the contrary, 
according to Lukács, Buchner “instead of vacillating to and from between the 
contradictory extremes” (86) always chooses the extreme of the plebeian.  
But there is a fundamental difference between Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of Buchner’s works as dramatizations of the absence—or in this section’s 
terms of the destruction of the illusion—of a concrete dialectical conceptualization of 
history, and between Lukács’ understanding of Buchner, and Woyzeck in particular, as 
the “greatest depiction of the German ‘poor’ of that time” (87). While for Deleuze and 
Guattari Buchner scatters any notions of clearly defined oppositional extremes into 
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infinite multiplicities, for Lukács Woyzeck occupies the extremity of the plebeian that is 
clearly opposed to the extremity of the rich. And even when Lukács’ surrounding 
materiality proves his dialectical schema wrong, even when he encounters “the 
insolubility of the objective contradictions in reality (and also in Buchner’s head)” that in 
his contention “are reflected in the fact that the people’s bitterness is still without 
direction, oscillating from one extreme to the other,” (78) Lukács never questions 
dialectics. On the contrary he understands dialectics as the only materially concrete way 
to approach matter-reality even when matter-reality itself proves dialectics wrong or 
insufficient. 
 I contend that Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck (2014) 
dramatized this insufficiency of dialectics. Savas Stroubos—member and director of Zero 
Point Theatre Group—in one of his published reflections on the play writes “Logic 
demands to turn [fragmented] notions into whole ones […] it demands to impose 
meaning, to clean history of its contradictions. Logic thinks in terms of two [antithetical] 
edges [...] the fragment comes aggressive and audacious […] to talk about the sound of 
silence and the smell of death” (Στρούµπος 2014). Dialectics remove from history its 
valuable contradictions rendering history passive and inactive. Woyzeck reminds us of 
that. Theatre reminds us of that. This is why Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoyefsky, 
Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari turn to theatre in order to understand political praxis.  
 For Lukács intellectuals like Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Dostoyefsky and 
Nietzsche—one could easily situate Deleuze and Guattari in the same “chain” of 
thought—that think in terms of oscillating multiplicities are part of the “demonic-
dramatic lineage” of “demonic inbetweenness” (72). In Lukács’s contention this 
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“demonic-dramatic lineage” of “demonic inbetweenness” is nothing but a “period of 
capitalist apologetics,” a “repeated call for despair-in the service of a reactionary 
capitalism” (90). In other words for Lukács dialectically oriented schemata are more 
materially concrete and, eventually, more capable of inciting revolutions, than concepts 
that affirm multiplicities and conditions of inbetweenness that are utterly dispossessed 
from promises of oppositional resolution.  
Lukács wants to fully destroy capitalism and fascism. And for Lukacs, any 
conceptualizations of teleological dialectics fueled with the “consciousness of the poor,” 
(86) was resistance’s only hope against both. Earlier I argued that Lukács’s dialectics was 
less materially concrete than Lukács himself wanted to admit. However, exactly because 
Lukacs wanted to offer a concrete conceptualization of a revolution that would clearly 
differentiate itself from both the “educated liberals” (75) or in other words, the “rich” and 
the “noble,” (74) and the “National Socialist Revolution,” (72) he insisted on 
understanding class struggle-driven rebellion as resistance’s only safe solution. In my 
contention Lukács turned to Büchner not just because Büchner, according to Lukács, 
perceived “with clarity the economic foundations of a liberation of the working masses” 
(74) but mainly because Buchner the “plebeian revolutionary” was highly appropriated 
by the two things Lukács feared the most: the bourgeois and the fascists.  
It was this combination between Büchner’s work and its appropriation by 
Germany’s “educated liberals” and “National Socialist Revolution” that allowed Lukacs 
to “concretely”—at least in his own terms—differentiate any class struggle-driven 
revolutions from both capitalism and fascism. Lukács strongly believed that it was the 
“dramatic lineage” of “demonic inbetweenness” that allowed the bourgeois and the 
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fascists to appropriate Buchner. Therefore Lukács wanted to rescue Büchner from this 
chain of thought of dramatic inbetweenness by understanding Büchner’s dramas as 
“poetic reflections of life” that “adhere to historical fact” (87). For Lukacs the most 
efficacious way of fighting capitalism and fascism was to understand both as historically 
concrete and thus, to situate resistance on capitalism’s and fascism’s oppositional 
extremities. He understood Büchner as part of those oppositional extremities. But it did 
not occur him once that both capitalism and fascism might not perform in terms of 
concreteness and that Büchner not only might have suspected that but also that he might 
have dramatized his suspicion.  
 In Greece of 2014, Zero Point Theatre Group had to deal with the same 
challenges: capitalism and fascism. On the one hand Greece was the infinitely indebted 
Greece of the unemployed who sell their labor for free, of the homeless who search in the 
streets for leftovers, of the underpaid who are asked to pay taxes with salaries they don’t 
get, of the retirees who buy their drug prescriptions with pensions they never receive, of 
the ones who commit suicide because there is no exodus, of the ones who had no other 
option but to emigrate, and no matter where or how far they go they will always remain 
imprisoned in a system that cruelly feeds upon its own irregularities.  
On the other hand, 2014 Greece was the Greece where the monster of fascism fed 
on human death, hunger, fear and desperation. Golden Dawn—Greece’s extremely 
violent neo-fascist party—became the third party of the Greek parliament. For Stroubos 
“the camp is our world” (Left.gr 2014) and for Eleana Geourgouli—member and 
performer of Zero Point Theatre Group—“today we need to confront classic texts [like 
Woyzeck] because they carry an abstracted density” (Left.gr 2014). As opposed to 
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Lukács’ reading of Woyzeck, Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck (2014) 
chose to fight the abstraction of capitalism and fascism through fully destroying 
capitalism and fascism’s masks and lies of concreteness. Zero Point Theatre Group’s 
Woyzeck (2014) fought capitalism and fascism’s fake edges with infinitely edgeless 
inbetweenness.  
Adorno, distinguished from Lukács, gets closer to understanding Büchner’s 
dramas in terms of unresolvable contradiction and inbetweenness. Moreover Adorno’s 
epistemological paradigm consists of dialectical schemata full of unresolvable 
contradictions. But although Adorno’s contradictions remain unresolvable, or in other 
words always in-between, he, just like Lukács, never abandons dialectics. In the 
following paragraphs I will closely examine the “inbetweenness” of these unresolvable 
contradictions that Adorno traces in Buchner’s Woyzeck through his analysis on Berg’s 
Wozzeck. James Harding in “Integrating Atomization: Adorno Reading Berg Reading 
Buchner” argues that “Adorno’s interpretation of Alban Berg’s operatic rendition of 
Woyzeck provides the basis for an as-yet unexplored reading of Georg Buchner’s 
unfinished drama” (Harding, 1992:1). Although the reading of Woyzeck that this section 
proposes differs from the one that Harding explores in ways that that I will be describing 
in the next paragraphs, for now I would like to draw upon Harding’s argument and 
examine how Adorno’s analysis on Wozzeck unfolds any “not-yet” explored aspects of 
Woyzeck’s “inbetweenness.” My goal remains the same: to understand Buchner’s 
Woyzeck as a dramatized crash-test on dialectics. 
In order to do so, in the comments to follow I place particular emphasis on 
Adorno’s understanding of Berg’s music for Wozzeck as an intensification—or, drawing 
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upon the thought process that this article’s introduction suggests, a dramatization—of the 
“in-between” (Adorno 1994:84) aspects of Buchner’s drama. Furthermore I examine the 
political stakes of the differences between Adorno and Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of 
“inbetweenness.”  
In “Alban Berg” Adorno understands Berg’s opera of Wozzeck as a dramatization 
of Woyzeck’s unresolved contradictions. He specifically argues that the “intention” 
behind Berg’s “composition” of Wozzeck is to “seek justice for the drama” (84). For 
Adorno that justice “brings to light those aspects of the work that had been buried” (84). 
And according to Adorno this buried drama, these forgotten aspects of the work, had to 
do with the “fragments” of Woyzeck: with “every last comma of its texture” that Berg 
“respects” and “illuminates how closed is the openness, how complete the incomplete in 
Buchner” (84). Berg’s music brings back to life, intensifies and dramatizes the “in-
between” and the “interlinear” (84) aspects of Buchner’s text. But although Adorno’s 
epistemology of unresolved contradictions grasps how these “in-between” aspects of 
Buchner’s work do not “shrink from extremes,” (85) Adorno never questions the 
assumed and simultaneously naturalized existence of these kinds of extremities.  
But there is a fundamental difference between Lukács’s and Adorno’s non-
questioning of these extremities. As Harding reminds us Adorno’s analysis of Berg’s 
Wozzeck is “consistent with Adorno’s classic critique of Georg Lukács and thus offers an 
implicit challenge to Lukács’s own interpretation of Buchner’s work, an interpretation 
that Lukács bases upon an analysis of class conflict” (Harding 1992:2). In the next couple 
of paragraphs I will draw upon Harding in order to argue that Adorno differentiates his 
analysis from Lukacs’s class struggle-driven interpretation of Woyzeck by shifting the 
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focus from class conflict to the tension between notions of the whole and notions of the 
particular. In my contention this conceptual shift from Lukács’s emphasis on class 
conflict to Adorno’s unresolvable tensions between the whole and the particular is a 
conceptual shift from externally oriented dialectics—as Harding argues Lukacs’s 
dialectics is a class conflict that “will eventually supersede itself” (3)—to internally 
oriented, infinitely rotting dialectics.  
But Adorno’s internally oriented and infinitely rotting dialectics differ from Zero 
Point Theatre Group’s dramatization of edgeless inbetweenness that I described in the 
beginning of this section. Adorno’s reverse dialectics are the dialectics of the particular. 
Harding argues that, “the critical strategies of Adorno’s Alban Berg lay the foundation for 
a materialist analysis of Woyzeck in which the relation between particular and universal is 
reversed, the later being subordinated to the evolution of the former”. Additionally for 
Harding “this reversal is consistent with Adorno’s classic critique of Georg Lukács and 
thus offers an implicit challenge to Lukács’s own interpretation of Buchner’s work, an 
interpretation that Lukács bases upon an analysis of class conflict” (1). But, for Harding, 
Adorno’s negative understanding of both Wozzeck and Woyzeck’s particularity places the 
latter always-already dependent upon the sovereignty of the whole. And although I agree 
with Harding that Lukács’s reading of Woyzeck grasps class conflict-resolution in terms 
of an externally oriented teleology, and that Adorno’s reading of Wozzeck and Woyzeck 
frames the resistance, and eventually the potential domination, of the particular in terms 
of internality, I contend that Harding opens the door to a non-dialectical reading of 
Woyzeck in which Harding himself does not engage.  
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I also contend that Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Buchner and that the Zero 
Point Theatre Group production of Woyzeck (2014) offers a non-dialectical understanding 
of the play. In order to explain how I will briefly return to Adorno’s analysis of Wozzeck. 
According to Adorno “the ultimate paradox of the Wozzeck score [is] that it achieves 
musical autonomy not by opposing the word but by obediently following it as its 
deliver.” And Adorno adds, “Wozzeck fulfills Wagner’s demand that the orchestra follow 
the drama’s every last ramification and thus become a symphony, and in so doing finally 
eliminates the illusion of formlessness in music drama” (Adorno 1994:87). Adorno likes 
Berg’s “music drama” because it intensifies the resistance of Buchner’s dramatic text to 
form a whole that becomes something more than its parts and thus that dominates and 
over-defines its parts. But while Adorno exorcises the sovereignty of the whole he 
simultaneously legitimizes the sovereignty of the particular. And this I contend can be 
highly problematic because Adorno is afraid to exorcise sovereignty once and for all. In 
fear of fascism and capitalism and their shared affinities both Lukács and Adorno are 
afraid to eliminate all forms of power.  
I contend that Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of both Büchner and Berg in 
terms of “inbetweenness” does exactly that: it exorcises any form and/or formation of 
centered power. This condition of “inbetweenness” does not merely resist organization—
and thus any internally or externally oriented centralization that goes along with it—but it 
also resists being grasped in terms of perceivably concretized—what Deleuze and 
Guattari understand as “localizable” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987:297)—opposition. In A 
Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari parallelize “Berg’s B in Wozzeck” and 
“Schumann’s A. Homage to Schumann, the madness of Schumann.” For the authors of A 
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Thousand Plateaus the music of both Berg and Schumann performs as “a transversal” 
that “breaks free of the vertical and the horizontal as coordinates; and the transversal 
breaks free of the diagonal as a localizable connection between two points.” And they 
add: “In short, a block-line passes amid (au milieu des) sounds and propels itself by its 
own non-localizable middle (milieu). The sound block is an intermezzo” (297). The most 
important aspect of that “intermezzo” is that “it runs between points in a different 
direction that renders them indiscernible” (298).  
While Adorno’s Berg resides in the domination of the particular in order to resist 
the domination of the whole, Deleuze and Guattari’s Berg fights all sorts of domination 
by producing a “moving matter of continuous variation” (340). What in my contention 
needs to be taken into consideration is that in Deleuze and Guattari’s case the 
“continuous variation” does not shatter any kind of centralized authority—either 
fragmented (Adorno) or unified (Lukács)—into millions pieces. On the contrary Deleuze 
and Guattari’s the “in-between” understanding of Buchner’s Woyzeck and Berg’s 
Wozzeck reminds us that any kind of domination is founded upon an elusive promise of 
resolution simply because opposition is nothing but a constructed schema. 
Bridging my thought process to the process of dramatization that was introduced 
in the Interlude I would like to argue that this is what dramatization does: it never ceases 
to produce differentiated multiplicities that are irreducible to schemata of oppositional 
doubles and it thus never ceases to remind us that resolution is nothing but a promise 
designed to remain elusive. Strong It also reminds us that both performances of power 
and of resistance can be founded upon this elusive aspect of resolution. Like Zero Point 
Theatre Group, in fear of capitalism and fascism both Lukács and Adorno found in 
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Woyzeck a praxis of resistance. But neither Lukács nor Adorno exorcises notions of 
elusive resolution—and the dangers of domination they entail—like Deleuze and 
Guattari’s understandings of Woyzeck and Wozzeck do.  
Echoing Deleuze and Guattari, the Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of 
Buchner’s Woyzeck presaged the non-efficacy of Greece’s resistance against its 
international creditors by introducing conditions of “inbetweenness” and by dramatizing 
the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus. Right before the Greek snap elections 
of January 2015—when Woyzeck was produced by the Zero Point Theatre Group—
capitalism and fascism over-defined Greece’s status quo. On the one hand the party of 
SYRIZA—Greece’s radical left—was founding its campaign upon promises of resolution 
of the asymmetrical conflicts between Greece and its international creditors. But, within 
frames of 21st century neoliberal Europe, these kinds of promises of resolution are 
designed to remain elusive in order to perform as a permanent means of political 
leverage. On the other hand Golden Dawn—Greece’s extremely violent neo-fascist 
party—was becoming more and more popular.  
Five months after its victory—a victory that was based on SYRIZA’s promise not 
to sign a third memorandum—the government of SYRIZA ended up signing a third 
memorandum. Six months after its victory the government of SYRIZA resigned and 
called for snap elections. According to the results of the Greek snap elections of 
September 2015, Golden Dawn remained the third largest political party in the Greek 
parliament. Even before the Greek snap elections of January 2015, the Zero Point Theatre 
Group’s production of Woyzeck anticipated Greece’s emerging relations to capitalism and 
fascism and dramatized conceptualizations of resistance that would not rely on notions of 
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resolution and exodus and that would perform always “in-between.” For Despoina 
Hatzipavlidou—the Zero Point Theatre Group’s actor who performed the Showman, the 
Doctor and Adres—the Showman performs as a “zero point.” Bridging Hatzipavlidou’s 
quote to this section’s thought process I contend that the Showman, as someone who 
never ceases to produce dramatized multiplicities, always starts at degree zero.  
But this notion of degree zero has nothing in common with the notion of ground 
zero. Returning to one of Deleuze and Guattari’s passages that I cited earlier, “Making a 
clean state, starting or beginning again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a 
foundation—all imply a false conception of voyage and movement (a conception that is 
methodical, pedagogical, initiatory, symbolic…). But Kleist, Lenz and Buchner have 
another way of travelling and moving: proceeding from the middle, through the middle, 
coming and going rather than starting and finishing” (25).i Both capitalism and fascism 
rely on promises of resolution that, especially within frames of 21st century neoliberal 
Europe, are designed to remain elusive in order to be used as permanent means of 
political leverage.  
Foreseeing the interplay between the capitalist masks of fascism and the fascist 
masks of capitalism and notions of ground zero, the Zero Point Theatre Group’s 
production of Woyzeck in Greece right before the snap elections of January 2015 
dramatized the destruction of notions of resolution and exodus and the conceptualization 
of resistance in terms of inbetweenness that starts at degree zero. As described above I 
traced this inbetweenness that starts at degree zero in the Metaxourgeio area of Athens, 
where Zero Point Theatre Group rehearses and performs, inside Zero Point Theatre 
Group’s space and finally in the dramatization of the Showman. For Deleuze and Guattari 
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“beginning at a degree zero” is a beginning that always starts “in the matter of variation, 
in the medium of becoming or transformation” (507). Maybe infinite variation and 
transformation can successfully challenge capitalism and fascism and their produced 
affinities. But because I want to avoid any implied panaceas that this statement might 
entail, for now I would like to call for concepts that might get us there. I contend that the 
concept of dramatization could be one of them.  
In an effort to relate the concept of dramatization to the notion of 
TragedyMachine(s) that this dissertation introduces I would like to argue that the latter 
assembles dramatization as production of multiplicities irreducible to oppositional 
doubles, with other productions. These productions might or might not lessen the 
revolutionary force of irreconcilable contradictions to seeming promises of resolution that 
are designed to remain elusive. For Stroubos, Büchner’s Woyzeck “throws tragedy, as 
Büchner received it from Goethe and Schiller [when tragedy] dealt with the passions of 
Kings, masters and knights […] to the hell of a delusional pariah […] to the dregs of 
society.” (Left.gr 2014) I understand Stroubos’s statement not as an urge to understand 
tragedy in strict terms of class struggle but in terms of an intense unfolding of 
multiplicities that resist “rationalized” schemata of oppositional doubles. It is this intense 
unfolding of multiplicities, that produces non-resolvable and infinitely edgeless 
conditions of inbetweenness. The next section traces this inbetweenness in Yiannis 
Houvardas’s (Γιάννης Χουβαρδάς) production of Oresteia (Ορέστεια).  
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4.2.1 Oresteia in Post-Referendum Greece  
Yiannis Houvarda’s Oresteia was part of the Athens and Epidaurus Festival of 
2016. It opened on July 8 2016 in the ancient theatre of Epidaurus, toured all over Greece 
and closed on September 7 2016 in the Odeon of Herodes Atticus in Athens. The 
previous summer, the summer of 2015, was a summer of political turmoil for Greece. 
After very long negotiations with Greece’s international creditors, Greece’s then newly 
elected government of SYRIZA—an acronym that stands for Greece’s radical left—
rejected the severe austerity measures “suggested” by the European Commission (EC), 
the European Central Bank (ECB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). SYRIZA 
then called for a referendum.  
The Greek referendum that took place on July 5 2015 asked from the Greek 
people to vote YES (NAI) or NO (OXI) to the most recent EC, ECB and IMF’s proposal. 
The results of the referendum were decisive. 61.31% of the voters rejected the proposal 
of EC, ECB and IMF. Yet, less than ten days after the referendum the government of 
SYRIZA ended up signing a third memorandum with Greece’s international creditors that 
included more severe austerity measures than the ones that were initially proposed. After 
the Greek parliament approved the memorandum agreement on August 13 2015, Alexis 
Tsipras—prime minister of Greece and president of SYRIZA—resigned and called for 
snap legislative elections. The elections took place on September 20 2015. SYRIZA won 
again but just like in its previous victory after the Greek snap legislative elections on 
January 25 2015 SYRIZA had to coalesce with the conservative, right-wing party of 
ANEL (ΑΝΕΛ)—an acronym that stands for the Independent Greeks.  
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Since then, the asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between Greece 
and its international creditors have been hiding beneath masks and promises of resolution 
that are designed to remain elusive in order to perform as a permanent means of political 
leverage. The elected government of SYRIZA is turned to a spectator. The “informal 
body” of the eurogroup—a definition provided by the official website of the Council of 
the European Union—remains unminuted41, non-answerable to any elected parliament 
and more powerful than the formally recognized institutional formations of the European 
Union.  
How can a 21st century production of the ancient tragedy of Oresteia 
conceptualize power as performed within the neoliberal frames of the Eurozone? How 
can a production of Oresteia in Greece of 2016 dramatize the transformation of both 
elected governments and entire countries to spectators? How can a production of Oresteia 
in Greece of 2016—a tragedy that is mostly discussed as the theatricalized moment of 
transition from αυτοδικία (aftodikia, self justice) to institutionalized justice—disrupt that 
narrative and dramatize the non-institutional aspect of institutionalization and the well 
hidden dangers that the latter entails? Finally, how can Oresteia as part of the Athens & 
Epidaurus Festival of 2016 engage critically with the production of its own production? 
These are the questions that Houvarda’s Oresteia took on. In the following 
comments, I argue that this specific production of Oresteia critically examined how 
power, within frames of 21st century Eurozone, power does not perform in terms of a 
whole that dominates its parts but in terms of parts that group with other parts in order to 
dominate them. I examine how Deleuze and Guattari offer conceptual tools that can grasp 
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these performances of power in ways that current discourse of Theatre and Performance 
Studies does not. I also argue that Houvarda’s choices regarding the dramatizations of 
Athena, Orestis, Erinyes/Evmenides and the chorus made clear that absolute power 
produces institutions not only in order to conceal and legitimize its performance outside 
these institutions by rendering this performance fully unuttered but also in order to turn 
its production of sounds—sounds that inscribe pain and death onto certain bodies—into 
legitimized texts. Finally, I make the case that this production of Oresteia dramatized the 
cruel asymmetries and power relations of its own production.  
 
4.2.2 Oresteia Machines and the Eurozone  
 On your way from the parking lot to the theatre space of ancient Epidaurus—
approximately a 15-20 minute walk—everything scatters you in multiple temporalities. 
Although these multiple temporalities refer to time and space on an abstract level they 
simultaneously resist spatiotemporal concretization. Of course the tour guides, ready to 
construct and commodify highly problematic narratives of originality, will claim 
otherwise. But the blending of the stones that have been there since the 4th and the 2th 
century B.C with the ones that were recently added in order to support the theatre’s 
construction while looking like “ancient”, the cafeterias and the restaurants, the tourist 
attractions, the facilities that are part of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival (Hellenic 
Festival S. A), all perform topographically, but none of these topical inscriptions 
(graphein) rests on one specific topos.  
 This atopic aspect, in terms of specificity, of the topographical performances of 
the multiple temporalities was also part of the production of Oresteia directed by 
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Houvardas. On your way to the seats you could see the sets of Oresteia from multiple 
angles since in the ancient theatre of Epidaurus you can only get to the seating area 
through the landscape that is behind the space that is marked as the stage. The sets 
included two living rooms placed upstage left and downstage right, a group of chairs 
placed upstage right, a lounge chair placed downstage left, a wooden piece of furniture 
that looked like a cupboard also placed upstage left in the middle of one of the living 
rooms, and a construction that looked like a gigantic wooden wardrobe with metallic 
balusters built on top of it placed upstage center. Finally, you could see one of the actors 
lying next to one of the sofas and another one on the top of the gigantic wooden 
construction.  
 
Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane 
Even before the opening, the aesthetics of what was already on stage situated you 
inside a mid-class living room in Greece during the decade between 1940 and 1950: 
when Greece went through a war with Italy, a period of occupation by the axis powers—
Nazi Germany, the Empire of Japan and the Kingdom of Italy—a period of restoration 
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and a civil war. But even though the sets on stage situated you somewhere near this 
decade, the gigantic box, the costume of the actor that was lying on top of it, the soil that 
performed both as the floor for the sets and the stage, the spikes that were growing right 
next to one of the chairs, the landscape beyond the stage and finally the indebted Greece 
that, even if you were not from Greece, you encountered every step of your way to the 
ancient theatre of Epidaurus—in the homeless, in the highway signs that reminded you 
that these roads were indebted to EU, in the stores that went bankrupt—resisted situating 
you in the specificity of that decade.  
 
Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane 
According to Houvardas the references to that decade were a “loose poetic 
metaphor, a smooth conceptual journey to a period of our history […] that, in the third 
part […] launched in to a sphere of ideas somewhere in space” (Dimadi 2016). This 
simultaneity between the atopic and the topographic performances of the multiple 
temporalities—temporalities that Oresteia dramatized through innumerous multiplicities 
of signs—was intensified throughout the entire show. Some of these multiplicities were 
culturally specific references in the temporalities that only Greek audiences might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   187	  
recognize. Klytemnestra’s white apron covered in blood in combination with her big 
combat boots blended implied notions of gendered domestic labor with acts of war. 
Agamemnon’s furry military uniform was contradicted by Orestis’ polished suit and big 
myopic glasses. The Messenger’s military uniform and crutches challenged the notions of 
class and privilege that the silken robe of Aigisthus implied. Kassandra’s black high heel 
boots and babydoll were contradicted by the grey long-hair wigs and the long black 
cassocks of Erinyes. Electra’s chintz-like woolen jacket and braces was cancelled out by 
Athena’s white suit. Apollo’s cane with strikes and polka doted bow tie were in utter 
incompatibility with the cheap, dirty shirt that the Guard was wearing. Pilades’s cheap 
suit was contradicted by Pythia’s gold-glitter dress. The actors’ voices that were 
occasionally coming through a speaking trumpet were blended with the voices of Sofia 
Vembo, Stella Greka and Kakia Mendri—Greek singers famous for singing songs 
dedicated to Greek resistance during the decade between 1940–1950—that were coming 
through the gramophone placed inside the wooden furniture that looked like a cupboard, 
all scattered signs that carried you into various spatiotemporalities without allowing you 
to rest in any of them.  
Current discourse in Theatre and Performance Studies understands this capacity 
of multiplicities of signs to both perform topographically—in terms of topic 
continuities—and atopically—in terms of topic disruptions—as processes of de-
hierarchization. For example, in his intellectual and discursive effort to offer conceptual 
tools for theatre that performs in terms other than the ones of telos, linearity, illusion and 
inadequate similitude, Hans-Thies Lehmann introduces the concept of “parataxis/ non-
hierarchy” (Lehmann 2006:86) of signs. In Postdramatic Theatre Lehmann defines the 
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“parataxis” of signs as a process of “de-hierarchization of theatrical means” that 
“blatantly contradicts tradition, which has preferred a hypotactical way of connection that 
governs the super – and subordination of elements in order to avoid confusion and to 
produce harmony and comprehensibility” (86). And, he adds: 
we can repeatedly note a non-hierarchical use of signs that aims at a 
synaesthetic perception and contradicts the established hierarchy, at the 
top of which we find language, diction and gesture and in which visual 
qualities—such as an experience of an architectonic space—if they come 
into play at all—figure as subordinate aspects (86) 
But, in my contention, in his attempt to grasp theatrical praxis that is not 
subordinate to teleologically oriented storytelling designed to produce illusions of totality 
and wholeness, Lehmann neglects that the hierarchy that emerges from the power 
relations between a logocentric and formalized whole, on the one hand, and the parts that 
are in service to this whole, on the other, is not the only hierarchy there is or can be. 
Lehmann also seems to neglect that the word parataxis (παράταξις)—as one Greek 
etymology suggests—implies things being put in order by an authority. Furthremore 
parataxis as a living term within frames of Greek everyday life is closely associated with 
deeply hierarchical formations like for instance political parties and the military.  
I contend that Lehmann’s “de-hierarchization” allows two other interconnected 
hierarchies not only to emerge but also to remain hidden and unaddressed. The first one 
regards to the production of the works Lehmann understands as non-hierarchical. In 
Postdramatic Theatre Lehmann completely overlooks that the works he defines as non-
hierarchical—for instance the works of Robert Wilson or Jan Fabre (19)—are works 
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where the artists have absolute power over their creations and that this absolutism of the 
artist remains unchallenged or gets to be enhanced by the scattering of the signs.  
The second hierarchy regards the power relations and asymmetries among the 
multiplicities of signs. Lehmann disregards that the multiple particularities of signs—
especially because the latter are always already overcharged with meanings irreducible to 
one signification—relate to each other via multiple power relations and asymmetries. In 
both of these cases the destruction of one hierarchy does not eliminate hierarchy once and 
for all but lays the ground for multiple hierarchies to emerge. Instead of the domination 
of the whole we are left with dominations of some of the parts—the artist included—not 
in relation to a whole but in relation to other parts. But unfortunately that does not 
decenter or de-hierarchize domination. Therefore I contend that the emphasis should not 
be placed on processes of hierarchization and de-hierarchization but on productions of 
continuities and disruptions.  
In the following paragraphs I argue that Oresteia by Houvardas conceptualized 
power not in terms of the domination of the whole over its parts but in terms of the 
domination of some parts over other parts. I contend that in this particular production of 
Oresteia that domination of some parts over other parts emerged from the multiple 
productions of topographic continuities and atopic disruptions. Furthermore I examine 
how the works of Deleuze and Guattari offer the theoretical tools that can grasp these 
relations between performances of power and productions of continuities and disruptions. 
In this particular production of Oresteia the domination of some of the parts/ signs did 
not emerge from the resistance of the latter against a whole that was becoming something 
other and/ or more than its parts, but from parts/ signs that, when put together with other 
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signs, became something other and/ or more than other parts. The intensification of the 
atopic and topographic temporalities of the signs made this domination of some of the 
parts in relation to other parts more visible and explicit. They also dramatized how this 
domination of some of the parts is often hidden beneath promises of a whole that are 
designed to remain elusive.  
For Deleuze and Guattari this kind of spatiotemporal doing and undoing serves as 
a great stage for us to observe and grasp the domination of parts over other parts. In Anti-
Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari write: “[this] non-localizable intercommunications and 
dispersed localizations [are] bringing into play processes of temporalization, fragmented 
formations and detached parts, with a surplus value of code, and where the whole is itself 
produced alongside the parts, as a part apart or, as Butler would say, ‘in another 
department’ that fits the whole over the other parts” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 286-
287). On a conceptual level, for Deleuze and Guattari this production of the whole 
“alongside the parts” is produced by what Deleuze and Guattari understand as a 
“machine.”  
Although providing a singular definition for Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of 
machine would be a topic for a whole book since the concept itself, throughout Deleuze 
and Guattari’s works, transforms into, among others, abstract-machines, desiring-
machines, social-machines, War-machines and so on, for now I would like to briefly 
describe machine as a group of heterogeneous and “disparate” (343) elements that 
produces “interruptions or breaks” (38). In Chaosophy — a collection of interviews of 
Deleuze and Guattari as well as essays that Guattari wrote between 1969 and 1992 — 
Guattari writes, “For the machine possesses two characteristics of powers: the power of 
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the continuum (…) but also the rupture in direction” (Guattari, 2007: 96). Additionally, in 
Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari write: “In a word, every machine functions as a break 
in the flow in relation to the machine to which it is connected, but at the same time is also 
a flow itself, or the production of a flow, in relation to the machine connected to it” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2009: 36). Oresteia produced “continuums” and “ruptures” 
through the atopic and topographic performances of the multiple signs.  
Echoing Deleuze and Guattari, Oresteia, connected two actual machines together: 
the machine of the gramophone and the machine of the gigantic box placed upstage 
center. On the one hand the gramophone kept playing songs by Vembo, Greka and 
Mendri dedicated to Greek resistance during the years of occupation. On the other hand 
the gigantic box kept changing colors and appearances and producing different sounds. It 
performed as a door that only Klytemnestra could use in order to come out to the stage, as 
a guard tower on which the Guard guarded the boarders of the city, as a static on stage 
machina that both Apollo and Athena had to access—as opposed to the deus ex machina 
where the machine is the tool that gives access to the gods—in order to perform their 
monologues, as Orestis’s prison when he was haunted by the Erinyes and finally, as a 
death machine that vomited out the dead bodies of Agamemnon and Kassandra. The 
sounds of resistance produced by the gramophonic machine—sounds that were also 
implying a topographic continuity in terms of resistance in Greece during the decade 
between 1940 and 1950—were continuously interrupted by a death machine—the 
gigantic box—that via its multiple performances, inscribed sounds onto the production of 
pain and death. Additionally, just like Deleuze and Guattari predicted, the gigantic box—
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a machine that was a part among other parts—got to perform as a whole “alongside the 
parts.”  
Through the machine of the gigantic box Oresteia staged conceptualizations of 
power in terms of domination of parts over other parts that—like a machine—combines 
heterogeneous elements and produces both continuities and disruptions of all sorts of 
flows through inscribing sounds onto their “authorized” production of pain and death. In 
Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Nietzsche’s works on tragedy and 
introduce the notion of “phonographic connection” (191), from the Greek phoni (φωνή, 
voice) and the Greek graphein (γραφειν, write), in order to describe the cruelty of 
inscription of unwritten laws: what Deleuze and Guattari call “the coding of pain and 
death” (192). How was that relevant to what Greece was experiencing?  
 Twenty-first century Eurozone is a surplus economy founded upon the 
asymmetrical and non-resolvable power relations between its parts: the creditor member-
states of the European North and the debtor member-states of the European South 
(Lazzarato 2015, Varoufakis 2016). Greece is part of the latter. The surplus economy of 
the Eurozone does not perform as a whole that becomes something other and/ or more 
than its parts but as a machine that, just like Oresteia’s box machine, brings together 
asymmetrical and heterogeneous parts so that some of these parts dominate others. This 
domination is exercised through non-institutional formations like the Eurogroup. 
Additionally, this domination is based on decisions that are made behind closed doors, 
only to be verbally announced as de facto rules that will be forcefully imposed onto 
elected national parliaments in order to conceal the commanding sounds of their voices 
(phoni, φωνή) beneath the productions of written laws on a national level. But, just like in 
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Oresteia’s box machine, it is the sound of these decisions that inscribes pain and death. 
The written law is designed to infinitely remain one of the parts that are dominated. 
4.2.3 The limited chorus, the unuttered intervention of Athena and the indebtedness 
of Orestis and Erinyes   
 Houvarda’s production of the Oresteia trilogy lasted 2 hours and 15 minutes. In 
order to achieve that duration, the production’s translator, Dimitris Dimitriadis, limited 
the parts of the chorus and placed particular emphasis on the dialogic parts of Oresteia. In 
one of his interviews, Houvardas stated that he wanted to  
create a very dynamic team of actors that would do all the work, including 
the ‘clean’ and the ‘dirty’ work. Something like a theatre gang, with 
common codes and conspiratorial relations, flexible, bonded but 
theatrically fearless. Furthermore I was interested in staging the whole 
trilogy without the exhaustion of a 3-4 hour performance. It was important 
to me that the audience watched carefully the last and, in my opinion, the 
most important part of the trilogy, “Evmenides.” Therefore […] we 
focused on the dialogical aspects of the play getting from the parts of the 
chorus the ones with the most intense poetic volume. (Dimadi 2016)  
Houvarda’s choice to limit the chorika (χορικά, the parts of the chorus) was 
unexpectedly welcomed by the audience of the festival. The audience of the Athens & 
Epidaurus Festival often expresses its disapproval through catcalls and through leaving 
the theatre before the end of the show. Oresteia’s premiere ended with almost no catcalls. 
Furthermore very few people left the theatre of Epidaurus during the show. I described 
the audience’s welcoming of this particular production of Oresteia as unexpected because 
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the majority of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival consists of tourists and of theatre-goers 
that go to the ancient theatre of Epidaurus in order to experience an actualization of the 
highly problematic narratives that not only dictate a relation between notions of 
authenticity, on the one hand, and Greek theatre and Greek tragedy on the other, but also 
that they dictate how this pre-set understanding of “authentic Greek tragedy” should look 
like on stage.  
This audience is not usually willing to reflect critically on the very important 
political stakes of these constructed narratives and to eventually welcome theatre that 
disrupts them. That said, since the administration of Giorgos Loukos in 2006—an 
administration that ended in early 2016 for reasons that I will examine in the third and 
last part of this section—the festival includes more experimental theatre and avant-garde 
performances creating a polyphony of artistic voices.   
Although Houvarda’s choice to limit the parts of the chorus was unexpectedly 
welcomed by the festival’s audience it was not welcomed by theatre-critics. Matina 
Kaltaki—a theatre-critic that publishes in LiFO—made one of the most severe criticisms. 
According to Kaltaki “this was not Oresteia […] if the director distorts the form (through 
for instance cutting the parts of the chorus) he distorts the content that was always 
already distorted from turning the prototype into a pocket version” (Kaltaki 2016). My 
disagreement with Kaltaki can be traced on two different levels. On a level of 
conceptualizing theatre as poetic praxis I contend that theatre not only can but has to 
experiment with the inter-linkages between content and form. On a level of this particular 
production of Oresteia, I contend that Houvarda’s choice to cut down the parts of the 
chorus was more than a “pocket” choice.  
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 Cutting down the parts of the chorus not only shrunk the trilogy’s time but it also 
reduced the “distance” between the chorus and Oresteia’s protagonists. In this particular 
production the chorus consisted of three chorus-leaders that were all the time fully 
merged with the rest of the actors. Furthermore in many occasions during the show the 
actors merged with the chorus-leaders and performed as chorus. This blurring of the 
boundaries between the chorus and the protagonists not only gave the chorus access to 
structures that could only be accessed by the protagonists but also limited the elitism of 
the latters. Although in terms of Aeschylus’ text Houvardas did reduce the chorika, in 
terms of on-stage performance the role of the chorus was enhanced.  
 For Friedrich Nietzsche understanding chorus as sufficient in itself rather than as 
defined through a dichotomy between itself and the protagonists was of great importance. 
Not on a level of actual theatre production but on a level of philosophy of tragedy 
Nietzsche challenges discourses that impose dichotomies between the chorus and the rest 
of the actors. In The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit of Music Nietzsche argues that:  
“the tradition [that] tells us quite categorically that tragedy arose from the 
tragic chorus […] obliges us to penetrate to the core of this tragic chorus 
as the true primal drama, disregarding the usual aesthetic clichés: that it is 
the ideal viewer of that it represents the populace as against the nobble of 
the drama proper” (Nietzsche 2009: 35).  
And he adds, “this latter interpretation” if found “edifying” by “certain 
politicians” because it suggests that “the immutable moral law of the democratic 
Athenians was represented in the popular chorus, always correct in its appraisal of the 
passionate misdeeds and extravagance of the kings” (35). Leaving aside Nietzsche’s 
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highly problematic arguments that are oriented around notions of originality, I contend 
that the connections he establishes between means of political leverage and narratives 
that understand the chorus as the representatives of the “populace” or the “demos”, reveal 
that those who have access to decision-making processes use notions of representational 
inclusion in order to exclude the ones who they claim to include. These narratives/ means 
of political leverage conceal that the chorus is excluded in the name of a promise of 
inclusion that is well designed to remain elusive. 
 As a result Nietzsche turns to A. W. Schegel in order to find philosophies of 
tragedy that understand the chorus not in terms if inclusion-exclusion but in terms of, 
what later discourses will define as, affect. Nietzsche reminds us that for Schegel the 
chorus is the “ideal spectator” (36) because it positions itself “on stage” allowing “the 
world on stage to affect him not in an aesthetic way but in a physically empirical way” 
(37) calling for other spectators to do the same. The question is to be affected by what? In 
regards to this question Nietzsche draws upon Schiller and argues that, “the chorus is a 
living wall against encroaching reality because it […] depicts existence more truly, more 
authentically, more complete than the man of culture who sees himself as the sole reality. 
The realm of poetry […] wishes to […] cast off the mendacious finery of the supposed 
reality of the man of culture” (37). From this point of view theatrical tragedy destroys the 
illusions of reality on stage. If a forth wall is created it is only for protecting the staged 
destruction of the illusions of reality by the illusions of reality. 
 According to Nietzsche one of the most dangerous illusions of reality is the one 
that disguises all sorts of absolute power—what in my contention Nietzsche understands 
as the “Apollonian masks”— as inclusive and democratic in terms of access of both its 
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production and its exertion. For Nietzsche “Aeschylus places the Olympian world on his 
scale of justice” (48). But although Aeschylus stages how justice transforms from 
something constructed to something deified he never destroys that illusion of deification, 
or as Nietzsche says “he does not plumb the full depths of its terrors” (49). I contend that 
this is exactly what Houvarda’s Oresteia did: it revealed the terrors of absolute power 
especially when the latter is hidden beneath the appearance of justice. 
 Earlier I described how Houvarda’s choice to cut down the chorika from 
Aeschylus’s text intensified the presence of the chorus on stage. Drawing upon 
Nietzsche—and his interpretations of Schegel and Schiller—I laid the conceptual ground 
so that the blurring between the chorus and Oresteia’s protagonists is understood in terms 
of unraveling of one of the illusions that absolute power constructs; as I have been 
arguing since the beginning of this section absolute power is founded upon promises of 
inclusion that are designed to remain elusive. It is this elusiveness of these promises that 
Houvarda’s Oresteia dramatized.  
 In the last part of this particular production of Oresteia’s trilogy—the part of 
Evmenides—Athena, right after she announced her decision to institutionalize justice, she 
moved to the theatre’s second diazoma (διάζωµα, frieze), right in the middle of the 
audience, in order to choose the “best citizens” (Liouliou 2016: 62)—according to 
Demetriades’s translation of Aeschylus’s text—that would participate in Orestis’s trial. 
While—only after upon Athena’s call—Oresteia’s spectators were emptying the 
audience space from spectators by moving towards the stage, everyone on stage was 
turning into a spectator spectating Athena who positioned herself on top of everyone else. 
On the one hand there was Athena that emptied and occupied the space of the spectators 
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and on the other hand there was the stage that besides the ghost of Klytemnestra, Apollo 
and Orestis it included the audience members that were “chosen” and promised that they 
would participate in the decision-making process of Orestis’s trial and the Erinyes that 
consisted of the chorus leaders, Agamemnon, Aigisthos, the Guard and the Messenger.  
Athena emptied and occupied the space of the spectators and positioned herself on 
top of both that space and the stage. The stage momentarily blurred the boundaries 
between actors and spectators, and the chorus and the protagonists, in order for Athena to 
turn it into a spectator. Schegel’s “ideal spectator” was fully affected by the unraveling of 
the illusions beneath which absolute power remains hidden. Houvarda’s Oresteia 
dramatized how absolute power conceals its exclusive production and exertion beneath 
promises of inclusion that are designed to remain elusive. 
At this moment, the moment during which Athena sent the citizens of her choice 
on stage—leaving the excluded ones fully unnoticed and unheard— turned everyone on 
stage into a spectators in the name of an elusive and fake promise of inclusion, occupied 
both the space of the stage and the space of the spectators and positioned herself outside 
and higher than both, Oresteia revealed one of the most efficacious foundations of 
absolute power. As Giorgio Agamben reminds us in the State of Exception—one of the 
most important contemporary understandings of Carl Schmitt’s notion of state of 
exception—“Being-outside, and yet belonging: this is the topological structure of the 
state of exception, and only because the sovereign, who decides on the exception, is, in 
truth, logically defined in his being by the exception, can he too be defined by the 
oxymoron ecstasy-belonging” (Agamben 2005: 30). Drawing upon Agamben I contend 
that this ecstatic topology of absolute power is founded upon its hypocritical capacity to 
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hide its production and exertion beneath pseudo-promises of participatory agency and 
inclusivity. I also contend that, because of its hypocritical capacity, the production and 
exertion of absolute power is performed, paraphrasing Shakespeare, “out of joint”: fully 
unuttered.  
Once the citizens of her choice moved from the auditorium to the stage Athena 
positioned herself on the top of the gigantic box-machine. From the top the box-
machine—the machine that during the entire performance was inscribing pain and death 
onto bodies—Athena initiated the voting process for the trial by voting for Orestis and by 
announcing that in case of a tie her vote will prevail. Following Aeschylus’s text in this 
production of Oresteia the number of votes against Orestis ended up being equal to the 
number of votes for Orestis. As a result Athena imposed her initial decision without 
justifying or being asked to justify her power to do so. As opposed to the scenes before 
and after Athena’s decision, in this particular production of Oresteia, the moment when 
Athena decides to acquit Orestis was designed to be performed fast and remain relatively 
unnoticed. The decision-making process behind Orestis’s acquittal remained fully 
unuttered and fully hidden beneath the process of the trial; the institutionalized and 
elusive promise of participatory inclusion that was predestined to be ignored.  
 In addition to the unuttered aspect of Athena’s decision to acquit Orestis and her 
use of institutionalized justice in order to legitimize that unuttered aspect, Houvarda’s 
Oresteia dramatized Orestis’s acquittal not as a resolution but as a condition of infinite 
indebtedness to Athena. According to Demetriades’s translation of Aeschylus text, during 
his defense of Orestis Apollo promised Athena that, “he [Orestis] be eternally faithful to 
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you so that you can win, Goddess, allies him and his decedents” (Liouliou 2016: 65). But 
Orestis was not the only one who remained indebted to Athena. 
From a dramaturgical and directorial perspective, Houvardas synthesized 
Orestis’s condition with Evmenides’s infinite indebtedness to Athena. In his interview in 
“Το Βήµα” (Vima) newspaper, Houvardas talked about Erinyes’s transformation to 
Evmenides in terms of an asymmetrical and non-resolvable exchange that renders 
Erinyes infinitely indebted to Athena: “The Erinyes that are transformed to Evmenides 
are bought by Athena. It is as if they are taking ministries given by Athena. They are 
‘redeemed’ but they [remain] under the edifice of Athena” (To Βήµα 2016). This 
production of Oresteia dramatized the destruction of what Nietzsche in The Birth of 
Tragedy defines as “redemption by illusion” (Nietzsche 1993: 25). This production of 
Oresteia showed that Erinyes’s redemption was nothing but an illusion that beautified 
that Erinyes were bought off and silenced by Athena.  
This redemption by illusion echoed post-referendum Greece: where the left 
government of SYRIZA, from resisting Erinyes, was forcefully transformed to silenced 
and “redeemed” Evmenides infinitely indebted to Greece’s international creditors. On a 
stage level, after this unequal exchange between Athena, on the one hand, and Orestis 
and the Erinyes/ Evmenides on the other was established, Athena remained on the top of 
the box-machine and Orestis and Erinyes sat on the stage’s living rooms that since the 
beginning of the third part of the trilogy had been covered with huge, transparent covers 
made of plastic. Once Pythia entered the stage everyone started singning in an ironic and 
mocking way Kakia Mendri’s song “Life Restarts for Us” (Η Ζωή Ξαναρχίζει για Εµάς): 
a song created by Andrea Poggis (music) and Kostas Karfiniwtis (lyrics) in 1947 and 
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associated with the very much desired end of the Greek civil war that started in 1946 and 
ended in 1949.  
But Athena’s voice was louder. Also, while everyone was signing, Pythia 
distributed to Evmenides flyers with the lyrics of the song so that Evmenides sang along 
with Athena without voicing anything other than what Athena wanted them to voice. 
Athena’s sound—coming from the top of the box-machine—turned into texts that were 
then inscribed onto the bodies of the Evmenides; onto the bodies of those who were 
rendered infinitely indebted. Once the song was over, Pythia ordered everyone to 
“maintain pandemic silence” (ΕΡΤ 2016) and everyone covered themselves with the 
plastic, transparent covers. Athena remained on top of the box-machine waving like a 
politician. The play ended with the box-machine producing one last deafening sound. 
 
Picture taken by Daniel Dilliplane 
This specific production of Oresteia made clear that absolute power produces 
institutions not only in order to conceal and legitimize its performance outside these 
institutions by rendering this performance fully unuttered but also in order to turn its 
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sounds—sounds that inscribe pain and death onto certain bodies—into legitimized texts. 
Drawing a parallel trajectory between this production of Oresteia and Greece during the 
years of 2015-2016 I contend that it was exactly this kind of conceptualization of power 
that the left government of SYRIZA—a government that was elected because of its 
promise to resist politics of debt—failed to grasp and address. In my contention, the stage 
of Oresteia, that through the mixing of the chorus with the play’s protagonists blurred 
notions of agency and spectatorship only to be transformed and turned by the absolute 
power of Athena into a spectator, was Greece two days before the Greek referendum of 
July 2015.  
On July 3 2015 millions of people—including members of the Greek government 
of SYRIZA and other αντιµνηµονιακά (anti-memorandum) parties of the Greek 
parliament—occupied Greece’s public squares, parks, streets and buildings in order to 
publically say “NO” to the severe austerity measures that Greece’s international creditors 
were about to impose on Greece. This blurring between the Greek parliament and the 
Greek electorate was particularly intensified on Syntagma square in Athens, when the 
Greek prime minister and president of SYRIZA, Alexis Tsipras, stepped out from 
Maximos Mansion—the official seat of the prime minister of Greece that is located near 
the Greek Parliament—and joined the demonstration. But the illusion of inclusion lasted 
no more than one day: the day of the referendum.  
According to the results of the referendum the 61.31% of the voters rejected the 
EC, ECB and IMF’s proposal. After a very long and painful “negotiating fight” the 
government of SYRIZA, like the “redeemed” and silenced Erinyes, ended up signing a 
third memorandum between Greece and its international creditors. Just like the actors of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   203	  
Oresteia, both the Greek government and the Greek electorate were transformed into 
passive spectators whose actions were “allowed” to be taken, only to be ignored by 
“informal bodies” like the eurogroup. Just like Athena’s voice silenced the voices of the 
chorus on stage, the third memorandum silenced the voice of the Greek bailout 
referendum of 2015.  
Within frames of 21st century European Union and Eurozone informal bodies like 
the eurogroup are not minuted—keeping their discussions and processes opaque—are not 
answerable to any elected parliament, are stronger than any other institutional formation 
of the European Union and they have the power to impose the sounds of their decisions—
decisions that are announced as unchangeable facts—onto parliaments and other 
institutionalized formations in order to legitimize them as laws. Furthermore, just like in 
the case of Orestis and Erinyes/ Evmenides, the resolution that the third memorandum 
offered was not an actual resolution but a perpetuation of Greece’s asymmetrical and 
non-resolvable condition of indebtedness to its creditors hidden beneath the promise of a 
resolution that is designed to remain elusive.  
 
4.2.4 Jan Fabre and the 2016 Athens & Epidaurus Festival  
 In the next pages I would like to briefly elaborate on the processes of production 
of Oresteia’s production and Oresteia’s larger position within the Athens and Epidaurus 
Festival: Greece’s biggest festival that takes place every summer in different venues all 
over Greece. The intention behind this brief elaboration is to differentiate theatre that 
very fearlessly addresses the cruel asymmetries and power relations that are always 
already embedded in its production—like for instance, in my contention, Oresteia did—
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from theatre that pretends to be non-hierarchical only to hide the deeply hierarchical 
organization of both its surrounding materiality and its own production. In the first 
section of this essay I argued that Lehmann fell into the trap of the second kind of theatre 
production and understood deeply hierarchical theatre as “non-hierarchical” theatre. I 
used Lehmann’s understanding of Jan Fabre’s art in order to support my arguments. 
Fabre was not a random choice. 
On February 9 2016, with zero transparency and without initiating any dialogue 
between the ministry and the unions of the artists that labor for the Athens and Epidaurus 
Festival, Aristides Baltas—the at the time Greece’s minister of culture and athleticism— 
announced that “the new artistic director of the Athens & Epidaurus Festival will be Jan 
Fabre” (Υπουργείο Πολιτισµού και Αθλητισµού, Δελτία Τύπου 2016). Although much 
can be said about the incongruity between SYRIZA’s left orientations and the way the 
ministry of Culture and Athleticism decided to hire Jan Fabre as the artistic director of 
the Athens & Epidaurus Festival, for now I would like to place particular emphasis on 
how Fabre’s work, both as an administrative director, or as “the festival’s curator” 
(CameraStyloOnline 2016) as he called himself, and as an artist. I contend that, on both 
an artistic and administrative level, Fabre concealed the production and exertion of 
absolute power beneath elusive promises of inclusion and “wholeness” that produced and 
legitimized cruel hierarchies. Bridging this thought process to my criticism of Lehmann’s 
notion of postdramatic theatre—a criticism that was introduced in the beginning of this 
chapter—I will closely examine the political stakes of Lehmann’s understanding of 
Fabre. 
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Fabre visited Athens only to announce his plans and decisions regarding the 
festival. On March 29 2016 Fabre called for a press conference in order to announce the 
festival’s program and to introduce his main collaborators. Greek artists, directors, actors 
and performers were fully excluded not only from the process of the press conference but 
also from both the festival’s program and the team of Fabre’s collaborators, except for 
the festival’s vice president Yianna Theodoratou.  
After Fabre introduced his collaborators in full absentia of the artists who labor 
for the festival, he projected a picture of Belgium’s national football team and stated, “I 
would like to start with this slide […] to the ladies, that’s the men’s national soccer team 
of Belgium.” And he added,  
I chose this symbol for different reasons […] first of all my first year will 
be about Belgium […] because I know the country […] Also, the [players 
of] the Belgium national team are not only Flemish, but they have a 
background from Ukraine, from Uganda, Turkish roots, different 
nationalities, that’s also Belgium, that’s also Europe. Essentially the first 
year of the festival will be about this. We invite people who live in 
Belgium, work in Belgium, essentially this pluralistic society, this open 
society” (CameraStyloOnline 2016).  
In addition to his gendered and sexist offering of “further clarification” to the female 
population of the room regarding the men’s national soccer team of Belgium, Fabre 
legitimized the absolutism of what earlier I understood as an absolutism of the part—in 
this case an absolutism of the part with very specific nationalistic undertones—in the 
name of “pluralistic openness”. 
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But, according to Fabre, this “pluralistic openness” can be plural and open only 
when it is dictated by Fabre, only when it is performed in Fabre’s terms, and only when it 
serves as a stage for Fabre’s works and vision. Fabre’s “pluralistic openness” was not 
open enough to include those who labor for the festival, those who go to the festival, 
those who pay for the festival through their taxes, those who administer the festival and 
so on. In response to Fabre’s absolutism, on April 1 2016 more than 500 actors gathered 
in Σφενδόνη (Sfendoni) theatre in Athens and demanded from both minister Baltas and 
Fabre to resign.  
Apparently Fabre’s “pluralistic openness” was not open enough to include those 
who challenge him. As a result, Fabre resigned. But he announced his resignation, not to 
the ministry that hired him, but via the Belgian newspaper l’ Avenir: “I accepted the 
proposal made by the Greek minister of culture under the condition that I would be 
absolutely free to make my artistic choices. I don’t think that something like that is 
possible in Greece. I don’t want to work in this hostile environment to which I came with 
open mind and open heart” (Το Βήµα 2016). Freedom, including artistic freedom, does 
not mean that one has the absolute power to conduct experiemnts on the backs of others 
and when the others resist that they are narrow minded. 
The kind of freedom that emerges from absolute power and cruel hierarchies is 
not freedom; it is just power. This is exactly what Lehmann’s understanding of “non-
hierarchical” theatre fails to grasp allowing the absolutism of the part to legitimize itself 
in the most invisible ways. Fabre ignored, or chose to ignore, that his choices could not 
be isolated from Greece’s socio-political contexts. Within frames of 21st century 
neoliberalism we need theatre and concepts that address fearlessly the existing power 
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relations and not theatre and concepts that conceal those relations in order to make them 
stronger. This particular production of Oresteia was not part of the program that Fabre 
announced during the press conference on March 29 2016. Fabre legitimized its 
exclusion—like every other exclusion—in the name of “pluralistic openness.” By 
dramatizing the destruction of these kinds of fake promises and masks Oresteia became 
more real than the life that is often defined by absolutisms of parts that perform as wholes 
and that pretend to include difference only to cruelly exclude and erase it.  
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Non-Epilogue 
 The concept of tragedy that this dissertation introduces understands the relations 
between a creditor and a debtor as disproportionate, asymmetrical, lopsided, non-
resolvable power relations, hidden beneath promises of resolution that nevertheless 
remain elusive. It is because of the conceptual capacity of this notion of tragedy to 
understand the interrelations between conditions of indebtedness, on the one hand, and 
non-dialectical, or most accurately dialectically unresolved, tensions between a creditor 
and a debtor, on the other, that I content that the notion of tragedy that this dissertation 
introduces is valid in 2015-2016 indebted Greece. As this dissertation demonstrates, 
when contextualized within frames of 21st century European debt-economy and 2015-
2016 indebted Greece, this specific concept of tragedy does not only grasp performances 
of power, but also it introduces revolutionary praxes of resistance.  
 The initial idea for this project though did not emerge from Greece’s actual, 
political realities. On the contrary it emerged from my familiarization with the production 
of American discourse—mostly on an educational level—on tragedy. When I came to the 
US I realized that dialectically oriented understandings of tragedy are more popular than 
understandings of tragedy that are conceptually closer to the notion of tragedy that this 
dissertation suggests. Elaborating on why, within specific sociopolitical and geopolitical 
contexts, certain philosophies of tragedy—both in terms of discursive and theatre and 
performance production—become more popular over others, and how these philosophies 
of tragedy relate to revolutionary praxis of resistance, is one of the many projects that this 
dissertation introduces and need further elaboration.  
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As described in this dissertation’s Anti-Prologue, it was not until the “NO” 
demonstration that took place two days before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015, that 
the idea of examining how a contemporary philosophy of tragedy informs praxes of 
resistance that are valid in current frames of European debt-economy, became more 
crystalized. The political turmoil in Greece during the years of 2015 and 2016 intensified 
the need for a more detailed exploration of that idea. Between 2015 and 2016 everyone 
was talking about the “tragedy of the Greek debt crisis”: activists, journalists, artists, 
Greece’s international creditors, Greece’s left government of SYRIZA and so forth. It 
was because of all these very repetitive but yet very different references to tragedy that I 
decided to investigate the contingencies between these references to tragedy and the need 
for a rigorous philosophy of tragedy that addresses the political stakes of notions of 
indebtedness. 
The final “push” was given during the “NO” demonstration when Christos 
Thivaios—one of the many artists that performed during the demonstration—shouted into 
the microphone: “we owe more to our poets than we owe to our creditors.” In contexts of 
lived Greek language and Greek public discourse, tragedy is a poetic praxis always 
already politically charged. The “NO” demonstration staged that political praxis in terms 
of resistance against conditions of imposed indebtedness. On a level of performance 
philosophy, and more particularly on a level of philosophy of tragedy, Deleuze and later 
Deleuze and Guattari, traced these interrelations between notions of tragedy, 
performances of power and of resistance and conditions of indebtedness in Nietzsche’s 
works on tragedy. Although I had been working on the interplay between the works of 
Deleuze and Guattari and notion of performance for a really long time, it was not until 
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the “NO” demonstration that I started rereading both Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia and A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia through a lens of 
philosophy of tragedy that sheds light on aspects of 21st century European debt-economy 
that the discourse of political economy leaves relatively unexamined.  
Even though the works on the political economy of debt that this dissertation 
draws upon—like for instance the works of Maurizio Lazzarato and David Graeber—
examine in the most critical ways the production of debt, I contend that they need to be 
complemented with more conceptually abstract understandings of conditions of 
indebtedness, like the one that this dissertation proposes. This is also something that I 
would like to explore more in the future. I am particularly interested in how the 
philosophy of tragedy that this dissertation introduces, performs as a conceptual lens that 
grasps the non-dialectics of European debt-economy and the non-dialectics of potential 
praxes of resistance against politics of debt and austerity.  
 In addition to a philosophy of tragedy that is valid in 21st century European debt-
economy, this dissertation’s emphasis is also placed on the very fertile tensions between 
notions of performance and the works of Deleuze and Guattari. This dissertation 
“applied” this fertile tension between Deleuze and Guattari, on the one hand, and 
performance, on the other, on the following case studies: the negotiations between the 
Greek government of SYRIZA and Greece’s international creditors, the “YES” and “NO” 
demonstrations that took place before the Greek bailout referendum of 2015, Efthimiou’s 
production of Anouilh’s Antigone, the two EU-Turkey statements on migrants, the 
photography exhibition organized by St. Antony de Padua in Istanbul, the “Roads of 
Survival” exhibition organized by the government of SYRIZA, the MARCH IN 
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SOLIDARITY WITH MIGRANTS/ REFUGEES AND SELF ORGANIZED 
SOLIDARITY PROJECTS, Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck and 
finally Houvardas’ production of Oresteia.  
 Both in the Anti-Prologue and in the first chapter of this dissertation, titled “The 
Tragedy of the Greek Debt Crisis,” I introduce a philosophy of tragedy that grasps the 
dialectically unresolved tensions between a creditor and a debtor. I then apply this 
concept of tragedy on the negotiations between Greece and its international creditors that 
happened before and after the Greek bailout referendum of 2015. This discussion 
regarding the relevancy and the applicability of the concept of tragedy within current 
frames of European economy lays the conceptual ground for the rest of the chapters of 
this dissertation. “The Tragedy of the Greek Debt Crisis” implicitly argues that the 
European Union is not a unitary whole that rules over its different parts but an 
assemblage of the asymmetrically non-resolvable power relations between creditor 
nation-states and debtor nation-states. Within current frames of European debt-economy 
the memory of “paying back” is so internalized that it is forgotten as the new status quo. 
 The second chapter of this dissertation titled “Dromocratic Democracies” uses the 
notion of tragedy that the first chapter introduces in order to closely investigate the 
dynamic interplay between street performances and the need for non-discursive 
understandings of what performance studies theories define as “performatives.” I 
particularly draw upon the tensions between Austin and Deleuze and Guattari in order to 
investigate how street performances of resistance call for non-discursive, non-semiotic—
or, not merely discursive or not merely semiotic—understandings of the catchphrases that 
are used during these performances.  
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I then examine how, in the case of the “NO” demonstration, a response to this call 
that comes from the interlinkages between performance studies and Deleuze and Guattari 
studies, can grasp the emergence of new agents of resistance and revolution. 
“Dromocratic Democracies” argues that the mergence of the demos with the state can be 
one of those resisting and revolutionary agents. This is another project I would like to 
investigate more: How, within current frames of European debt-economy, a concept of 
tragedy that orients itself around the non-resolvable power relations between a creditor 
and a debtor can grasp the revolutionary potentialities of the mergence of the demos with 
the state without being reduced to a state philosophy. I am particularly interested in how 
the theatricalized mergence of the demos with the state becomes the stage for 
performances of resistance both in terms of produced precepts and affects.  
 This question that addresses the revolutionary capacities of the mergence of the 
demos with the state is particularly challenging since, as I argued in the beginning of the 
Non-Epilogue, according to specific discursive productions, notions of tragedy are often 
associated—even when that association occurs in terms of opposition—with the existence 
of a state that (re)presents its demos in ways that exceeds it. Tracing notions of tragedy 
and/or theatre and performance in non-state philosophies is also a project that I would 
like to explore in the near future.  
 The third chapter of this dissertation titled “Imperceptible Performances” looks at 
the two EU-Turkey statements on migrants, and at two photographic exhibitions and one 
street demonstration that were organized around the refugee camps and hotspots of 
Greece. Drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of imperceptibility the chapter 
argues that the political production and organization of perceptibility is founded upon 
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rendering the economic aspects of the political production and organization of 
perceptibility imperceptible. It traces implications of that argument in the tensions 
between the works of Deleuze and Guattari and the works of Hanah Arendt, Giorgio 
Agamben and Walter Benjamin.  
As chapter three demonstrates, at the threshold of European debt-economy the 
production of the EU-Turkey statements—statements that contradict the International 
Law on Refugees—performs not in terms of exception, as Agamben argues, but in terms 
of elusion and imperceptibility. Drawing upon this notion of imperceptibility the third 
chapter of my dissertation finally introduces the work of performance studies scholar 
Peggy Phelan in order to bridge the notion of imperceptible economy to notions of non-
representation and non-representability. As the chapter demonstrates the ones detained in 
the hotspots and refugee camps of Greece were rendered imperceptible only to labor as 
staged for the West to, once again, perform heroism. This interplay between the political 
economy of the refugees—a political economy that is founded upon rendering the 
economic power relations imperceptible—and notions of non-representation is also 
something that I would like to keep exploring.  
 Finally, the fourth chapter of this dissertation titled “Theatres of Dramatization” 
looks at Zero Point Theatre Group’s production of Woyzeck and Houvarda’s production 
of Oresteia. It closely investigates how Deleuze’s concept of dramatization resists 
notions of dialectics and notions of representation. The political stakes of the tensions 
between notions of performances and Deleuze’s notion of dramatization is also 
something that my research will keep exploring.  
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 My dissertation is a first draft of an ongoing project that is always in a state of 
flux. What I presented here is by no means definitive. On the contrary, it is a first attempt 
to explore how the interplay between Deleuze studies and Theatre and Performance 
studies sheds light on aspects of the debt and refugee crises that occur within the larger 
contexts of 21st century European debt economy that would otherwise remain 
unaddressed. A lot of the introduced concepts are still vague and the some of the 
connections between the case studies and the introduced theories might feel abrupt.  
My experience though as someone who had to migrate in order to survive the 
crisis, as someone who not just researches but lives the crisis, and, finally, as someone 
whose house in Greece is less than ten minutes away from the refugee camp of Eliniko, I 
contend that both the debt and refugee crises that our century faces need to be addressed 
in terms of asymmetrically non-resolvable power relations. Both in the Anti-Prologue and 
the first chapter of this dissertation I argued that power performs in what Nietzsche, 
through his focus on tragedy, conceptualized as the force of Dionysus; a force that both 
destroys and hides behind masks that produce illusions of resolution. The challenge for 
resistance is to do the same.  
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